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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to provide a better understanding of the impact that 
the Single European Sky, and more broadly European air law, could have on the inter-
Members relationship, with respect to liability issues. The aspects explored are its 
main aims, the ‘old’ regime of liability, the changes brought by the SES Regulation 
and finally, how it could be improved. By showing the advantages of the proposal, this 
research highlights the hypothesis that the Single European Sky will not bring any 
changes to the current liability framework; on the contrary, it will further blur the 
general picture by adding a layer of fragmentation. 
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Introduction  
This research project intends to provide a better understanding of the impact the 
Single European Sky (SES), and more broadly European air law, could have on the 
liability issues between Member States. My thesis seeks to show that the Single 
European Sky will not bring any major changes to the current liability framework; on 
the contrary, it will further blur the general picture by adding a layer of fragmentation. 
 
In the last few decades, the institutions of the European Union are more willing to 
push Europeanization to its maximum extent, whereas Member States have become 
increasingly protective towards the last bits of full sovereignty they exercise on fields 
that may possibly be harmonized by the Union without conflicting with the provisions 
of the Treaties. This conflict can be exemplified by looking at the Single European 
Sky, an ambitious project, but hardly a success. In fact this initiative was launched in 
1999, but its intended outcome has not yet been achieved. Some progress has been 
obtained in 2004 through the enactment of four Regulations by the Commission, 
which have been revised in 2009 and supplemented by another Regulation. Yet, the 
Single European Sky is to become a reality.  
 
We may say that the Single European Sky is the equivalent of the internal market 
but then in airspace as it aims to eliminate national borders in the sky. Instead of being 
divided into 28 countries there will only be nine blocks of States.   
 
Before, the Commission began to legislate over the creation of a single sky, the 
situation within Europe was disastrously inefficient. The airspace was submitted to 15 
different national air traffic control systems and divided into even more complicated 
sectors. As a consequence, airplanes were not always allowed to take the most direct 
routes to their destination, which is still the case today. This resulted not only in 
additional fuel costs and air control charges, t ultimately paid by the passengers, but 
also in serious environmental issues such as higher emission of CO2 due to an 
excessive consumption of fuel.  
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Given the needs and potential benefits of this project, one may wonder why the 
SES is still not yet completed and functioning. One reason for this delay may be 
imputed to the fact that some Member States are unwilling to give up their power over 
airspace control. One other reason is that the SES Regulations as they stand are not 
complete enough and leave many unresolved issues to be dealt with. For instance, 
since the SES will create a switch from national to supranational control, liability rules 
should be clearly determined, otherwise when a collision occurs major legal issues 
may be raised. 
 
The more clearly defined the tasks are, the easiest it is to establish liability. This is, 
basically, where the Regulations of the Single European Sky, and in general the law 
regarding space, fails to be clear and concise. Not explicitly addressing liabilities is a 
first serious defect: 28 different national regimes exist, and the SES regulations do not 
provide a unified regime, nor does it establish clearly what national laws will be 
applicable. Instead, the relationships between the various actors are intricate and the 
distinctions between their tasks are blurry.  
 
This uncertainty provides the background for the main research issue to be 
addressed in this thesis: How will the liability framework change with the 
implementation of the Single European Sky?  
 
Two steps must be taken in answering the main question: First, I will consider how 
liability is dealt with today, before the implementation of the SES. Then I will analyse 
the novelties introduced by the SES, and specify how such novelties have an impact 
on the identification of who will be liable, for what kind of damage and to what extent.  
 
Many articles have been published in the recent years on this topic. Most of themes 
articles focus on specific kinds of liabilities. In my view, it is important to offer a 
broader picture of the topic in order to discuss specific issues. Additionally, none 
provides a systematic analysis of the tasks allocated to different actors, a violation of 
which may result in a liability, under the SES regime. The thesis is only concerned 
with liability issues in cases of collisions, therefore the case of a bird becoming stuck 
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inside the engine of a plane and leading to a crash is out of the scope of this 
dissertation.  
 
 The development of my analysis of the liability questions in the Single European 
Sky takes the following path. First, a general introduction on the Single European Sky 
will be provided, illustrating the context and the purpose of SES. The reasons for the 
Commission to push the project towards implementation will be highlighted. I will 
also examine whether the SES is really needed or if, on the contrary, the situation may 
remain unchanged. Another chapter will be dedicated to the liability issues. This 
chapter will address various issues: first, the type of liability that can be found with 
respect to airspace law; second, the type of defects that could result into liability; 
finally, the liability of the different actors involved. The last section will examine both 
the liability of the actors involved as it was under the ‘old’ regime and how it is 
expected to be under SES regime, if any changes are to be noticed. Thirdly, I will turn 
to the problems that victims and States may encounter within a lawsuits or while filing 
a lawsuit. Finally, the last chapter concludes with some recommendations and 
remarks. 
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1. The concept behind the Single European Sky  
The major problem currently faced by European airspace is its fragmentation, 
leading to delays, longer flights, inefficiency and huge divergences in the quality of 
safety standards.1 The problem actually is the direct result of Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) being submitted to different legal systems.2 It might be surprising to hear that 
there are still borders in the airspace, while one of the biggest achievements of the 
internal market was precisely the abolishment of borders. In other words, there is an 
internal market but there never has been one air market, even after the full 
liberalization of the market in 1997.3 The segmentation of the European airspace is an 
obstacle to the full implementation of two fundamental European freedoms: the free 
movements of persons and goods. 
 
This section will start by sketching the general situation which the European 
airspace is currently facing (1.1).  Then the Regulations will be addressed to help the 
reader to understand the concept of the Single European Sky in order to avoid any 
misunderstanding of my claim (1.2). A brief history of the actions the Union took in 
order to ameliorate the situation in the airspace will be given(1.3). Then, the division 
of the FABs will be discussed (1.4). Some of the criticisms will be mentioned (1.5). 
The reason why the Commission wants it to be enumerated (1.6). Finally, the US 
system will be briefly discussed (1.7).  
  
                                                 
1 European Commission Mobility and Transport, ‘Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs)’  
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single_european_sky/fab/> accessed 9 June 2014; Commission, 
‘Building the Single European Sky through functional airspace blocks: A mid-term status report’ 
(Communication) COM (2007)101 final, p.5 
2 Belgocontrol, ‘Ciel Unique Européen: en route vers l’Europe’,  
<http://www.belgocontrol.be/belgoweb/publishing.nsf/Content/Single_European_Sky_FR> accessed 29 June 
2014 
3 Andreas Loewenstein, European Air Law: Towards a New System of International Air Transport Regulation 
(Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991), p. 48; Daniel Calleja Crespo and Timothy Fenoulhet, ‘The 
Single European Sky (SES): “Building Europe in the Sky”’, in Daniel Calleja Crespo and Pablo Mendes de Leon 
(eds), Achieving the Single European Sky: Goals and Challenges (p.3-9, Kluwer Law International, 2011), p.3 
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1.1 Why do we need the SES? 
Every day 26,000 aircrafts land at or depart from any given European airport.4 The 
airports are already considered saturated. It has been predicted that by 2030 this 
amount will double, reaching nearly 16.9 million flights per year.5 According to 
Eurocontrol6, for the period 2011-2018, the increase in traffic flow will be around 
16%.7 European airports are not ready for this situation and there has been a cry for 
changes.8 This inefficiency was caused by several factors, one of which being the 
complicated Air Traffic Management (ATM) and Air Navigation Service Providers 
(ANSPs) system.910 The problem started in the 90s with the liberal packages allowing 
European carriers to freely operate routes within the Union, leading to congestion of 
some airports.11 The losses generated by the antiquated ATM system, compared to 
other similar systems in the world, are assessed to be around 2-3 billion euro per 
                                                 
4 ‘Chaque jour, 26'000 avions se croisent au-dessus de l'Europe.’ See Luigi Jorio, ‘Ciel Unique pour voler plus 
sûr et moins cher’ (swissinfo, 30 July 2013) <http://www.swissinfo.ch/fre/ciel-unique-pour-voler-plus-
s%C3%BBr-et-moins-cher/36483300> accessed 29 June 2014; Nats, ‘Single European Sky’, 
<http://www.nats.aero/news/projects/ses/> accessed 29 June  2014; Eurocontrol, ‘Single European Sky’ 
<http://www.eurocontrol.int/dossiers/single-european-sky> accessed 29 June  2014; Banque Européenne 
d’Investissement, ‘L’aviation Civile’ (April 2013)  
<http://www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/civil_aviation_fr.pdf> accessed 29 June 2014, p.1 
5 Jean Weissenberger, ‘New rules on EU airport noise restrictions’ (Library of the European Parliament, 5 
February 2013) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/120421/LDM_BRI(2013)120421_REV1_
EN.pdf> accessed 29 June 2014, p. 1; Banque Européenne d’investissement (n 4), p.1; SESAR Joint 
Undertaking, ‘Sesar: the future of flying’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-2G_vxso9g> accessed 3 July 
2014 
6 Eurocontrol is the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, an international organisation 
founded in 1960. It currently has 40 member states and working on improving the air traffic management. It has 
own treaty. See: Eurocontrol <https://www.eurocontrol.int/> accessed 29 June 2014 
7 Weissenberger (n 5), p.1  
8 Banque Européenne d’Investissement (n 4), p.1; Commission, ‘Single European Sky II: towards more 
sustainable and better performing aviation’ (Communication) COM (2008) 389/2, p.2 
9 Air traffic management (ATM) is about the process, procedures and resources which come into play to make 
sure that aircraft are safely guided in the skies and on the ground. Air traffic management is composed of a 
number of complementary systems: air management, air traffic flow and capacity management and air traffic 
control.  
Air Navigation Service Provider is the entity that manages air traffic on behalf of a company, region or country. 
See: Eurocontrol (n 6) 
10 Julian Moxon, ‘Single European Sky still fragmented’ (Ainoline, 7 June 2013)  
<http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/paris-air-show/2013-06-17/single-european-sky-still-fragmented> 
accessed 29 June 2014   
11 Pablo Mendes de Leon, ‘Liberal of air transport in Europe’, in Doo Hwan Kim and Chia-Jui Cheng (eds), The 
utilization of the world's air space and free outer space in the 21st century: proceedings of the International 
Conference on Air and Space Policy, Law and Industry for the 21st Century held in Seoul from 23-25 June 1997 
(p.15-21, Kluwer Law International, 2000), p.17 
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year.12 And, under the current system, the risks of delays are higher.13 Therefore, the 
infrastructure of the ATM system must be modernized in order to meet the projected 
growth in capacity.14  
 
Until recently, a plane could be serviced by as many different ANSPs, as countries 
it crossed.15 These different ANSPs are subject to different set of rules, economic 
conditions and operational requirements.16 Additionally, most ANSPs have designed 
their own training schools and support functions. A direct result of the sovereign 
nature of the Air Navigation Service (ANS) is that the division of Air Traffic Control’s 
sectors follows political boundaries, which creates even more constraints.17 These 
detriments to efficiency and performance have an impact on costs and safety.18 
Currently, the costs of air traffic management represent 6 to 12 % of ticket prices.19 
Furthermore, the inefficiency of the European system costs the airline companies an 
estimated 5 billion euro per year20, costs which are then passed on the final consumer. 
Even more striking, on average, each flight travels an additional 42 kilometers because 
no shorter route is available, which burns more kerosene and harms the environment.21 
Re-routing under the new system could save up to 10% of the kerosene currently 
used.22 Therefore, the key solution to this problem is enhancing cooperation among 
Member States and raising the level of solidarity23. The Commission claims that the 
                                                 
12 Eurocontrol, ‘Single European Sky’ (n 4) 
13 European Commission, ‘Single Sky: Commission acts to unblock congestion in Europe's airspace’ (Press 
Release IP/13/523, 11 June 2013) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-523_en.htm> accessed 29 June 
2014 
14 Dave Young, Nadine Pilon and Lawrence Brom, ‘Challenges Ahead for European Air Traffic’ in Information 
Resources Management Association, Regional Development: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications 
(Chapter 89, p. 1582-1603,  IGI Global, 2012), p.1583 
15 Kenneth Button and Rui Neiva, ‘Single European Sky and the functional airspace blocks: Will they improve 
economic efficiency?’ (2013) 33 Journal of Air Transport Management 73, p.79  
16 Loewenstein (n 3), p.49; COM (2007)101 final (n 1), p.2 
17 Francis Schubert, ‘Legal Aspects of Cross-Border Service Provision in the Single European Sky’ (2010) 35 
Air & Space law 113, p.113 
18 Commission, ‘Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs)’ (n 1) 
19 European Commission, Press Release IP/13/523 (n 13) 
20 Christopher Lawless, ‘Bounding the vision of a Single European Sky’ (2014) 180 The Geographical Journal 
76, p.76  
21 European Commission, Press Release IP/13/523 (n 13)  
22 Jorio (n 4); COM (2008) 389/2  (n 8), p.4; IATA, A blueprint for the Single European Sky: delivering on 
safety, environment, capacity and cost-effectiveness (White Paper, COM(96)57 final), p.2 
23 Moxon (n 10); Schubert, ‘Legal Aspects of Cross-Border Service Provision in the Single European Sky’ (n 
17), p.114; Commission, ‘Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs)’ (n 1)  
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SES system will reduce flight time and increase flight safety.2425 The cost involved for 
the air navigation service constituted more than the half of the all the overall cost 
related to air traffic control management.26 The main actors involved in the discussion 
agreed that those service costs should be reduced. 
 
Additionally, the ATM technologies have not really evolved since the 1970’s, 
which impedes interoperability and the true exchange of information.27  Therefore, the 
main role of Single European Sky ATM Research programme (SESAR Joint 
Undertaking) is to help modernise the European ATM system by regrouping research 
and design procedures.28 The modernisation of the system should lead to its 
optimization. In addition, the simplification of the system and the interoperability 
between air traffic controllers will lower the risk of collision.29 
1.2 The solution the Union found   
In order to remedy to the fragmentation of the airspace, the Commission has 
proposed to implement the Single European Sky (SES). Initially, the SES was meant 
to address the dramatic growth in air travel, by creating a legislative framework for 
EU aviation.30 The cornerstone idea of the SES Regulations was to create a so-called 
functional airspace blocks or FABs. These FABs are considered as being able to 
satisfy the growing capacity requirements of all airspace users with minimum delay by 
                                                 
24 For this reason the Commission creates the European Aviation Safety Programme (EASP). ‘The main 
objective of the Safety Plan is to create a common focus on European aviation safety issues as a continuation of 
the European work to increase aviation safety and to comply with ICAO standards.’  
See European Aviation Safety Agency, ‘European Aviation Safety Plan 2012-2015’ (2012) TE.GEN.00400-002 
final<http://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/sms-docs-European-Aviation-Safety-Plan-(EASp)-2012-2015-
-v1.0-FINAL.pdf> (accessed on 3 July 2014), p.4 
25 Jorio (n 4) 
26 ‘Single European Sky for faster and more convenient air travel’ (Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union 2013, 22 August 2013) <http://www.eu2013.lt/en/news/features/single-european-sky-for-faster-
and-more-convenient-air-travel> accessed 29 June 2014 
27 Moxon (n 10) 
28 Eurocontrol, ‘Single European Sky’ (n 4); Delegation of the European Union to the United States, ‘SESAR—
Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research’ <http://www.euintheus.org/what-we-do/policy-
areas/transportation/aviation/sesar-single-european-sky-air-traffic-management-research/> accessed 29 June 
2014; SESAR Joint Undertaking, ‘SESAR Releases: advancing ATM modernisation’ (SESAR Release)  
<http://www.sesarju.eu/newsroom/sesar-spotlight/sesar-releases-advancing-atm-modernisation> accessed 29 
June 2014; European Commission Mobility and Transport, ‘What is the SESAR project?’ 
< http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/sesar/index_en.htm> accessed 29 June 2014 
29 Jorio (n 4)  
30 COM (2008) 389/2 (n 8), p.2 
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managing the air traffic more dynamically, which will produce as immediate 
consequences an increase in efficiency.31 These blocks would no longer be divided 
with regard to national border but rather according to traffic flows and efficiency 
based criteria.32 The route-by-route, as opposed to state-by-state strategy will more 
accurately reflect the reality of the airspace system.33 Consequently, the airspace will 
be managed more rationally.34 Thus the FABs would contribute to meet the capacity 
requirements of airspace users, to reduce minimum delays, enabling more dynamic 
management of the air traffic, resulting in an increase in efficiency.  Furthermore, the 
FABs are also regarded as the best solution for achieving the highest level of 
integration possible by maximizing cooperation.35 In order to achieve this goal, the 
Union launched the proposal for SES in 1999.36 
 
Currently the SES framework is composed of five Regulations. The first package of 
four was adopted in 2004. After having reviewed the progress of the SES in 2007, the 
Commission realized that some further actions were needed, resulting in the 
publication of a revised version in November 2009. To this revised version, a fifth 
Regulation was added.37 The volcanic eruption in Iceland of 2010 clearly pinpointed 
the deficiencies of the system and boosted the debate about the proposal, as it was 
imperative to find solutions.38   
                                                 
31 Lawless (n 20), p.76; Eurocontrol, ‘Evaluation of Functional Airspace Block (FAB) initiatives and their 
contribution to performance Improvement’ (Performance Review Commission) FAB Evaluation (2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/studies/doc/traffic_management/evaluation_of_fabs_final_report.pdf> 
(accessed 3 July 2014); Button and Neiva (n 15), p.74; Belgocontrol, ‘The Functional Airspace Blocks in the 
Single European Sky’  
<http://www.belgocontrol.be/belgoweb/publishing.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Background_on_FABs.pdf/$FILE/B
ackground_on_FABs.pdf > accessed 29 June  2014, p.2 
32 Lawless (n 20), p.76; Mark Franklin, ‘Sovereignty and Functional Airspace Blocks’ (2007) 32 Air & Space 
law 425, p.425 
33 Alberto Alemanno, Governing disasters: the challenges of emergency risk regulation (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011), p. 239 
34 Commission, ‘Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs)’ (n 1) 
35 Button and Neiva (n 15), p.75  
36 Joeri Meerts, ‘A critical assessment of the Regulation 996/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council  
of the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation’ (LL.M. Master of Advanced 
Studies in European Law, Ghent University, 2012), p.7 
37 The coming into existence of the SES cannot be discussed in detail here. There is a large range of articles and 
books dedicated to the description of lengthy process that led to the drafting of the 5 regulations. See for 
instance: Niels van Antwerpen, ‘Single European Sky’ (2002) 27 Air & Space law 3; Calleja Crespo and 
Fenoulhet (n 3); Francis Schubert, ‘The Single European Sky- Controversial Aspects of Cross-Border Service 
Provision’ (2003) 28 Air & Space law 32 
38 Alemanno (n 33), p.239 
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The SES Regulations aim to improve and increase efficiency and safety throughout 
Europe. It is assumed that once the airspace system would be harmonised, air travel 
within the Union will be faster and more convenient.39  Additionally, 5 interrelated 
pillars have been established: safety, performance, technology, airport capacity and 
human factors.40  
 
The SES proposal, besides increasing efficiency and security, would provide direct 
advantages to passengers, for instance shorter flights and cheaper tickets. The airspace 
will be more tailored with respect to the passengers’ needs rather than divided 
according to national borders, as it was before.41  
 
The actual system will not be able to satisfy such demand; traffic flow, within 
Europe, will be doubled by 2030.42  As a result, the Commission is trying to prevent a 
capacity shortage and even better; to triple the capacity of the airspace.43 The 
Commissions aims to remedy this emerging problem while leaving a margin of error 
in case the growth predications were incorrect. It also leaves more time for the 
Commission to develop a new action plan for any additional increases in the European 
flight capacity.  
 
Additionally, it is expected that the number of sectors will decline from their 
number of 650.44 As a result, it will lead to the reduction in the number of control 
                                                 
39 ‘Single European Sky for faster and more convenient air travel’ (n 26) 
40 Calleja Crespo and Fenoulhet (n 3), p.7-8 
41 Lawless (n 20), p.76 
42 ‘Selon les prévisions, le trafic aérien devrait doubler d’ici à 2030. La plus grande difficulté consiste à faire en 
sorte que l’espace aérien européen puisse faire face à la croissance du trafic, tout en réduisant les coûts et en 
améliorant les performances.’ 
See: Banque Européenne d’Investissement (n 4), p.1 
43 IATA, A blueprint for the Single European Sky: delivering on safety, environment, capacity and cost-
effectiveness (n 22), p.2 ; ‘Le "Ciel unique européen", qu'est-ce que c'est?’ (le nouvel observateur social ) 
<http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/social/20130611.OBS2746/le-ciel-unique-europeen-qu-est-ce-que-c-est.html> 
accessed 29 June 2014; CAPA, ‘Europe to take a third attempt at sorting out the Single European Sky’(26 
October 2012) <http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/europe-to-take-a-third-attempt-at-sorting-out-the-single-
european-sky-86383 > accessed 29 June 2014 
44 Moxon (n 10)  
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centers, which is one of the causes of the inefficiency. These changes should bring 
Europe closer to the American model.45 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, however, in the proposal there is no mention of liability in the 
case of an accident. The system that is foreseen in the SES will lead to a shift from 
nationally based air traffic management to ‘supra-national’ management. Therefore, 
the question of liability is one of the most crucial to be addressed. One may expect that 
the nature of the risks inherent to the airspace system will be contingently redefined.46 
 
A word of warning should be given: one should not believe that the SES will 
introduce an entirely new regime in which only one Air Navigation Service Provider 
(ANSP) will supply its services for the whole FAB. Article 8 of the Regulation 
550/2004 requires each Member State to establish one exclusive ANSP for the 
airspace under its responsibility. Furthermore, in order to comply with their 
obligations flowing from international law, each Member State must have an ANSP. 
The only novelty that is brought by the proposal is that cross-border cooperation will 
be extended and hopefully, this will in turn lead to an even closer Europe. 
Consequently, one may wonder whether the regime as it was before the SES proposal 
will be changed or whether we will still find the same answers, making the topic of 
great interest for research.  
  
                                                 
45 European Commission, Press Release IP/13/523 (n 13)   
46 Alemanno (n 33), p.239  
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1.3 What the Union already did to open airspace?   
Before 1987 and the ruling of the CJEU in the case Nouvelles Frontières47, the 
airspace market was protected and considered taboo by both national and 
supranational authorities.48 As the result of some pressures and the willingness of the 
Commission to reform the air transport market since 197949, the Single European Act 
made the creation of a legal framework for aviation possible.50   
 
Three packages of liberalization regulations were promulgated between 1987 and 
1992.51 However, soon after the liberalization of the market, it became obvious that 
the airspace was not managed efficiently. As a result, in 1994, the discussions began 
but it was not until 1999 that the Single European Sky proposal was launched.52 In so 
doing, the Commission relied on Eurocontrol, one of its most important allies.53 
Eurocontrol’s role as a central player in aviation grew in the 1990s.54 One of its main 
aims was to increase coordination between air navigation services within the Union.  
 
The SES will create a new division of the European airspace. In order to meet the 
objectives of the SES, the Member States are required to establish FABs, the crux of 
the SES55, as stipulated in Article 5 of the SES Airspace Regulation (No 551/2004).56 
                                                 
47 Joined Cases 209 to 213/84 Ministère public v Lucas Asjes and Others, Andrew Gray and Others, 
Andrew Gray and Others, Jacques Maillot and Others and Léo Ludwig and Others 
48 Loewenstein (n 3), p.47; Alfonso Arroyo, ‘Single European Sky and Functional Airspace Blocks’. 
(Directorate-General for Energy and Transport/Air Transport Directorate, Montreal, 2008)  
<http://legacy.icao.int/NetCentric/pres/A.Arroyo.pdf> accessed 1 March 2014, slide 3  
49 Commission, ‘Contribution of the European Communities to the development of air transport services: 
Memorandum of the Commission’ (Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 5/79) COM (79) 311 
final 
50 Paul Stephen Dempsey, European aviation law (Kluwer Law International, 2004), p.23; Loewenstein (n 3), 
p.48; Stacy K Weinberg, ‘Liberalization of air transport: time for the EEC to unfasten its seatbelt’ (1992) 13 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 433, p.439 
51 Seth M Warner, ‘Liberalize open skies: foreign investment and cabotage restrictions keep noncitizens in 
second class’ (1993) 43 The American University law review 277, p.295; Loewenstein (n 3), p.48; Magnus 
Schmauch, EU law on state aid to airlines : law, economics and policy (Lexxion, 2012), p.18; Commission and 
the United States Department of Transportation, ‘Transatlantic airline alliance: competitive issues and regulatory 
approaches’ joint alliance report (2010), p.4  
52 Arroyo (n 48), slide 3  
53 Eurocontrol, ‘Single European Sky’ (n 4)  
54 Eurocontrol, ‘History’ <http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/history> accessed 29 June 2014  
55 Button and Neiva (n 15), p.74  
56 However in the consolidated version, this article has been deleted and replaced by Article 9a which adopts a 
similar wording. The article was as followed: ‘with a view to achieving maximum capacity and efficiency of the 
air traffic management network within the single European sky, and with a view to maintaining a high level of 
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However, it is only with the entry into force of Regulation 1070/2009 and Article 9a 
that a definition of, and article dedicated to the FABs was introduced, respectively.57 
Before, the only references to the FAB were in point 12 of the preamble and Article 5 
of Regulation 551/2004. Even in the consolidated version which was introduced after 
Regulation 1070/2009 entered into force, the only definition of FAB is in Article 2(25) 
of the SES Framework Regulation (No 549/2004), which defines an FAB as an 
“airspace block based on operational requirements, reflecting the need to ensure more 
integrated management of the airspace regardless of existing boundaries”. FABs are 
able to become the driving force for performance and will bring changes to the 
landscape of Air Traffic Management Service provisions.58 But, its definition was only 
introduced in 2009 and their creation has not been without obstacles, both economic 
and political.59 Additionally, the Member States have committed themselves to 
reaching the targets set out in a performance scheme adopted in January 2012.60  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
safety, the upper airspace shall be reconfigured into functional airspace blocks.’ See: Commission, ‘SES I and II 
consolidated: The 4 Regulations creating the Single European Sky’ (2010) EC working paper 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single_european_sky/doc/2010_02_12_ses_i_and_ii_consolidated.pdf> 
accessed on 3 July 2014  
57 Before Article 5 of the Regulation 551/2004 introduced the idea of FAB but did not mention all the 
requirements of the FABs such as eco friendly.  
58 Commission, ‘Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs)’ (n 1) 
59 Due to the fact that Air Traffic Control is falling under the heading of State sovereignty, some Member States 
used it as an excuse to block cross-border integration. Retrieved from COM (2008) 389/2 (n 8), p.3 
60 European Commission Mobility and Transport, ‘Performance’ 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single_european_sky/performance_review_body_en.htm> accessed 29 
June 2014  
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1.4 The division of the airspace in FABs 
The Commission proposes to divide the European airspace into 9 FABs61; 
(1) Danish- Swedish FAB 
(2) UK- Ireland 
(3) FABEC (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland) 
(4) South West FAB (Portugal, Spain) 
(5) BLUE MED FAB (Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta) 
(6) Baltic FAB (Lithuania, Poland) 
(7) FAB CE (Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia) 
(8) Danube FAB (Bulgaria, Romania) 
(9) North European FAB (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Norway).62  
The first established FAB was between the UK and Ireland and became operational 
in July 2008.63 Originally, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland should have been part of the 
North European FAB (NEFAB). Nevertheless, the Swedish and Danish Government 
preferred to establish cooperation only between their two States and create their own 
FAB. Therefore, Iceland is not currently part of any FAB. 64 Another striking fact is to 
be found in the Danube agreement, in which Article 14.1 leaves open the possibility of 
subdividing the area in a sector to maximize cooperation between ANS while the 
approval is left to the ANSP board of that FAB. A similar article can be found in 
Article 10.1 of the FAB CE under the heading of flexibility agreement. These articles 
might create problems because they allow two of the FABs to be differentiated from 
                                                 
61 Button and Neiva (n 15), p.75 
62 Eurocontrol, FAB Evaluation (n 31), p.21; Button and Neiva (n 15), p.75; Belgocontrol, ‘The Functional 
Airspace Blocks in the Single European Sky’ (n 31), p.2 
63 IAA, ‘UK-Ireland Functional Airspace Block’ <https://www.iaa.ie/FAB> accessed 29 June 2014 
64 NEFAB, ‘What is NEFAB?’ <http://www.nefab.eu/> accessed 1 March 2014 
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the others, which could lead to more disparities. However, there is a safeguard that 
dictates that if a subdivision negates the essence of the FAB and leads to a situation 
similar to the one before its creation, then the agreement would be null and void 
because it would not comply with the service provision regulation. However, because 
the central Europe sectors were and are relatively small -their size depends on the 
amount of traffic flow one controller can keep track of- it is unlikely that radical 
changes will occur with regard to the number of sectors to render these sectors more 
dynamic.65   
 
In order to have things moving smoothly and to avoid encountering similar refusals 
of cooperation from the Member States as in the past, the Commission set a deadline 
for the implementation of all FABs on the 4th of December 2012.66 However, after a 
recent survey, the Commission realised not only that only two FABs have been 
established (UK-Ireland and Denmark- Sweden) and also that none of the nine 
foreseen FABs were functioning in an efficient way.67 The Commission is not entirely 
satisfied by the functioning of the UK-Ireland FAB but its estimated benefits for 2008-
2011 show a net improvement. Apparently, 48,000 tons of kerosene were saved during 
that period, which represents a decrease of 152,000 CO2.68 As a result, the Union has 
decided to take measures against this rampant inaction by threatening to sanction 
Member States.69  
 
It is notable that the most important actors, such as The Air Navigation Service 
Provider (ANSP), National Supervisory Authority (NSA) and States, have made 
considerable efforts in developing the SES initiative and in supporting the 
Commission’s work.70 As always, some governments have been committed to ensure 
the good functioning of the SES. Yet, the level of involvement of several countries has 
mostly depended on the profit the SES will bring to them specifically.    
 
                                                 
65 Some sectors will be merged or split mostly above the borders (ground).  
66 Commission, ‘Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs)’ (n 1); Lawless (n 20), p.76 
67 Button and Neiva (n 15), p.75 
68 Nats, ‘Single European Sky’ (n 4)  
69 Lawless (n 20), p.76  
70 IAA (n 63)  
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1.5 The opinion of the opponent of the SES  
The necessity for harmonization, or at very least, bringing of the Union closer 
through cooperation, is not disputed. Neither is the fact that we needed a pan-
European solution. However, there are several skepticisms as to whether the FABs are 
in fact the best solution, or whether they were accepted only because the actors were 
desperate to find a solution. Some critics even suggest that the improvement the 
industry craves could actually not occur.71 The opponents mostly refer to the failure of 
other air traffic management projects such as EATCHIP and ATM2000+. The story 
seems to repeat itself: the deadlines have been prolonged for EATCHIP and 
ATM2000+ and now also for the SES. Consequently, they fear that the SES proposal 
will fail in the same way. This concern is not without merit. The FABs should have 
been implemented by now and the deadline for implementation has slipped to an 
undetermined future date; moreover, airline companies and customers are the first to 
suffer from the inefficiency.72 However, it should not be overlooked that two FABs 
are already implemented and functional and, the benefits are encouraging.73  
 
A major critique is that the Commission has tried to establish a truly European 
project to harmonize the system of air traffic management but realizing this would 
never occur, they took a pragmatic approach, aiming instead to increase the level of 
cooperation between ANSPs. Detractors believe this ignores the realities and 
fundamental problems facing the European ATM system, and moreover, that this 
cooperation may result in strong alliances that will add an additional layer of 
fragmentation.74  
 
They argue instead that SESAR alone could deal with the current shortcomings the 
European airspace.75 SESAR is a European undertaking whose main tasks is to define 
                                                 
71 Roger Wilco, ‘Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB) – the EC’s biggest blunder?’(FAB News, 30 April 2011) 
<http://www.roger-wilco.net/functional-airspace-blocks-fab-the-ec%E2%80%99s-biggest-blunder/> accessed 1 
March 2014  
72 CAPA (n 43)  
73 Nats, ‘Single European Sky’ (n 4)  
74 Wilco (n 71)  
75 Ibid  
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European ATM system.76 The reluctance of the ANSPs vanished when they realised 
that once SESAR materialized, they would have to join the movement if they did not 
want to be left behind. This enabled the ANSPs to group together and combine their 
forces to fight European solutions to the ATM problems with which they did not 
agree.77  
 
Some said that the switch in the role of Eurocontrol, from a unique organisation 
providing ATM services, to manager of the ATM network in Europe78, would destroy 
it, or at least considerably reduce its powers. The new role of Eurocontrol only gives it 
an advisory authority, which may suggest improvement to ANSPs and Member 
States.79   
  
                                                 
76 Moxon (n 10) 
77 Wilco (n 71)  
78 Eurocontrol, ‘Single European Sky’ (n 4)  
79 Wilco (n 71)  
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1.6   Why does the Commission want it? 
The SES will bring some major advantages, such as shorter flights, fewer delays, 
fewer CO2 emissions, more efficient management, etc. The question here remains why 
the Commission has been pushing so much for the SES, as these advantages will not 
directly affect the Union itself. There are 2 main arguments that can be found:  
 First, since 1990, air travel within Europe has not ceased growing. This has lead to 
major problems including delays, longer flights, inefficiency and huge divergences in 
the quality of safety standards. But the principal issue is that the airspace system is 
managed inefficiently, which wastes time and money. Transport is part of shared 
competences according to Article 4(2) (g) TFEU. Furthermore, Article 100(2) TFEU 
gives the Council the power to act with regard to air transportation. The ECJ clarified 
in the French Seamen case that Article 100(2) TFEU (at that time 84(2) EEC Treaty), 
means ‘transport is subject to the general rules of the Treaty’, even if the Council has 
not yet acted.80 However, air transportation has for a long time been governed 
exclusively by the Member States.81 Traditionally, the air navigation services were 
under the control of government or corporate entities, also referred to as Air 
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), which had a monopoly on the market.82 This 
leads to protective behaviour by the Member States, mostly with regard to airline 
companies, but also had the effect of distorting competition within Europe.83 Because 
ANSPs were entirely or partly state-owned, they had advantages compared to private 
companies.84 Likewise, because airports were and still are entirely or partially state-
owned, competition between airports was nearly impossible.85 Moreover, pricing was 
                                                 
80 Case 167/73, Commission v French Republic, ECR 1974. Paragraph 31-32  
81 Loewenstein (n 3), p.51 
82 Calleja Crespo and Fenoulhet (n 3), p.3; COM (2008) 389/2 (n 8), p.5; Kenneth Button and G McDougall, 
‘Institutional and structure changes in air navigation service-providing organizations’ (2006) 12 Journal of Air 
Transport Management 236, p.237 
83 Loewenstein (n 3), p.51 
84 International Civil Aviation Organization, ‘Worlwide air transport conference (ATCONF) Sixth meeting: 
Basic principles of fair competition’ (2013) ATConf/6-WP/51 
 <http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp051_en.pdf> accessed on 22 
June 2014; Button and McDougall (n 82), p.244; Dempsey, European aviation law (n 50), p.4; van Antwerpen 
(n 37), p.13 
85As airports are partly or entirely state owned they are also receiving state aids or are publicly funded. ‘The 
charge level is a key factor, since public funding granted to an airport manager could be used to maintain airport 
charges at an artificially low level in order to attract traffic and may thus significantly distort competition’.  
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not entirely transparent.86 In other words, the Union wants it because the system as it 
now stands distort competition.  
The Union hopes that new business opportunities will be created when the market 
will be opened. For instance, the Commission wants to open support services such as 
meteorology and communication, to competition. The core air traffic control services 
will remain a monopoly but the other services will be separated, enabling new 
companies to compete.87 Furthermore, it was one of the only shared competences in 
which the Union had not yet legislated.   
 
Second, in order to avoid that two out of the four freedoms being hindered, namely 
free movement of persons and goods, it is imperative to cure this deficit. Above all, 
when one of the most important concepts in European law, the mutual recognition 
principle, is only tackled in the Regulation 550/2004 as amended. Article 7 obliges 
Member States to recognize certificates delivered by any European State. Therefore, 
the Union felt the urge to redress this problem.  
 
Other minor advantages are the creation of new jobs and the reduction of 
agreements with non-EU states. First, The Commission estimates that 328,000 jobs 
will be created in Europe, mostly thanks to SESAR.88 A second advantage, which was 
at the center of the discussion for some time, is the reduction of the number of 
agreements with non-EU states.89 In 1990, there were 609 BATAs, some of which 
were very liberal while others were strictly based on Bermuda type agreements.90 
There was a need to change this situation too and SES could drastically improve it.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
See : Commission, ‘EU guidelines on state aids to airports and airlines’ (Communication) Draft (2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_aviation_guidelines/aviation_guidelines_en.pdf> (accessed 
3 February 2014), §40; A. E. du Perron, ‘Liability of air traffic control agencies and airport operators in civil law 
jurisdictions’ (1985) 10 Air law 203, p.210  
86 Antolín Sánchez Presedo, ‘Report on the Annual Report on EU Competition Policy’ (Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs, document: A7-0143/2013) 2012/2306(INI) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201304/20130430ATT65503/20130430ATT65503EN.
pdf> (accessed 3 July 2014), p.12  
87 European Commission, Press Release IP/13/523 (n 13)  
88 CAPA (n 43)  
89 Loewenstein (n 3), p.52 
90 Commission, ‘The Community relations with third countries in aviation matters’ (Communication) COM(92) 
434 final  
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Taking into account the above mentioned reasons, one can understand why the 
Commission decided to launch infringement procedures against 25 out of 27 Member 
States after the 4 December 2012 deadline for implemented the SES passed.91 The 
Commission pursued infringement procedures against the Member States that have 
made little or no progress towards reform.92 The informal proceedings have begun and 
the Commission expects answers to its questions in April 2014, at the latest.93 The 
informal proceedings led to letters of formal notice for the members of the FABEC. 
The Commission is still considering sending other formal letters to the members of the 
Baltic, Danube, BLUEMED, FAB CE, Southwest and UK-Ireland.94 In other words, 
nearly all the Member States are likely to receive a letter of formal notice in the 
following month.    
1.7 The US example 
The Union tries to bring its airspace system closer to the American model by 
introducing the FABs. However, the US example is not an absolute model for the EU 
because of the federal character of the US and because of the technology used. Yet, it 
is still interesting to look at the US system in order to realise how inefficient the 
European system is.  
 
In a strict geographical sense, the surface of Europe and the United States is nearly 
identical; 11.5 million km² and 10.4 million km² respectively.95  However, the US has 
                                                 
91 For more information please refer to: European Commission Mobility and Transport, ‘Infringement 
proceedings in the field of Air transport’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/media/infringements/proceedings/air_en.htm> accessed 8 May 2014; BBC-News, 
‘Single European Sky: EU urges action on joint airspace’ (12 Octobre 2012) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-19921805> accessed 2 March 2014; Isabelle Smets, ‘Commission to launch infringement procedures’ 
(europolitics, 2012) <http://www.europolitics.info/commission-to-launch-infringement-procedures-artb345916-
20.html> accessed 20 December 2013 
92 European Commission, Press Release IP/13/523 (n 13)  
93 Moxon (n 10)  
94European Commission, ‘Single European Sky: Commission urges Germany, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg to make a decisive move towards a common airspace’ (Press Release IP/14/446, 16 April 
2014) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-446_en.htm> accessed 29 June 2014 
95 John Gulding et all., ‘US/ Europe comparison of ATM-related operational performance: An initial harmonized 
assessment by phase of flight’ (2009) Eighth USA/Europe Air Traffic Management Research and Development 
<http://www.atmseminarus.org/seminarContent/seminar8/papers/p_115_APMM.pdf> accessed on 2 March 
2014, p.2; CAPA (n 43)  
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more airports, with 509 to Europe’s 450.96 The level of air traffic and number of air 
controllers within Europe and the States are almost identical.97 Yet, Europe employs 
many more people in airspace-related jobs.98 It is worth mentioning that while traffic 
growth within the European Union has continued to increase significantly, the US has 
not experienced the same trend.99 Yet, the US does not face the problems confronting 
the Union. The reason for this is simple: in the US there is only one air traffic service 
provider, whereas in Europe there are more than 38.100 Furthermore, in the US there 
are 21 en-route centers with a single operating system, while in Europe there are 58 
using different operating systems.101 In order to facilitate the management of the 
superficies covered by these centers, sectors dealing with a smaller and more specific 
area were created.102 In the US the number of sectors contained in an en-route center 
area varies between 12 and 25.103 The number of sectors in Europe was around 650 
sectors.104 In both the US and Europe, each sector uses a different radio frequency and 
is under the supervision of a different controller.105 Therefore, the cost unit in Europe 
is much higher than in the US.106 It might seem surprising that there is a bigger trend 
in the US to consider sectorization of the airspace as a potential solution to increase 
efficiency by reducing the controllers’ workload.107 A team of up to four controllers108 
can be assigned to the management of one sector in the US.109   
                                                 
96 CAPA (n 43) 
97 ‘Single European Sky for faster and more convenient air travel’ (n 26); CAPA (n 43)  
98 CAPA (n 43) 
99 John Gulding (n 92), p.2  
100 ‘Single European Sky for faster and more convenient air travel’ (n 26); John Gulding (n 92), p.2; CAPA (n 
43)  
101 NASA, ‘Center or Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC)’ <http://virtualskies.arc.nasa.gov/atm/6.html> 
accessed 29 June 2014; EC, ‘SES 2+ cost and flight efficiency’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single_european_sky/doc/ses2plus/cost-flight-efficiency.pdf> accessed 
2 March 2014, p.1; COM (2008) 389/2 (n 8), p.6 
102 NASA (n 101)  
103 Congress Office of Technology Assessment United States, Airport and air traffic control system 
(Washington, 1982) ch. 3, p.36 
104 COM (2007)101 final (n 1), p.4 
105 Congress Office of Technology Assessment United States (n 103); COM (2007)101 final (n 1) p.4; Hanif D. 
Sherali and Justin M. Hill, ‘Configuration of airspace sectors for balancing air traffic controller workload’ (2013) 
203 Annals of Operations Research 3, p.3 
106 Calleja Crespo and Fenoulhet (n 3), p.4 
107 John Gulding (n 92), p.1  
108 However, it is more usual to have team up to 3 controllers 
109 U.S department of transportation and Federal Aviation Administration, ‘A Plan for the Future: 10-Year 
Strategy for the Air Traffic Control Workforce 2012 – 2021’ (Report) 
 <http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/controller_staffing/media/cwp_2012.pdf> (accessed 3 July 2014), 
p.24-25; John Gulding (n 92), p.2; NASA (n 101) 
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In the US airspace system, the division between states was never a problem as it is 
in Europe in the sense that each en-route center in the US covers a space of thousands 
of square miles, which may include part or all of the airspace of several states.110 
Additionally, the position of air traffic controller is regulated by federal law as most 
controllers are employed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pass 
through a federal civil-service system.111 Due to this uniformity, the controllers can be 
sent throughout the US. This would be impossible in Europe because the controllers 
undergo different training.   
 
For all the reasons above, the US system is said to be more efficient than the 
European system. Of course, this is not to say that the EU should model itself on the 
US prototype; there are a crucial difference between the US and the EU, namely that 
the US is a Federation, which is precisely what the Union sought to avoid. 
Additionally, two federal agencies, the FAA and the NTSB regulate air travel and 
investigate accidents.112 Lastly, the technologies used in Europe for the traffic 
management were designed in the 1950s, and can be considered as archaic113, which is 
not the case in the US. 
 
After having introduced the SES and explained that this system copies the US 
system, I will go to the core of this dissertation, namely the liability issues.  
 
  
                                                 
110 NASA (n 101)  
111 Craig Freudenrich, ‘How Air Traffic Control Works’ 
 <http://science.howstuffworks.com/transport/flight/modern/air-traffic-control.htm> accessed 29 June 2014, p.4; 
Vivian Giang, ‘Why Air Traffic Controllers Face A Staffing Crisis Every 25 Years’ (Business insider, 22 April 
2013) <http://www.businessinsider.com/air-traffic-controllers-will-face-a-staffing-crisis-every-25-years-2013-4> 
accessed 29 June 2014 
112 ‘Aviation Accidents – Overview’ (Findlaw) <http://injury.findlaw.com/torts-and-personal-injuries/aviation-
accidents-overview.html> accessed 2 March 2014  
113 European Commission, Press Release IP/13/523 (n 13); European Commission, ‘Single Sky: Commission 
Acts to Unblock Congestion in Europe's Airspace’ <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-523_en.htm> 
accessed 29 June 2014 
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2. Liabilities in the Single European Sky (SES)  
Airspace law is a highly regulated field of law; it derogates from the more general 
branches of law. Nevertheless, when airspace law does not provide an answer, then the 
solution must be sought in the other fields of law, such as tort, contract, etc.114  In our 
specific case, neither European nor International airspace law, nor national laws are 
able to solve the problem of liability on their own. However, a combination provides a 
workable answer to the question of liability.  
 
One of the major loopholes in the system conceived by the European Institution is 
that there is currently no European legislation that deals specifically with issues of 
liabilities in the Air Traffic Management (ATM)/ Air Navigation Service (ANS) field. 
Some answers might be found in international conventions that regulate part of the air 
law.115 However, these conventions mostly deal with specific topics and their 
relevance might be very limited. As a result, the issues of liability are left nearly 
entirely to the Member States to decide by using national law. Of course, the FAB 
agreements can be considered a tool to help Member States allocate liabilities and 
mitigate risks. No clear-cut answers in the case of a crash, however, are to be found. 
This makes the allocation of liabilities tricky, especially when numerous actors are 
involved.116  
 
The only safeguard provided within Regulation 1070/2009, amending Regulation 
550/2004 is Article 8(5): this provision stipulates that ‘Where difficulties arise 
between two or more Member States with regard to a cross-border functional airspace 
block […] the Member States concerned may jointly bring the matter to the Single Sky 
Committee for an opinion. […] the Member States shall take that opinion into account 
                                                 
114 Eurocontrol, ‘Impact de la responsabilité juridique dans le domaine du contrôle du trafic aérien’ (Projet INO-
1-AC-SHIF) (2005) Note EEC No. 06/05, p.4 
115 Marta Simoncini, ‘Governing air traffic management in the single European sky: the search for possible 
solutions to safety issues’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 209, p.219 
116 Marta Simoncini, ‘Air traffic management in the single European sky: standardisation of safety and liability 
issues’ (2012) EUI MWP; 2012/05 
 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/21759/MWP_2012_05_Simoncini.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 29 
June 2014, p. 12; Maurice Catino, ‘The Linate Air Disaster: A multilevel model of accident analysis’ in Patrick 
Alvintzi and Hannes Eder (eds), Crisis management (p.187-210, Nova Science Publishers, 2010), p.188; Francis 
Schubert, ‘The technical defragmentation of air navigation services’ in Pablo Mendes de Leon (ed), From 
lowlands to high skies: a multilevel jurisdictional approach towards air law: essays in honour of John Balfour 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), p.63  
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in order to find a solution.’ However, the Article fails to define ‘difficulties’ and the 
Single Sky Committee may only deliver an opinion without binding effect.  
 
The absence of relevant provisions does not mean that questions of liability were 
not examined during the legislative process and development of the FABs. Yet, before 
2004, and through state-owned administrations or corporations, most Member States 
were providing air navigation service over their own airspace and were fully liable for 
any incidents there. This concept flows directly from the Chicago Convention, which 
made dealing with liability not seem like a major issue and therefore also unnecessary. 
  
With the introduction of cross-border air navigation services, liability issues 
became salient. Although the liability has been a recurring issue during the 
development of the SES proposal, only Recital 15 and Annex I section 7 of the 
Regulation 1035/2011 requires Member States to enter into agreements with their Air 
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) at the beginning of their operations. These 
agreements should help to resolve liability questions in cross-border cases. While one 
of the main aims of the SES is to create closer cooperation between States, Article 8 of 
Regulation 550/2004 makes clear that the SES does not intend to create an entirely 
new regime in which only one ANSP will supply its services for the whole FAB.  
 
Yet, it has been decided that the question of how to settle disputes in practice is best 
to be left to the national level. As a result, no new mechanisms for allocation of 
liability have been designed. In other words, the Union allows States to apply 
international and national legal instruments that best fit the specific case. The absence 
of top-down rules of liability proves that even if a shift from national based 
management to supranational based management will occur, the approach is still 
closely linked to international concepts.117 In every agreement establishing a FAB118, 
one of the first articles concerns sovereignty and includes a statement to the effect that 
the agreement is ‘without prejudice to the sovereignty of the Contracting States over 
their airspace or their rights and obligations under the Chicago Convention and other 
                                                 
117 Simoncini, ‘Governing air traffic management in the single European sky: the search for possible solutions to 
safety issues’(n 115), p.223 
118 Since the FABs are agreements between States, it probably does not give rights to third parties.  
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instruments of international law.’119 Therefore, the principle expressed in Article 1 of 
the Chicago Convention is not affected by the arrangement between Contracting 
States. The Member States are protected against inconsistencies that could arise 
between the provision of EU law and International Conventions; International law still 
prevails and consequently, the concepts of international law prevail as well.120 For 
instance the norm that the state of occurrence is the first to compensate stands. 
Moreover, the Signatory States are under the duty to provide an ANSP, as 
encompassed in Article 28 of the Chicago Convention.121 
 
Today more systems are becoming automated and this is also true for the ATM, 
which may alter the customary ways of deciding on liability issues. This potential 
technological process cannot be ignored in designing a functional system for 
allocation liability.  
 
In conclusion, the system envisaged is complex with various intricately connected 
actors involved at different levels.122 It is impossible, and no one would argue, that the 
SES could or should prevent the risk of all accidents. Nevertheless, to have a legal 
instrument dealing specifically with such risks will help resolve the issue of liability 
more easily and may raise the awareness of various actors about their responsibilities. 
 
There are two major components to the problem: who will compensate the victims 
and can the State claim money back from the wrongdoer? In order to answer these 
questions this section is divided as follows: the type of liability will be discussed 
(section A). The causes of liability will be enumerated and explained (section B). The 
liability of the main actors involved will be analysed under both the ‘old’ and new 
system (section C). Then, the perspective of the victims and the State with regard to 
compensation and right of recourse will be explored (section D). The liability in the 
                                                 
119 Article 3 of the NEFAB Agreement. Similar wording; For instance Article 5 of the Baltic FAB 
120 Article 3 TEU: the EU shall contribute “to the strict observance and the development of international law”. 
For more details about the discussion see: Etienne Judicaël, ‘Loyalty towards international law as a 
constitutional principle of EU law?’ Jean Monnet Working Paper n°3/11  
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/11/110301.pdf> accessed 29 June 2014 
121 However the wording of Article 28 does not make it mandatory.  
122 Simoncini, EUI MWP; 2012/05 (n 116), p.13 
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US will be briefly touched upon (section E). Finally, section F will provide 
intermediate conclusion.    
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A. Types of liability: 
It is critical to decide which type of liability/ liabilities will be applicable in a 
certain case, as different rules apply to the different types, which results in different 
consequences.123 This section will only provide a general understanding of the four 
types of liability that can be applied in air collision cases, as well as who has to bear 
the liability. Subsequently, the following section provides more details on the actors 
involved in air traffic control and how the general picture will change with the 
implementation of the SES. 
i. Criminal 
In the context of airspace activities, criminal law can only be applied to certain 
specific actors. Criminal liability with regard to Air Traffic Service Providers (ATSP) 
can concern the members of the board of directors, the Air Traffic Controllers and 
even the directors or employees of the national supervisory authority. Corporate 
liability can also play a role in certain cases. Nevertheless, for corporate liability to 
apply specific conditions must be fulfilled.124 Not all countries have corporate liability 
and others limit it to specific fields. Therefore, for corporate liability to attach all three 
conditions must be met: the country must recognize corporate liability, the ATS must 
fall within the scope of that country’s corporation liability, and finally, ATS must be 
included into the personal scope of the law.125126  
 
The board of directors of the ATSP may be convicted of a crime if it can be proven 
that the accident was, even partially, the result of a failure of the system, provided that 
causality and negligence is established. Airport managers and national supervisory 
authority employees can also be convicted for the same crime. For instance, the airport 
                                                 
123 More than one type might be applicable to a given case.  
124 Michael Chatzipanagiotis, ‘Liability Aspects of Air Traffic Services Provision’ (2007) 32 Air & space law 
326, p.340 
125 For instance in the UK the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 applies to airport. 
Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ‘Liability for third party damage caused by aircraft some recent developments and 
issues’ (2009) 2 Journal of Transportation Security 91, p.97 
126 Chatzipanagiotis (n 124), p.340; Ronald I C Bartsch, International Aviation Law: a practical guide (Ashgate 
Publisher, 2012), Ch. 8 criminal law 
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manager as well as the director of Linate airport were found guilty in a 2001 case, 
referred to as the Linate air disaster.127128 
 
Air traffic controllers and pilots may be charged with (involuntary) manslaughter or 
(severe) bodily injury.129130 It seems that, even though they are aware of the possible 
criminal proceeding, however, generally there is a lack of knowledge as to the law and 
proceedings that might be filed.131 One should bear in mind that criminal law only 
takes into account the person and not the position he/she has in the society or his/her 
work.132 As a logical extension, in most countries, criminal law is not applicable 
against actions taken by States or public authorities when exercising ATS functions.133 
In other words, controllers cannot protect themselves and escape criminal liability by 
claiming that they are performing a public job. Even if specific legislation is in place 
that makes it possible for the State or public authorities to be held criminally liable, 
that enables the State to be criminally prosecuted, the criminal responsibility of the 
individuals is not excluded.134  
 
There is common ground in the Union with respect to the actors that will likely face 
criminal liability, but the level of the criminal sanction varies considerably among 
                                                 
127 CONDANNA: GUALANO Sandro alla pena di anni sei e mesi sei di reclusione; FEDERICO Francesco alla 
pena di anni sei e mesi sei di reclusione; ZACCHETTI Paolo alla pena di anni otto di reclusione; FUSCO 
Vincenzo alla pena di anni otto di reclusione 
CONDANNA: Altresì gli imputati, in solido, al pagamento delle spese processuali.’ 
128 Chatzipanagiotis (n 124), p.341; ‘Catastrophe de Linate : 6 à 8 ans de prison’ (le nouvel observateur social) 
 <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20040416.OBS7770/catastrophe-de-linate-6-a-8-ans-de-prison.html> 
accessed 29 June 2014  
129 In France and in Italy, the controllers can be held criminally liable for intentional or involuntary 
manslaughter. France: Article 121-3(1) of the French Penal Code refers to the notion of intentional fault.  
Article 221-6 of the French Penal Code defines the involuntary manslaughter. See: Eurocontrol, Note EEC No. 
06/05 (n 114), p.25-26 
Italy: the Cagliari accident. See: Ed Pooley et all, ‘The 2004 Cagliari accident and afterwards’ [2013] Hindsight 
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2579.pdf > accessed 29 June 2014  
130 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Airport Business law (AuthorHouse Publisher, 2009), p.71; Chatzipanagiotis (n 124), 
p.341 
131 Sofia Michaelides-Mateou and Andreas Mateou, Flying in the face of criminalization the safety implications 
of prosecuting aviation professionals for accidents (Ashgate Publisher, 2010), p.153 
132 "Le droit pénal, contrairement au droit civil ou administratif, s’attache aux personnes individuellement, et non 
à leur « enveloppe », à l’activité qu’elles exercent ou ce qu’elles représentent pour la société". See: Eurocontrol, 
Note EEC No. 06/05 (n 114), p.2 
133 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Air navigation law (Springer-verlag, 2012), p.38 
134 Chatzipanagiotis (n 124), p.341 
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Member States because each penal code was based on moral values important to that 
specific country.135 
ii. Civil/ tortious136  
Tortious liability is one of the most common allocation of risk mechanisms. Tort 
law does not offer specific provisions for airspace matters. The determination of 
whether a conduct was or was not wrong is done on a case by case basis, applying 
general principles of tort law.137 The Rome Convention of 1952 established strict 
liability of the carrier toward third parties caused by a foreign aircraft on the 
surface.138 Article 1(1) of the Rome Convention implies that the act giving rise to the 
damages was of a delictual/tortious nature.139 This implication is also to be found in 
Article 6(1) and 12(1) of the Convention. However, Article 26 restricts its scope of 
application to civil airplanes only.140141 In order to establish that a wrong has been 
committed, the victim has to show that damages were caused by the aircraft without 
need of showing that a duty of care owed to him by the defendant was breached, and 
that the breach led to damages that are neither remote nor unforeseeable.142  
 
                                                 
135 "Mais, le mode de gestion reste néanmoins « d’essence publique » dans la majorité des Etats car le caractère 
public de cette activité est bien réel" See: Eurocontrol, Note EEC No. 06/05 (n 114), p.41 
136 Liability based on tort arises in order to remedy a wrong done to someone or something. Civil liability is 
mostly associated with a risk that can be either a consequence of, or the conduct itself. Causation plays an 
important role; there must be a link between the action and the claimed damages. There are two main types of 
liability; first fault liability, in which the risk is caused by the behaviour and is mostly due to negligence, the 
breach of a standard of care. Secondly, there is strict liability, in which no fault is necessary; the activity itself 
can result in damages.  
See for instance: Cees van Dam, European tort law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2013) 
137 For instance aviation repair stations can be held strictly liable because they can contract insurance but above 
all they are involved in the safety of the plane.  
See: Tom Davis, ‘Aviation repair stations and strict liability’ (1974) 40 Journal of air law and commerce 413, 
p.146 et seq; Bartsch (n 126), ch. 6 tort law 
138 Article 23 of the Convention which has been supplemented by a protocol of 1978 on the same topic. 
However, only 49 countries have signed the Convention. Additionally, some of the ‘bigger’ player such as the 
US and Germany did not sign nor ratify it. See: ICAO, ‘Convention on damage caused by foreign aircraft to 
third parties on the surface, signed at Rome on 7 October 1952’ 
<http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Rome1952_EN.pdf> accessed 29 June 2014  
139 Peter P. C. Haanappel, The law and policy of air space and outer space : a comparative approach (Kluwer 
Law International, 2003), p.86; Doo Hwan Kim, ‘Some considerations of the draft for the convention on an 
integrated system of international aviation liability’ (1988) 53 Journal of air law and commerce 765, p.766; 
George Leloudas, Risk and liability in air law (Informa Publisher, 2009), p.160 
140 Article 26: ‘This Convention shall not apply to damage caused by military, customs or police aircraft’ 
141 Haanappel (n 139), p. 86  
142 But the liability of the plane owner can be diminish or extinguish according to Article 5 of the Convention   
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Rules on International carriage of persons and baggage are embodied in the 
Montreal Convention. The carrier is liable only if the damages occurred ‘on board the 
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking’, 
according to Article 17. But if the carrier can prove that the damages were entirely or 
partly caused by the person seeking compensation, the carrier might be partly or 
entirely exonerated.143 Article 22 limits the amount of compensation in case of delay 
or for damage, loss or destruction of the baggage. The applicable law, according to 
Article 29 related to the basis for claims, is national law.144  
 
When the Conventions do not apply – if a country has not ratified it or is not a party 
to it– then national tort law applies unless specific rules have been designed with 
respect to liability for damages caused by an aircraft on the ground. This latter type of 
liability is mostly based on strict liability. This is the case in France, UK and 
Germany.145 Whether the liability is strict or fault based depends on national law.146 
However, a common feature is that the liability is unlimited.147 For instance in the UK 
or the Netherlands, fault-based liability is used to resolve cases involving negligent air 
traffic controllers. The rationale is that aviation is no longer considered a dangerous 
activity. In contrast, in Switzerland and France, strict liability applies to controllers, 
and an even stricter form of liability applies in France.148 Of course, in a purely 
internal situation, whereby damages are caused by a national aircraft on national soil, 
national tort law will apply.149  
 
The range of situation where tort law could play a role in airspace related matter is 
relatively wide.150 The plaintiffs must show that the defendant owed them a duty of 
care, that this duty was breached and that their damages were reasonably foreseeable 
as well as sufficiently connected to the actions of the defendants; in other words they 
                                                 
143 Article 20 of the Montreal Convention  
144 But, Article 35 limits the time-period to bring a claim to two years 
145 Haanappel (n 139), p.86  
146  Chrystel Erotokritou, ‘The Legal Liability of Air Traffic Controllers’ (2012) 4 Studentpulse 1 
 <http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/613/2/the-legal-liability-of-air-traffic-controllers> accessed 29 June 
2014, p.2 
147 du Perron (n 85), p.206 
148 Erotokritou (n 146), p.2 
149 Haanappel (n 139), p. 86  
150  Bartsch (n 126), ch.6 tort  
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must establish a proximate cause link. There is one exception: strict liability for 
instance liability of manufacturers151. According to the general European Directive on 
product liability Article 1 the liability is absolute.152 By the simple fact that a product 
is placed on the market it leads to liability of the manufacturer in case of defects.153154 
However, the manufacturer has a right of recourse against his contractors, Article 
8.155156   
 
Product liability also includes hardware failure.157 Even if in the contract between 
the developer and the purchaser there is an exclusion of liability clause, it will not be 
affective against third parties. Additionally, other types of product liability can also 
lead to tortious actions, for instance if a table or seat has injured the passenger. 
Generally, airline companies cover these damages.158 Consequently, we are not going 
to elaborate on this section but some references will be made in the part of this 
dissertation concerning insurance.  
 
  
                                                 
151 The victims of defective products are not only the users but it can also be a bystander. See: David G. Owen, 
‘Products Liability: Principles of Justice for the 21st Century’ (1990) 11 Pace Law Review 63, p.67 
Also, vicarious liability is mostly seen as a type of strict liability of the employer for the wrongful act of his 
employee. For more information see: Paula Giliker, Vicarious liability in tort : a comparative perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
152 Directive 85/374/ EEC liability for defective products 
153 Even though the Directive named it strict liability, elements of negligence are required in order for the 
Directive to apply. The plaintiff still needs to prove “damage, defect and causal relationship between the defect 
and the damage”, according to Article 4 of the Directive. Furthermore, Article 7 enumerates cases in which 
manufacturers will not be liable.  
154 Elmar Giemulla and Heiko van Schyndel, ‘Liability in European Law’ in Elmar M. Giemulla and Ludwig 
Weber (eds), International and EU aviation law: selected issues International and EU Aviation Law : Selected 
Issues (p.339-355, Kluwer Law International, 2011), p.349; Simoncini, ‘Governing air traffic management in the 
single European sky: the search for possible solutions to safety issues’(n 115), p.225; Alias, ‘E.02.13-ALIAS-
D1.3-Framing the Problem - Final Version’ (Version 00.00.01) E.02.13 (2013), p.39 
155 Article 8 is without prejudice to national law, as a result the right of recourse will only exist if it is allowed by 
national law.  
156 David I Levine and Carel J.J.M. Stolker, ‘Aviation products liability for manufacturing and design defects : 
two recent developments’, in  Doo Hwan Kim and Chia-Jui Cheng (eds), The utilization of the world's air space 
and free outer space in the 21st century: proceedings of the International Conference on Air and Space Policy, 
Law and Industry for the 21st Century held in Seoul from 23-25 June 1997 (Kluwer Law International, 2000), 
p.189 
157 Alias, ‘E.02.13-ALIAS-D1.3-Framing the Problem - Final Version’ (Version 00.01.02) E.02.13 (2013), p.58 
158 Justyn Harding et all, Aviation Insurance (Institute And Faculty of Actuaries)  
<http://www.e-
bookspdf.org/view/aHR0cDovL3d3dy5hY3R1YXJpZXMub3JnLnVrL3N5c3RlbS9maWxlcy9kb2N1bWVudH
MvcGRmL2hhcmRpbmcucGRm/QXZpYXRpb24gSW5zdXJhbmNlIC0gSW5zdGl0dXRlIEFuZCBGYWN1bH
R5IE9mIEFjdHVhcmllcw> accessed 29 June 2014, p.22 
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iii. State 
The concept of State liability in air collision cases is not new; it has roots in 
International law. It is not embodied in any conventions. A State is responsible and 
liable with regard to certain specific duties related to aviation, according to customary 
international law.159160 When the State provides a service and is not acting as a private 
person, it will be held liable for the wrongdoing of its agents. In other words, the State 
will be liable for the negligence of its national Air Navigation Service Provider. 
Additionally, the State will be required to pay damages that result from the negligence 
of the air traffic controller(s), if such person(s) are regarded as a civil servant under 
national provisions.161 The State will be required to compensate damages occurring as 
a result of negligence on the side of the air traffic controller(s), if under national 
provisions that person is regarded as a civil servant.162 The State may then sue the 
wrongdoer, but that is done under national law.  
 
Claim for compensation can be filed in two different ways: by relying on public 
international law or by relying on private international law. Public international law is 
not used in case of aviation law as the threshold is too hard to meet: one state needs to 
show that the other state breaches an international duty which results in damages for it 
or its citizens.163 Private international law allows private parties to sue a State.164 
 
                                                 
159 No damages are required: the simple breach of its international obligations will lead to State liability.  
See: Christian Dominicé, ‘The international responsibility of states for breach of multilateral obligations’ (1999) 
10 European Journal of International Law 353, p.359-360 
160 Article 1 of the UN document on responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful acts. Retrieved from: 
United Nations Legislative Series, Materials on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts 
(Book 25, ST/LEG/SER B/25, United Nations, 2012); But also in Niels van Antwerpen, Cross-border provision 
of air navigation services with specific reference to Europe: safeguarding transparent lines of responsibility and 
liability (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2008), p.111; Loewenstein (n 3), p.28-29; Abeyratne, Air navigation 
law (n 133), p.38 
161 Walter Schwenk and Rüdiger Schwenk, Aspects of international co-operation in air traffic management 
(Martin Nyhoff Publisher, 1998), p.140 
162 du Perron (n 85), p.206 
163 For instance the Chicago Convention, the State is under no obligation to compensate the victims. But States 
mostly consider ANS as falling under their responsibility.  
See: van Antwerpen, Cross-border provision of air navigation services (n 160), p.120; Francis Schubert, La 
responsabilité des agences du contrôle de la circulation aérienne (Lenticularis, 1994) 
164 Schwenk and Schwenk (n 161), p.139-140 
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This is one of the reasons why the agreements establishing the FABs between 
Member States must be clearly designed. If this is not the case, then the State where 
the accident occurs will pay for damages arising from the wrongdoing of a foreign 
entity, without any possibility of subsequent compensation from the wrongdoer.  
Undoubtedly, the State will try to recover its losses through different means, which 
may have myriad disastrous consequences. 
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iv. Contractual liability 
Business would be impossible without contract law. Contracts are everywhere and 
allow enterprises to do business together. This is also true in airspace law.165 One of 
the most common contracts in aviation law is the contract of carriage, which is 
regulated by International and European instruments.  
 
Contractual clauses are mostly used to mitigate tortious liability principles. The use 
of exclusion clauses, whereby the liability of one of the parties is limited or 
extinguished, may encourage companies to enter into riskier agreements because they 
know that they are protected against liability. The best example is when the purchaser 
agrees on a limitation clause, whereby the software producer is precluded from 
liability for damages caused by a defect in the software.166 Limited liability could also 
encourage manufacturers to invent more complex systems without fearing they will be 
saddled with liability stemming from their product’s failure. While this has benefits, it 
also means that the purchaser has no recourse, which may discourage consumers who 
do not want to bear the risk. Article 26 of the Montreal Convention explicitly prohibits 
this kind of clauses. Furthermore, these clauses do not protect software developers 
against third parties claims.167  
 
With respect to the SES, it will be difficult to ascertain when contract liability will 
arise since the terms of any contracts remain unsettled. However, it is possible to 
identify the main situations in which it would be likely for a contract to be established, 
to which contractual liability could be attached.   
 
                                                 
165 Bartsch (n 126), ch.5 contract law in introduction  
166Antonio Moccia, ATACCS’13-Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Application and Theory of 
Automation in Command and Control Systems (edited by Guillaume Brat, Eduardo Garcia, Antonio Moccia, 
Philippe Palanque, Alberto Pasquini, Francisco Javier Saez & Marco Winckler, ACM, 2013), p.120 
167 For instance in the UK, a person that was not involved in the accident, but who suffered emotional or nervous 
trauma by hearing about the involvement of a relative, has a claim on negligence under the Fatal Accidents Act 
1976 and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. See: Hamid Kazemi, ‘Carrier’s liability in air 
transport with particular reference to Iran’(PhD, Leiden University, 2012), p31; Alias, E.02.13 (version 
00.01.02) (n 157), p.58 
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Contractual liability can be imposed on air carriers but only towards its passengers, 
as embodied in the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions.168169 Due to the presumption 
that a fault was made by the carrier during the carriage, the burden of proof is on the 
carrier.170 But contractual liability is not always applicable; even though the Air 
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) charge the airlines for their services, they 
generally do not have a proper contract with the airline companies. According to some 
authors, certain crucial elements of contract are missing.171 The same is true with 
regards to controllers, whose tasks are provided by law and not contract.172 This 
eliminates contractual liability.173 However, airports may be contractually liable, 
which will be explained in further detail later.174 
 
We might notice a change in the nature of the legal relationship between ANSPs 
and airline companies resulting from the establishment of the FABs and the allocation 
of service provision to a private ANSP.175 It could become more common to enter into 
contracts with private companies, which if breached, would lead to contractual 
liability.  
  
                                                 
168 The Warsaw Convention contains a set of rules which helps to resolve claim arising out of contractual 
relationship in the context of international air carriage. See: Hwan Kim, ‘Some considerations of the draft for the 
convention on an integrated system of international aviation liability’ (n 139), p.765; Erotokritou (n 146), p.2 
169 The courts of both the place of departure and of arrival have jurisdiction as ruled in Case C-204/08 
Peter Rehder v Air Baltic Corporation 
170 Hwan Kim (n 139), p.765-766 
171 van Antwerpen (n 37), p.34; du Perron (n 85), p.206 
172 du Perron (n 85), p.205  
173 Erotokritou (n 146), p.2 
174 du Perron (n 85), p.211 
175 Erotokritou (n 146), p.2 
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B. Causes of accidents leading to liability: 
Aviation cases are organisational accidents meaning that the accident is due to 
multiple causes involving various actors who operate at different levels.176  
i. Latent defect/ technical failure 
The major problem with latent defects is that they may be “dormant” in the system 
for a long time.177 The defects may only become evident when other errors occur. In 
other words, the adverse consequences of latent defects may be dormant for a long 
time and together with other errors may lead to even more disastrous consequences.178 
Generally, controllers do not create accidents, but more often, they inherit of defective 
systems (software). The defective system leads to collisions when combined with 
other mistakes.179 Latent defects pose a greater threat to safety because they are mostly 
undetectable before an accident happens and can lead to serious incidents.180 But 
above all, the main problem is that latent defects are remote from the control interface, 
which makes it hard to determine the cause(s) of the problem(s) and therefore who 
should be held liable.181  
 
Latent defects may be the result of an error by the designer, maintenance personnel, 
constructors, managers, the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) as a 
technology and Air Traffic Management system (ATM) as encompassing all the 
components of the ATM system.182 For instance, the Concorde case, where a piece of 
metal, which fell from the aircraft onto the runway, cutting the tire and leading to the 
fire of the Concorde. This was a case of bad design which led to catastrophic results.  
 
                                                 
176 James Reason, ‘Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice’ (1998) 12 Work and Stress 293, p.295 
177 James Reason, ‘Beyond the organisational accident: the need for "error wisdom" on the frontline’ (2004) 13 
Quality & Safety in Health Care 28, p.29 
178 James Reason, Human error (Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.173 
179  Ibid, p.173; James Reason, ‘Human error: models and management’ (2000) 320 British Medical Journal 768 
180 Robert B. Whittingham, The blame machine why human error causes accidents (Elsevier Butterworth-
Heinemann, 2004), p. 30; Reason, ‘Beyond the organisational accident: the need for "error wisdom" on the 
frontline’ (n 177), p.29 
181 Reason, Human error (n 178), p.173 
182 Ibid, p.173 
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For the purpose of my research, I will mostly focus on the latent defect in the ATM 
and TCAS softwares, because this may have repercussion on the liability in cross-
border cases. Additionally, this software is part of the multi-layer technology 
developed to maximize the reduction of the risk of mid-air collisions.183 Nevertheless, 
the designer of the systems cannot possibly foresee all accidental scenarios that might 
occur.184  
 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is often viewed as improving safety.185 
Yet, what happens when the system does not function properly and leads to disasters 
such as collisions? It is acknowledged that the system has the potential to reduce the 
likelihood of crashes.186 The reduction of risks through a new system does not 
necessarily preclude the introduction of new sources of safety risks by that system. 
The ATM software introduced is based on an automation of the existing system. This 
will reduce the workload of the controllers187 but its ability to increase safety depends 
on the ability of the system to override human error when needed. The new system 
may reduce human errors but it will also make it more difficult to determine what 
went wrong, which is critical for allocating liability. Who is liable and to what extent 
will also be difficult to determine. There are myriad of reasons why the ATM system 
may fail.188 For instance, in both the Linate and the Überlingen cases, the investigation 
highlighted a problem that was caused by a latent defect in the system in conjunction 
with human error.189  
                                                 
183 James K. Kuchar and Ann C. Drumm, ‘The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System’ (2007) 16 Lincoln 
Laboratory Journal 277, p.277 
184 Reason, ‘Beyond the organisational accident: the need for "error wisdom" on the frontline’ (n 177), p.2 
185 ATM system was created to guarantee flight safety. See: Andrew Cook, European air traffic management : 
principles, practice, and research (Ashgate Publisher, 2007), p.1; Jeffrey J. Joyce, ‘Software safety for air traffic 
management systems’ (Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of British Columbia, 
Vancouver, 2002)  
<http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/35848/16-358JSpring-2003/NR/rdonlyres/Aeronautics-and-
Astronautics/16-358JSystem-SafetySpring2003/3A4E41EE-1935-4631-A018-A8DC84CE6E44/0/jeffjoyce.pdf> 
accessed 3 July 2014, p.1 
186 Joyce (n 185), p.1 
187 Alias, E.02.13 (version 00.01.02) (n 157), p.57; Joyce (n 185), p.1 
188 Joyce (n 185), p.9 
189Eurocontrol, ‘ES2 - Experience Sharing Enhanced SMS’<http://www.eurocontrol.int/services/es2-experience-
sharing-enhanced-sms> accessed 29 June 2014; Agenzia Nazionale per la sicurezza del volo, ‘Accident involved 
aircraft Boeing MD-87, registration SE-DMA and Cessna 525-A, registration D-IEVX Milano Linate Airport, 8 
October 2001’ (2004) N. A/1/04 <http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/480.pdf> (accessed 5 June 2014); 
Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung, ‘Investigation Report’ (2004) AX001-1-2/02  
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Defects in the TCAS can be caused by the processors insufficient capacity to 
compute updates or design defects.190 TCAS can also induce minor errors and new 
hazards.191 Additionally, defects can occur in the Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems 
(RPAS), if, for instance, the software that calculates the avoidance manoeuvres does 
not function properly due to inadequate testing. In these cases, the airline companies 
or the ATM providers would have a product liability claim against the constructor or 
designer, unless there is an exclusion clause in the contract.192 Product liability claims 
are only acceptable when it can be proven that the technology proposed by the 
manufacturer has failed to function properly, which led to the crash.193 This has been 
illustrated in the judgment of the Spanish Court of First Instance N. 34 of 
Barcelona194, whereby the Court decided that the alleged defect could not be proven 
and the technology worked properly.195 In order to apply product liability rules, the 
technology provided by the manufacturer needs to be considered as a product in the 
first place, otherwise, a different type of liability will apply.196197 Furthermore, a claim 
against the software producer will fail if the contract contains an exclusion clause 
which extinguishes the designer liability.198  
 
Air Traffic Control Systems are less likely to be subjected to bugs because the 
profile of these special-purpose software systems are better defined than those for 
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/AIG/Documents/Safety%20Recommendations%20to%20ICAO/Final
%20Reports/02001351_final_report_01.pdf>(accessed 22 June 2014)  
190 Moccia (n 166), p.119  
191 José Luis Garcia-Chico, ‘A human factors analysis of operational errors in ATC: the TCAS case study’ 
(Degree of Master of Science, The Faculty of the Graduate Program in Human Factors and Ergonomics of San 
José State University, 2006)  
<http://www.hf.faa.gov/hfportalnew/Search/DOCs/JLGChico-Thesis-Operational%20Errors%20in%20ATC-
TCAS_Final_no%20appendix_.pdf> accessed 29 June 2014, p.1 
192 Moccia (n 166), p.120 
193 Isabella Henrietta Philepine Diederiks-Verschoor, An introduction to air law (Aspen Publishers, 2006), p.148 
194 The case was first filed in the US, where the claim was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, 
Faat v. Honeywell Int’l, (2005) WL 2475701 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2005)   
195 Alias, E.02.13 (version 00.01.02) (n 157), p.39 
196 If the TCAS is regarded as a service then the liability basis will be fault and no more strict liability. However, 
after the decision of the CJEU in the Usedsoft case (C-128/11), we can deduce that TCAS failure will fall under 
product liability.  
197 Moccia (n 166), p.120 
198 R. Bender, Space transport liability: national and international aspects (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1995), 
p.143; Moccia (n 166), p.120 
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general use software.199 Although the risk cannot be eliminated entirely, the reduced 
risk of software bugs is critical because of the disastrous consequences that a failure in 
these software programs could create.  
 
According to the Swiss cheese theory, accidents are caused by a multitude of 
failures.200 Under the Swiss cheese theory, the simultaneous alignment of failures, at 
different levels of the system, can lead to disastrous consequences.201 Human errors, 
both active and latent, are only two of the possible failures.202  
  
                                                 
199 Stephen H. Kan, Metrics and models in software quality engineering (2nd ed, Addison-Wesley Professional, 
2002), p.87; Charles Perrow, Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies (Princeton University Press E-
Book, 2011), p.133 
200 Eurocontrol, ‘Revising the "swiss cheese" model of accidents’ (Eurocontrol Experimental Centre) (2006) 
EEC Note No. 13/06 <http://i3pod.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Revisiting-the-Swiss-Cheese-Modek-EEC-
note-2006-13.pdf> (accessed 13 April 2014)  
201 Reason, ‘Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice’ (n 176), p.295-6; Reason, ‘Beyond the organisational 
accident: the need for "error wisdom" on the frontline’ (n 177), p.29 
202 Garcia-Chico (n 191), p.35 
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ii. Human error 
Many authors around the world, particularly in the US, argue that human error 
causes most accidents.203 Others have demonstrated that human error cannot provide 
the whole picture. It is true that looking at the causation chain and finding the root 
cause of the accident is very complicated, if not impossible.204 It might seem simple to 
say that the error was caused by a person without considering the complex system with 
which he/she works. But it is also in human nature to find causes to problems even 
when there are none, and to try to fit all the facts together.205 In Hollnagel’s view, 
accidents happen as a result of the convergence of several factors, but he does not 
consider any one of these the main cause. In the complex and nearly automatic system, 
humans are usually seen as the most vulnerable component, but at the same time, they 
are the ultimate safety barrier to prevent collisions, as they are more flexible and can 
make adjustments which will stop or mitigate the failure which computers cannot 
do.206  
 
The term human error encompasses any situation where part or all of an incident or 
collision is caused by human action.207 Therefore, human errors can be caused by 
various actions, leading to liability of various actors. According to Reason’s definition 
a human error is: ‘a generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned 
sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and 
when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance agency.’208 
In the past few decades, the automation of the system has increased.209 But even with 
all the innovations, humans still order traffic flow, even if computerization has 
                                                 
203 Robert L. Helmreich, ‘On error management: lessons from aviation’ (2000) 320 British Medical Journal 781, 
p.781; Whittingham (n 180); Eduardo Salas and Dan Maurino (eds), Human factors in aviation (2nd ed, 
Academic Press Publisher, 2010), p.337; Barnes W. McCormick, ‘Aviation accident reconstruction and 
litigation: a gudie for the attorney and expert’, in Barnes W. McCormick and Myron P. Papadakis (eds), Aircraft 
Accident Reconstruction & Litigation (4th ed, Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company, Inc, 2011)   
204 Garcia-Chico (n 191), p.5 
205 Erik Hollnagel, ‘The phenotype of erroneous actions’ (1993) 39 International Journal of Man Machine 
Studies 1, p.25 
206 Garcia-Chico (n 191), p.5; Alias, E.02.13 (version 00.01.02) (n 157), p.20 
207 Hollnagel, ‘The phenotype of erroneous actions’ (n 203); Whittingham (n 180), p.3 
208 Reason, Human error (n 178), p.9 
209 Ibid, p.174 
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allowed them to do many tasks at the same time.210 As a result, between humans and 
their ‘initial’ activities more and more layers of systems have been integrated211 and 
the tasks have increased in complexity.212 Today, their task is primarily to monitor the 
system.213 The efficiency of a system depends entirely on its actors.214   
 
Human error can occur in various ways. For example, when the person in charge of 
the maintenance did an insufficient or nonexistent maintenance, this leads to a human 
error. In such a situation, the maintenance operator is the first person held liable 
because he/she is under a duty of care. But one can also hold the maintenance manager 
responsible for a failure to realise that the problem could arise. Additionally, in some 
legal systems, the maintenance company can be held vicariously liable. Organisational 
responsibility of the company may also be available.215 
 
According to the latent factors theory, accidents can only happen if latent 
conditions are present.216 In other words, in a perfect system, human error will not 
have an important impact and will not be able to cause accidents. However, since a 
perfect system does not exist, there must be a failure in the system. This failure in the 
system combined with a human error will render accidents possible and mostly 
inevitable.217 
  
Nevertheless, this principle cannot always be held true. For instance in the Nantes 
accident, there were two major causes of the collision: first, military air controllers, 
who were not familiar with the equipment, were providing air control under the 
                                                 
210 van Antwerpen (n 37), p.5 
211 Reason, ‘Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice’(n 176), p.296 
212 For instance see: Perrow (n 199) or Erik Hollnagel and David D. Woods, Joint cognitive systems: foundations 
of cognitive systems engineering ( CRC Press, 2005), p.3 and seq  
213 Reason, Human error (n 178), p.174; Alias, E.02.13 (version 00.01.02) (n 157), p.20 
214 Robert W. Proctor and Trisha Van Zandt, Human factors in simple and complex systems (2nd ed, CRC Press, 
2008), p.9 
215 Moccia (n 166), p.119, figure 5 
216 Helmreich (n 203), p.783 
217 Catino 
 (n 116), p.189  
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Clément Marot system.218 Second, the controller mistakenly instructed the Spantax 
airliner to climb to level 290 twenty-two minutes before the accident.219 Therefore, 
both the Spantax aircraft and the Iberia flight, which were supposed to fly over Nantes 
at the same time (12h52), were at the same altitude but on different traffic lanes.220  
 
The control center of Brest (Menhir) communicated to the control center of Mont-
de-Marsan (Marina), which was in communication with the Spantax, to request the 
Spantax crew to delay their arrival over Nantes, because no other flight level was 
available.221222 Due to the lack of knowledge about the international civil aviation 
conventions, the controller forgot to confirm the order given to the Spantax. The 
confirmation of the order requesting the pilot to delay his arrival by eight minutes was 
given only nine minutes before the aircraft was meant to arrive in the Nantes sector. 
The pilot should have immediately requested to fly racetrack,223 however, he did not 
because he thought that by reducing his speed he would be able to lose the eight 
minutes. The traffic controller instructed the pilot to change radio frequency, as he was 
at the boundaries between the two control centers resulting in bad communication with 
the Marina control center. The pilot understood the order as being immediately 
effective and changed frequencies. The pilot reiterated his demand to fly racetrack but 
received no answer. The pilot was facing a dilemma; either wait for permission or be 
                                                 
218 The Clément Marot system is a contingency system established in order to ensure traffic control over French 
airspace when civilian air controllers are striking. The task of civilian traffic controller is taking over by military 
air controllers for the duration of the strike.  
219 "En raison de la grève des service de contrôle de l’aviation civile, le dispositif de remplacement, dit Clément 
Marot, prévu par l’instruction RAC-7, a été mis en place le 24 février 1973, à 11 h TU, par NOTAM A 96 du 
même jour." See: BEA, ‘Rapport final de la Commission d'Enquête sur la collision du DC. 9 EC-BII de la Iberia 
et du Coronado EC-BJC de la compagnie Spantax [Région de Nantes-5 mars 1973]’ (reproduction of report of 
1975) (2002) <http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1973/ec-i730305/pdf/ec-i730305.pdf> (accessed 22 April 2014), 
p.6 ; French Secretariat of State for Transport, ‘Iberia DC 9 EC-BII, Spantax Coronado EC-BJC, report on the 
collision in the Nantes area, France, on March 1973 : reprint of the report published by the French Secretariat of 
State for Transport’ (1975) Aircraft Accident Report 7/75  
<http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/7-1975%20EC-BII%20and%20EC-BJC.pdf> (accessed 3 
July 2014), p.9  
220 Aviation Safety Network, ‘Accidents’ <http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19730305-
1&lang=fr> accessed 2 March 2014 
221 Normally, when two planes are due to arrive at the same time over an identical point, the procedure requires 
the controllers to request one of the flight to change altitude. Here however, this possibility was apparently 
unavailable, that is why the controllers requested the Spantax to retard its arrival by 8 minutes. The new arrival 
time over Nantes beacon should have been 13H00.  
222 Aircraft Accident Report 7/75 (n 219), p.9  
223 When a plane flights racetrack that means it leaves its original traffic lane to go on the side and comes back in 
its original lane when it has lost the amount of time required 
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in defiance of the order he received, namely to delay his arrival over Nantes. So, the 
pilot decided to turn starboard with poor visibility and by doing so, he crashed into the 
Iberia flight arriving behind it.224 Notably, none of the control centers received 
Spantax’s flight plan beforehand225 so they did not expect the Spantax in their 
sectors.226  
 
In this case, no system defects were spotted in the accident report, only a human 
error. The controller’s responsibility in the collision is undeniable, while the pilot’s 
responsibility/role is unclear.227 Moreover, the French Government, perhaps a less 
obvious actor, was one of the main actors at fault; the French Government at that time 
refused to participate in fruitful negotiations that had begun in March 1973.228  
 
It seems that the Nantes accident is more of an exception, with the latent factor 
theory being generally the rule in cases of air collision. Therefore, it seems logical that 
the manager in charge of flight security would be held personally liable as a result of 
an accident. Furthermore, depending on national law, the company providing the 
service can be held vicariously liable.229 To reduce the risk of human error, a new 
ATM system was introduced with the primary purpose of diminishing the controller 
workload.230 However, the automation of the ATM system creates new tasks for the 
controllers, such as entering flight data and clearance. This poses the main problem: 
the system may work perfectly but if the controller fails to update the clearance or the 
flight data, it will cause false alarms. For instance, if the controller fails to change the 
altitude of an aircraft in the system and another aircraft is at the same altitude, then the 
system will send an alert to avoid collision when in fact there are no risks of such a 
                                                 
224 Aviation Safety Network (n 220)  
225 Aircraft Accident Report 7/75 (n 219), p.8; BEA (n 219), p.6 
226 BEA (n 219), p.6 
227 BBC-News, ‘1973: Mid-air collision kills 68’ 
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/5/newsid_4202000/4202039.stm> accessed 2 March 
2014  
228 A French administrative court found that the French State was responsible for 85% of the damages. The 
collision would have been certainly avoided if the controllers were not on strike. See de case from Conseil d’Etat 
1982.  
229 Moccia (n 166), p.119, figure 5 
230 Joyce (n 185), p.2; Frank Redmill and Tom Anderson, Improvements in system safety proceeding of the 
sixteenth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK, 5-7 February 2008 (Safety-Critical Systems Club, 
Springer, 2008), p.155-157 
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collision. If the pilots follow the instructions and change altitude again, his plane may 
end up on the same route as another aircraft. Such scenario fails to predict a real 
conflict.231 Furthermore, action taken by the system will be less comprehensible to the 
controller as he will only be supervising it but no longer dealing with the problem 
itself, unless a failure occurs.232  
 
One should bear in mind that the defect in the system could be present for several 
years but not until the combination of the defect with human error will disaster 
occur.233 The Überlingen mid-air collision case is a good example of this. On 1 July 
2002 at 23:35 a mid-air collision occurred between Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 
and DHL Flight 611 over the towns of Überlingen and Owingen in Southern Germany. 
The fact that both planes were flying at the same level, namely 36,000 feet, caused the 
accident. Flight 2937 was a charter flight from Moscow to Barcelona, carrying 60 
passengers and nine Russian crew members. The other plane was a cargo aircraft, with 
only the two pilots present, going from Bergamo to Brussels. All 71 people aboard the 
two aircraft died.  
 
Peter Nielsen was on two workstations at the time of the accident. This was against 
air control regulations, but was nevertheless, current practice in the Swiss company. 
Due to some maintenance on the main radar requiring the controller to work with a 
slower system, in addition to his own negligence, he failed to notice that the two 
aircrafts were on the same route at the same level and therefore, failed to keep them at 
a safe distance from one another. Furthermore, each plane had an on-board system 
called Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), and this system is linked to the air 
traffic control post in Zurich, where Skyguide was established. However, the system 
failed to alert Nielsen and only alerted the two pilots less than a minute before the 
crash. When Nielsen realised that the danger of having an accident was present, he 
requested the Russian plane to go down by a thousand feet. At the same time, 
however, the TCAS of both aircraft gave orders to avoid an accident; instructing the 
DHL plane to descend and the Russian plane to climb. Under Russian regulation, in 
                                                 
231 Joyce (n 185), p.3 
232 Alias, E.02.13 (version 00.01.02) (n 157), p.20 
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case of conflicting instructions, the final decision is left to the pilot. In this case, the 
pilot listened to Nielsen’s instructions and descended. Therefore both planes 
descended. Nielsen did not receive a notification of the alerts issued by the TCAS. The 
last crucial mistake he made was to tell the Russian crew that the DHL plane was on 
its right while in fact it was on his left. As a result, the Russian crew saw the DHL 
plane a few seconds before the collision but could not climb quickly enough to avoid 
it.  
 
In this incident, the collision occurred due to both a system failure, the maintenance 
of the radar and the TCAS failure to alert Nielsen on time, but also due to a human 
mistake, namely, Nielsen failing to realise that two aircrafts were on the same route at 
the same level.234  
 
Human errors can also be caused by pilots, crews and mechanics.235 It might be 
complicated to determine who was actually at fault. In theory every person has a 
specific role, however in practice people assist one another in order to increase 
efficiency.236 Then the question remains: is the person who helped make the decision, 
even though it was not part of his/her tasks, also liable? If a controller delegates part of 
his work to a colleague because he or she has too much work to do, or is taking a 
break as in the Überlingen case, does that mean that person is free from liability? As a 
general rule, liability is not transferrable but in certain specific cases, the person may 
be absolved from his/her responsibilities.  
 
The use of more complex systems and the risk of latent conditions in that system 
require the judge to look at the broad picture in order to decide a case, using the 
systemic approach theory to human error. In other words, a complex system cannot be 
                                                 
234 P. Nikolai Ehlers, ‘Case Note: Lake Constance Mid-Air Collision: Bashkirian Airlines v. Federal Republic of 
Germany’(2007) 32 Air & Space law 75  
235 Reason, Human error (n 178), p.173 
236 It is also referred to as the problem of many hands. See for instance: Rosja Mastop, ‘Characterising 
Responsibility in Organisational Structures: The Problem of Many Hands’, in Guido Governatori and Giovanni 
Sartor (eds), Deontic Logic in computer science (p.274-287, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010) 
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studied separately from human error because the interaction between the human users 
and the system itself forms the very essence of the systems.237 
 
Finally, it should be remembered that in these complex and nearly automatic 
systems, the human factor is usually the most vulnerable component, but at the same 
time, is also the ultimate safety barrier against collisions.238 Lastly, human errors can 
occur despite the competence of the operator.239   
 
In the current stage of the SES Regulations, the problem of latent-human error has 
not been discussed. The absence of clear (general) liability rules combined with the 
omission of addressing the human-machine relationship, especially for the ATM part, 
will complicate the picture further.   
 
  
                                                 
237 M Ottimo, ‘Complex systems’ (2003) 49 AIChE Journal 292, p.293 
238 Garcia-Chico (n 191), p.5 
239 Graham D. Edkins, ‘A review of the benefits of aviation human factors training’ (2002) 2 Human Factors and 
Aerospace Safety 201, p.118 
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C. Actors involved in traffic control and their liabilities 
This section will help to answer the main question by looking at the different actors 
involved and assessing the status of liability without the SES and whether the SES will 
change the liability framework.  
i. States 
Under customary international law, a State is responsible and liable for any breach 
of its international obligations.240241 For instance, Article 28 of the Chicago 
Convention imposes an obligation on the contracting States, to provide air navigation 
services.242 Article 31 of the Convention requires States to certify the airworthiness of 
aircrafts flying under its flag. Article 32 obliges the States to control the licenses for 
personnel on board aircrafts and to have insurance for potential damage to the 
aircraft.243 In as much, if a State does not comply with these provisions and a collision 
occurs, it will be liable.  
 
Another important principle of international law is that the State of occurrence is 
under the duty to compensate the victims and subsequently, it can seek recourse 
against the wrongdoer(s). A similar recommendation was made to the Commission by 
Eurocontrol in 2008: the state of occurrence is ultimately liable for accidents occurring 
within its airspace even after the introduction of the FABs system.244  
 
The FAB system is based on a close cooperation among States. In order to meet 
this requirement, Member States have to enter into agreements to establish the 
different FABs. The FABs could have changed the previous liability picture by 
                                                 
240 Article 1 of the UN document on responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful acts. 
Retrieved from: United Nations Legislative Series (n 160); But also in van Antwerpen, Cross-border provision 
of air navigation services (n 160), p.111; Loewenstein (n 3), p.28-29; Abeyratne, Air navigation law (n 133), 
p.38 
241 The Convention establishes rights and duties between States, but it does not create rights for individuals. See: 
Loewenstein (n 3), p.28-29 
242 van Antwerpen (n 37), p. 24; Erotokritou (n 146), p.1 
243 These provisions have been transposed into Regulation 550/2004, under Articles 6 and 7. In order for Article 
7 to be fulfilled the requirements of Regulation 2096/2005 must be met, as mentioned in Article 3 of Regulation 
2096/2005.  
244 Recommendation 17 in Eurocontrol, FAB Evaluation (n 31), p.181 
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introducing a new approach since the system is new. Therefore, the question is; would 
the State still be primarily liable?  
 
We can take a look at the Maastricht Upper Area Control Center (MUAC) and to 
which extent the State is liable. One may even regard the MUAC as the first FAB 
established in Europe. Eurocontrol is in charge of the MUAC, therefore it is partially 
liable for anything happening in the area covered by the MUAC, which consists of a 
part of Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands, as provided in the amended version 
of 1981, which amended the 1960 Convention signed in Brussels.245 Eurocontrol can 
face both contractual and delictual liability. Article 28.1 of the amended version246 
stipulates that the contractual liability derived and is governed by the law applicable to 
the contract. However, ATM services never give rise to contractual liability but only 
to delictual liability.247 Therefore, when Eurocontrol is operating as an ANSP then 
only Article 28.2 is applicable. Paragraph 2 stipulates that Eurocontrol is liable for 
damage resulting from its negligence, as it has legal personality, and that state 
immunity does not cover Eurocontrol.  
 
Here comes the problem: under the Belgian version of the agreement, which 
confers power to Eurocontrol, Article 1(2) clearly states that the delegation does not 
extinguish the rights and duties of the Belgian State under international agreements.248 
One may ask who is liable and who will pay first, to which an answer can be found in 
Article 11 of the same agreement. Although paragraph 1 states that each party is liable 
for the damage imputable to it, the second paragraph clearly states that, except for the 
cases falling under paragraph 1, Eurocontrol has to guarantee the contracting parties 
                                                 
245 Alias, E.02.13(version 00.00.01) (n 154), p.64 
246 Previously Article 25.1 of the Eurocontrol Convention  
247 Schwenk and Schwenk (n 161), p.148 
248 ‘Article 1.  
1. […] 
2. Chacune des Parties contractantes nationales, […], conserve ses compétences et obligations en matière de 
législation aéronautique, de réglementations, d'organisation de l'espace aérien et de relations avec des 
Organisations internationales comme l'OACI, ainsi qu'avec les usagers de l'espace aérien ou toute autre 
tierce partie.’  
Retrieved from: Accord relatif à la fourniture et à l'exploitation d'installations et des services de la circulation 
aérienne par EUROCONTROL au centre de contrôle régional de Maastricht, signé à Bruxelles le 25 novembre 
1986. Affaires Etrangères, Commerce extérieur et coopération au développement. Publication n° 14-03-1990, p. 
4706, Entrée en vigueur le 01-01-1990. 
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against actions that might be brought for damages. Here again, the picture is blurry; on 
the one hand we know that Eurocontrol will have to pay for damages, but on the other 
hand, the agreement does not extinguish the duties of the Contracting States under 
international law. Furthermore, the problem will be even harder to solve as the 
Convention neither stipulates which law will be applicable, nor which forum will have 
jurisdiction.249 Nevertheless, Eurocontrol has recourse against a State if the damages 
are also due to the negligence of that State, as specified in Article 28.2 of the 
consolidated version of the Convention250 and Article 11(3) of the Belgian 
Agreement.251  
 
The situations among Member States varies considerably; for instance in Germany 
only the State can be sued, whereas in other Member States, the air traffic provider can 
be held liable and State immunity can be waived. An example of a Member State 
waiving its immunity is the Tenerife collision of 1977, when Spain directly 
compensated the victims.252 The State is also accountable if damages result from a 
failure by the national air navigation service provider. However, the State can then sue 
the provider or sanction internally.253 In the UK, the ANS has been privatized so 
liability does not fall on the State, but rather, on the provider, which is considered a 
normal company by the courts. But, even under the UK approach, the State is not 
                                                 
249 Alias, E.02.13(version 00.00.01) (n 154), p. 64 
250 Old Article 25.2 of the Convention of 1981 
251  ‘Article 11 
1. Chaque Partie contractante nationale est responsable de tout dommage survenu par suite ou à l'occasion des 
services qu'elle fournit à l'Organisation conformément aux dispositions de l'Article 2, paragraphes 2 et 3 du 
présent Accord dans la mesure où ce dommage lui est imputable. 
2. Sauf dans le cas prévu au paragraphe 1 du présent Article, l'Organisation garantit les Parties contractantes 
nationales contre l'action qui résulte d'un dommage survenu par suite ou à l'occasion des services fournis 
conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 1 de l'Article 1 et du paragraphe 1 de l'Article 2 du présent 
Accord. 
3. La responsabilité de l'Organisation peut être mise en cause, conformément au paragraphe 2 de l'Article 25 
de la Convention amendée. Cependant, pour les cas visés au paragraphe 1 du présent Article, l'Organisation 
a un droit de recours contre les Parties contractantes nationales pour toute indemnisation due à ce titre. 
4. […]’ 
252 Erotokritou (n 146), p.1 
253 This is called the state primary responsibility doctrine.  
See: Francis Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single 
European Sky’, in Daniel Calleja Crespo and Pablo Mendes de Leon (eds), Achieving the single European sky: 
goals and challenges (p.51-64, Kluwer Law International, 2011), p.53 
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totally freed from its liability because it may still have to pay for damages for which it 
is directly at fault.254  
 
Even if a State has entered into a delegation agreement, in accordance with Annex 
11 of the Chicago Convention, it will still be liable if the damages occurred on its 
territory. As stipulated in that Annex; ‘a State may delegate to another State the 
responsibility for establishing and providing air traffic services.’255 The State might 
then be able to claim compensation, if the agreement so allows.256  
 
Public authorities still control Air Traffic Management.257 Even when the ATM is 
autonomous, the State will be held responsible -following the principle of international 
law- as the provider is under the regulatory control of the State.258 If public authorities 
are held liable, this means the State can be held liable, even though the State can then 
file another claim or take internal sanctions against the person(s) whose conduct led to 
the accident. The problem arising here is that the lawful interactions between the 
persons acting under state authority, following standard settings, can result in 
damages.259  
 
A state may escape liability by claiming sovereign immunity but only in cases 
involving a private party against that State.260 The courts are very reluctant to hear a 
case involving another State because of state equality embodied in the principle, ‘par 
in parem non habet imperium.’261 Additionally, actions of public bodies are mostly 
covered by state immunity. If the State does not voluntarily waive its immunity, there 
                                                 
254 This is called the service provider exclusive liability doctrine. It will be morally unacceptable if the UK 
would not help NATS to compensate the victim due to the very nature of the ANSP functions. Furthermore, 
NATS remains under the supervision of the UK, which is still responsible for certification and designation of 
service providers. See: Alias, E.02.13(version 00.00.01) (n 154), p. 64 
255 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.55; Schwenk and Schwenk (n 161), p.148  
256 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.55 
257 Simoncini, EUI MWP; 2012/05 (n 116), p.13  
258 Abeyratne, Air navigation law (n 133), p.21  
259 Simoncini, EUI MWP; 2012/05 (n 116), p.13  
260 Christian Tomuschat, ‘The International Law of State Immunity and Its Development by National 
Institutions’  (2011) 44 Vanderbilt journal of transnational law 1105, p.1118 
261 Sévrine Knuchel, ‘State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens’, (2011) 9 Northwestern University Journal 
of International Human Rights 149, p.150; Lazar Vrbaski, ‘Liability of Air Navigation Service Providers: 
Towards an International Solution’ (2013) 38 Air & Space law 33, p.35 
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is little chance that the case will be heard, unless the nation State of the victims 
becomes involved.262 However, eight States which have adhered to the 1972 European 
Convention on State Immunity, have agreed to waive their immunity de jure.263 But 
even if the State has not signed the Convention, States usually renounce to their 
immunity mostly because of moral considerations. For instance in the explanatory note 
of the NEFAB, it is clearly stated that the agreement will prevent states from invoking 
sovereign immunity. Moreover, the victims can ask his/her national State to sue the 
liable State on his/her behalf, making the case a public international case.264 
Consequently, it is critical that the agreement establishing the FABs is drafted to cover 
possible claims that can arise as the result of an accident and prohibit States from 
relying on state immunity arguments. But one should certainly not stress this argument 
too much, as generally States do not rely on their state immunity, at least in Europe.  
 
Generally, immunity is not an issue; the State where the accident occurred must 
compensate the victims, and subsequently can seek recoupment from the wrongdoer. 
A problem might arise if that State refuses to pay, while a foreign victim files a claim 
in their home country: the State of occurrence will be able to claim State immunity. 
There are no cases in the Union where a Member State used its immunity toward 
another Member State. This can partly be explained by the principle of mutual 
recognition and cooperation. The only problem that might arise is with accidents that 
occur in non-EU countries, but it is unclear if the State will claim State immunity. 
 
One may wonder how a case will be dealt with in practice as, it is clear from the 
preamble of the SES Regulation 549/2004 and 551/2004 and Articles on sovereignty 
in both agreements, that the SES will not prejudice the concept embodied in Article 1 
of the Chicago Convention, which reaffirms the sovereignty of states over their 
airspace. Although Paragraph 2.1.1 of Annex 11 of the Convention allows for 
delegation of air navigation service by agreement between States, what about block of 
                                                 
262 Stephen Wilson Brice, ‘Forum shopping in international air accident litigation : disturbing the plaintiff's 
choice of an American forum’ (1984) 7 Boston College international and comparative law review 31,  p. 37; 
Lazar Vrbaski, ‘Liability of Air Navigation Service Providers: Towards an International Solution’ (EU 
Aerospace Law, Leiden University, 2012) <http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/lazar-eu-aerospace-law-paper.pdf> 
accessed 29 June 2014, p.4 
263 Vrbaski, ‘Liability of Air Navigation Service Providers: Towards an International Solution’ (n 262), p.4 
264 Schwenk and Schwenk (n 161), p.140 
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States? First, one should remember the Union agreed to fully comply with the ICAO 
provisions. Second, ICAO is favorable to block of States, or at least does not prohibit 
them.265 Nothing requires States to provide ANS through state-owned entities. The 
only obligation imposed on states is to take care of air navigation services.266 This is in 
accordance with Article 22 of the Chicago Convention which is phrased as follows;  
‘Each contracting State agrees to adopt all practicable measures, […], to 
facilitate and expedite navigation by aircraft between the territories of 
contracting States, and to prevent unnecessary delays to aircraft, crews, 
passengers and cargo, […]’ 
 
One may conclude that inter-state cooperation is already required and embodied in 
the Chicago Convention. Therefore one may ask what will SES change? Why do we 
need it? 
  
                                                 
265 Article 1 of the Chicago Convention only mentioned that; ‘The contracting States recognize that every State 
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory’. 
266 Article 28 of the Chicago Convention 
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1. State liability within the Treaties establishing the FAB. 
Confusion exists regarding the nature and scope of service provision: most of the 
technical and operational responsibilities flowing from the exercise of service 
provisions are often associated with State obligations.267 Normally, the relevant state 
arrangements establishing the FAB will also provide the liability framework, 
otherwise national law will be applicable. This framework is essential for the effective 
operation of the FAB.268 Indeed, when liability frameworks are clear and precise, it 
brings legal certainty, which in turn may attract companies. Furthermore, the 
Contracting States may lay down conditions for reimbursement from the ANSP and 
how to use their right of recourse.269 One should not forget that it is the taxpayers of 
the State of occurrence that will bear the final responsibility for damages, as that State 
is always ultimately liable.270 So, it is crucial for the agreements to provide answers 
and the possibility of recourse in order to protect taxpayers from bearing the financial 
burden of the accident simply because an aircraft crashed over their home state 
without any fault by that State. Unfortunately, as we will see in the following section, 
not every FAB agreement contains specific provisions for a liability framework. 
1.1 FABEC  
The FABEC includes Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands 
and Switzerland. Therefore, it represents one of the biggest blocks: it will be 
accountable for 55% of the European traffic and encompass most of the major 
European airports.271 Due to its size, the number of actors who can be involved in 
accidents is more significant than in other FABs. Therefore, its liability provisions 
must be clear and precise.  
 
Chapter 11 of the Treaty establishing the FABEC deals with liability issues 
involving a cross-border element. According to the first sentence of Article 30.1, the 
State will bear responsibility. The wording of the second paragraph is crystal clear: 
                                                 
267 Schubert F, ‘Legal Aspects of Cross-Border Service Provision in the Single European Sky’ (n 17), p.116 
268 Ibid, p.122; Commission, ‘Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs)’ (n 1)  
269 Schubert F, ‘Legal Aspects of Cross-Border Service Provision in the Single European Sky’ (n 17), p.122 
270 Even in the case of NATS, which is a private company, if NATS is insolvent then the UK will be oblige to 
compensate the victims, due to the fact that ANSP is a sovereign function of the State, as stipulated in the 
Chicago Convention.  
271 Eurocontrol, ‘About FABEC’ <http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/about-fabec> accessed 29 June 2014  
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‘No direct action may be brought against the effective air traffic service provider or its 
agents or any other person acting on its behalf’. Therefore, the primary claim will be 
against the State, who may then claim compensation from the wrongdoer depending 
on the arrangement between the relevant parties. This concept is embodied in Article 
30.6, which gives Member States the possibility to seek reimbursement from the 
ANSP for accidents caused by its negligence, or reimbursement from ‘[…] any other 
person or operational entity’, Article 30.9. Additionally, the State of occurrence and 
the State of the ANSP can agree on sharing the costs, Article 30.8. 
 
This approach differs from the one used in the agreement conferring powers to the 
Maastricht Upper Area Control Center (MUAC). Eurocontrol is in charge of the 
MUAC, therefore it is partially liable for anything that happens over the area covered 
by the MUAC.272 The confusion lies in that: according to the FABEC Treaty, the State 
is primarily liable and then it can ask the ANSP to compensate for its negligence. 
However, in the MUAC agreement, the contrary is stated: Eurocontrol the ANSP is 
primarily liable and then can seek compensation from the negligent State. 
Additionally, Article 30(2) of the FABEC Treaty, clearly stipulates: ‘no direct action 
can be taken against the effective air traffic service provider or its agents or any other 
person acting on its behalf’, whereas Article 28.2 of the Convention establishing 
Eurocontrol stipulates that Eurocontrol is liable for damage resulting from its 
negligence and not subject to state immunity. As a result, if an accident occurs over 
the area under the control of Eurocontrol, no one knows who will be primarily held 
liable, as there are two pieces of legislation that contradict each other. Article 30 (13) 
of the Treaty only mentions ‘[…] bilateral agreements between two Contracting 
States’, which does not apply to the agreement establishing Eurocontrol.  
 
This is not the only contradiction. The Convention delegating power to Eurocontrol 
contains two incompatible provisions. First, the MUAC can be considered the first 
FAB established in Europe. Eurocontrol is in charge of the MUAC, and Article 28.2 of 
the consolidated version of the Convention stipulates that Eurocontrol is liable for 
                                                 
272 A part of Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands as provided in the amended version of 1981 which 
amended the 1960 Convention signed in Brussels. 
See: Alias, E.02.13(version 00.00.01) (n 154), p. 64 
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damage resulting from its negligence and that state immunity does not cover 
Eurocontrol. As stated above, this is in direct contradiction with the principles in the 
Chicago Convention. Second, as explained before273, under the Belgian version of the 
agreement, Eurocontrol is liable for damages imputable to it but the delegation does 
not extinguish the rights and duties of the Belgian State under international 
agreements.274 Here again, the picture is blurry; on the one hand, Eurocontrol will 
have to pay for damages, but on the other hand, the agreement does not extinguish the 
duties of the Contracting States under international law. The answer would have been 
simple, as Eurocontrol would have been liable for the whole amount of damages and 
have recourse against the State(s) for the damages not due to Eurocontrol’s 
negligence. The remaining problem would then be to determine the applicable law and 
jurisdiction. This does not fit, however, with the wording of Article 30 of the FABEC 
Treaty, which states the State is primarily liable. Therefore, in reality it is impossible 
to know who is primarily liable.  
 
Logically, the Treaty leaves it to each Member State to apply its national law to 
resolve domestic cases. However, this does not solve the issue of which law to use in 
cross-border cases, certainly because the Treaty applies only to cases occurring within 
the FABEC as it has a cross-border dimension. If the ANSP, for instance, provides 
service over the State is a national case, even if it has delegated some of its power to a 
foreign ANSP, the case will be considered domestic and the Treaty will not apply.275 
Article 1 (b) further restricted the scope of the Treaty to damages caused by foreign 
ANSPs designated in accordance with Article 8 Regulation 550/2004.  
 
Now that I have determined that the State of occurrence is liable, it is interesting to 
know which courts have jurisdiction and which law is applicable. Here, Article 30.5 
states that claims must be filed in the State of occurrence and must be decided 
according to national law, or at least it must be deduced from the wording of the 
article that it is in the State where the damages have occurred. Following the principle 
                                                 
273 See section C i State 
274 Article 1(2) of the Belgian version of the agreement conferring power to Eurocontrol  
275 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.59-60 
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of international law, it is assumed that it will be the court of the place of occurrence 
that will have jurisdiction. But nothing precludes the possibility that the proper venue 
may be the home court of the victim, though the victim’s home court might be 
reluctant to hear the case because of State immunity, this is unlikely to be much of a 
hindrance as Member States have renounced to immunity.276 
 
The most problematic limitation in the Treaty, aside from the geographical scope, is 
that the Treaty is only a last resort remedy under article 30 paragraph 4. According to 
paragraph 4, victims must first exhaust all available judicial remedies before turning to 
the Treaty to get compensation not already provided by judicial decisions. In other 
words, the victim will, according to the Montreal Convention of 1999, have to file a 
claim against the airline company.277 Then, he/she can bring a tort claim against the 
territorial State or the ANSP, relying on article 4(1) of Rome II which makes it clear 
that the applicable law is the law of the place where the damages arise.278 Article 30(1) 
(a) refers to the same principle. Paragraph 4 may be understood differently, namely 
that the agreement will be applicable if no final decision is rendered. Nevertheless, 
there is one problem with this interpretation: when paragraph 4 is read in conjunction 
with the preceding paragraph (paragraph 3), it is clear that paragraphs 1 and 4 are only 
applicable after a final decision has been given, since the contracting party has two 
years to bring another claim. The wording of the FABEC treaty does not preclude the 
victims to directly file a claim against the State or its ANSP, though such a claim 
would fall outside of the scope of the FABEC agreement.279  
 
Although, one may find the protection offered by the agreement extensive, closer 
examination of the provisions indicates that the Treaty is a last resort instrument and 
provides few answers beyond the basic one, namely, the State over which the accident 
occurred is held liable - an answer that could already have been provided by the 
International Conventions. Many cases are excluded from the scope of the Treaty, i.e., 
                                                 
276 Vrbaski, ‘Liability of Air Navigation Service Providers: Towards an International Solution’ (n 262), p.4  
277 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
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278 Rome II is not applicable according to Article 1(1) as the ANSP is of sovereign nature and Rome II does not 
apply to wrongful act of a State.  
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situations involving national accidents or occurring outside the FAB’s boundaries. 
Additionally, the Treaty only applied when the foreign ANSP was designated 
according to the provision of Article 8 Regulation 550/2004. But, it should not be 
overlooked that the Treaty provides a major advantage, namely, a legal mechanism to 
a State obligated to compensate for the negligence of someone else. For example, 
Article 30(6) of the Treaty enables such States to seek recourse against a foreign 
ANSP, or, if the foreign ANSP defaults, the territorial State may sue the State to which 
the ANSP is linked. And an adequate coverage of the ANSP is required, Article 30.11.  
1.2 The South West FAB example.  
The South West FAB encompasses Spain and Portugal. Even though Article 27 is 
one of the shortest articles on the matter, but it is clear, precise and concise. It leaves 
some room for the contracting States but is generally easily understandable for the 
involved parties for the following reasons:  
 
First, the scope of the agreement is clear: as the title of the Chapter 15 indicates, it 
is only concerned with civil liability. Chapter 15 is only constituted of one rather short 
article, namely Article 27.  
  
Second, Article 27 paragraph 1 stipulates that ‘A Contracting State shall be liable 
for the damage caused by its negligence or that of its agents or of any other person 
acting on its behalf, under the provisions of this Agreement’. This clearly indicates the 
State is liable. Paragraph 2, however, includes a safeguard allowing the State to bring 
an action against another State for reimbursement when the negligence of the other 
State or any agent acting on its behalf was in fact the proximate cause of the accident.   
 
Finally, unlike FABEC agreements, the FAB agreement specifies the choice of law 
as being relational to the place where the damages occurred, unless there is an 
arrangement stating the contrary.  
Unfortunately, the provisions still fail to address the question of proper jurisdiction 
1.3 The UK-Ireland FAB  
This is one of the two currently functioning FABs, however, the text of the State 
agreement is not available. The only document accessible is the Memorandum of 
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Understanding. This rather short document mentions nothing about liability. The main 
legal document leaves the contracting States a lot of freedom. Paragraph 5 of the 
Memorandum enumerates the reserved matters. From that list it can be deduced that 
the arrangement is influenced by the Chicago Convention. 
  
Point 6 is dedicated to dispute resolutions, and directs all disputes to be resolved by 
the National Supervisory Authorities through mutual agreements, or if the dispute is 
too complex by the FAB Supervisory Committee. However, the Memorandum does 
not specify the applicable law or forum, or whether the agreement is a last resort 
instrument. Additionally, there are no provisions on the extent to which the Chicago 
Convention should be applied. The liability system of these countries is does not differ 
greatly, therefore the question of liability would be less troublesome than in other 
FAB.280  
 
In order for a delegation of the ATS request to be valid, it should be initiated either 
by an ATS provider, Eurocontrol or the adjacent State. The request will only be 
accepted if it is clear that it will improve efficiency and safety. NATS, the service 
provider for the UK, is in charge of the development of operational procedures and 
agreements between foreign ANSP and other UK ATS providers. Nevertheless, the 
Single European Sky requires the FAB to be created in the upper part of the airspace, 
and the normal internal procedure for delegation of ATS is not applicable. NATS can 
avail itself of another ANSP’s service, as long as it is not contrary to the intra-state 
agreement. Furthermore, it has been decided that the SES will not apply further than 
the territorial waters.    
1.4 The Danish- Swedish FAB 
This agreement is rather short with only 21 articles. Therefore, one might not be 
surprise to read that no specific article dedicated to liability. Article 14, investigation 
of accidents and incidents, does not provide any help but only states that accidents or 
incidents are to be investigated by the Accident Investigation Committee. Article 20 
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only refers to dispute resolution and the obligation of the contracting States to 
negotiation in order to resolve the dispute.   
 
It is worth mentioning that Sweden has entered into an agreement with Finland and 
a part of the Finish airspace has been delegated to the control of a Swedish ANSP.281 
A political declaration was also signed in 2013, with the purpose of enhancing 
cooperation between the two FABs (NEFAB and Danish-Swedish FAB). Future 
consolidation of the cooperation is not precluded.282 Again the agreement does not 
address liability issues, but does offer only a political agreement to create the so-called 
‘Free Route Airspace’.  
1.5 BLUE MED FAB 
The BLUE MED FAB groups Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta in a same block, and 
like some other agreements, contains a specific provisions dealing with liability. 
Article 25 is fairly identical to Article 30 of the FABEC agreement. Direct action 
against ANSP or its staff is prohibited, Article 25.2. This agreement can only be used 
as a last resort remedy after all international remedies have been exhausted, Article 
25.3 in conjunction with 25.4. Any claim has to be filed with the State of occurrence, 
Article 25.5. The ANSP is under the obligation to reimburse the State, paragraph 6, 
but the State of occurrence and the State of the ANSP can agree on sharing the costs, 
paragraph 9. Furthermore, the State of occurrence or the ANPS has a right of recourse 
against any other person or entity, Article 25.10. An adequate coverage of the ANSP is 
required, Article 25.12. Finally, the Blue Med treaty supersedes the liability provisions 
in existing bilateral agreements between two contracting States, Article 25.14.  
 
One may think that the content of Article 27, titled investigation of accidents and 
serious incidents, like in the  Baltic FAB, would provide some solutions. Yet, except 
for the fact that it relies heavily on the Chicago Convention and that it embodies the 
manner for conducting investigation, the final paragraph clearly states that the article 
                                                 
281 Risto Murto, ‘Annual Report on the Application of FUA chapter 15’ LSSIP Year 2011 Finland 
 <https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/content/documents/official-documents/reports/2012-fua2011-
fi.pdf> (accessed 3 July 2014), p.5 
282 NEFAB, ‘Declaration of commitment for cooperation in airspace development between the Governments of 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Norway and Sweden’ (22 April 2013) <http://www.nefab.eu/749/> accessed 
2 March 2014  
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will, in no way help determine the questions of liability283, leaving the Member States 
to determine how to deal with the issue.   
1.6 Baltic FAB  
The agreement between Poland and Lithuania leaves a lot of room to the Member 
States involved in the FAB. However, Article 5(2) on sovereignty, stipulates that the 
agreement will not affect the rights and obligations under the Chicago Convention or 
any other international agreements to which the contracting States are parties. Chapter 
9 addresses liability issues. If one looks at it closely, it is possible to realise that the 
wording of this article is comparable to the wording to be found in the Treaty 
establishing the FABEC. Here again, the liability structure under this agreement can 
be used only as a last resort remedy after all international remedies have been 
exhausted, for the same reasons stated in the FABEC. 
 
But, there are some notable differences between the two FAB’s liability provisions. 
First, paragraph 13 of the FABEC states that the Treaty supersedes other bilateral 
agreements which is not provided in the Baltic agreement. Second, Article 30.7 of the 
FABEC provides that in case of problem of reimbursement by the ANSP, then the 
States are entitled to refer the case to arbitration under the “Permanent Court of 
Arbitration optional rules for arbitrating disputes between two States”. Finally, 
paragraph 7 of the Baltic allows the State or ANS to sue any natural or legal person. 
This right cannot be found in any of the other agreements governing the creation of 
other FABs.  
 
The FAB agreement must yet be supplemented by different agreements. In respect 
of ANSP, chapter 3, specially Articles 13, 18 and seq., clearly mentions that the 
contracting States must enter into a legal agreements with the ANSP. Hopefully, these 
agreements will cover any possible claim related to liability of the parties.  
 
                                                 
283 BLUE MED FAB, ‘Demonstration of Compliance for the BLUE MED FAB establishment in accordance 
with Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 and Commission Regulation (EU) No 176/2011’ (v. 2.0, 22 June 2012) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single_european_sky/doc/2012_06_22_blue_med_fab_establishment.pd
f> (accessed 22 June 2014) 
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The agreement still relies heavily on the Chicago Convention, above all in case of 
investigations of accidents.284 Although, this Treaty must be read in conjunction with 
the Chicago Convention, it still leaves a lot of room for national legislators and 
supplementation by other agreements. But it does a fairly good job laying out basic 
liability provisions: Article 27 governs liability in general, choice of law and forum, 
gives the actors involved the possibility of claiming damages from any wrongdoer, 
legal or natural, but it remains a last resort remedy. 
1.7 FAB CE  
The FAB CE includes the largest number of States: Austria, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. This 
agreement does not have any specific article with respect to liability issues. However, 
Article 22 relates to dispute resolution and refers to disputes arising with regard to 
‘interpretation, application and performance of this agreement’, which, because it is so 
broad could encompass a dispute resulting from the liability question. Nothing in the 
document helps elucidate the scope of that specific article, and therefore we can only 
extrapolate on what it includes.     
1.8 Danube FAB  
Likewise, there are no provisions on liability in the agreement between Romania 
and Bulgaria. The only hint is in Article 27.2, which specifies that in the case of a 
dispute, the ANSP board may require the SAPSC to deliver an expert opinion. Article 
3 stipulates that the agreement does not restrict the freedom of the ANSPs to co-
operate with other parties in order to achieve the goals of the Danube FAB. Article 4 
lists areas of cooperation, however there is no explicit mention of the liability 
question. One may presume that liability will be dealt with in point h, which refers to 
accident and incident investigations.  
1.9 North European FAB (NEFAB)  
The NEFAB encompasses Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Norway. The NEFAB is 
unique in the sense that an explanatory note accompanies the legal text, which makes 
it easier for the reader to understand the drafters’ intent. According to the explanatory 
note to Article 27; ‘An obligation imposed upon a State to compensate damages 
                                                 
284 See article 28 of the Treaty establishing the Baltic Functional Airspace Block  
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caused to passengers, aircraft operators or third parties on the surface, as a 
consequence of acts or omissions by an ANSP, only exists to the extent such an 
obligation is explicitly foreseen by an international convention or by the applicable 
national legislation of that State. This is the case both for strict liability as well as 
liability in case of negligence.’ Here, the legislation explicitly includes both strict and 
fault liability. One must pay attention to the fact that this agreement does not, in any 
case, create prerogatives for individuals neither rights.  
 
Furthermore, it imposes no duty on the States to repair damages caused by air 
navigation service providers. This can be deduced from the sentence; ‘[…]obligation 
is explicitly foreseen by an international convention or by the applicable national 
legislation of that State’. Currently, there are no international instruments specifically 
dedicated to State liability with regard to air navigation services. Nevertheless, the aim 
of Article 27 of the NEFAB agreement is to provide a legal framework that will allow 
all parties involved to know the extent of their responsibilities and duties and also to 
diminish the possibility that States will rely on their sovereign immunity to avoid 
liability. Through this clear legal structure, the legislators also intended to provide 
legal certainty by designating the appropriate forum and law.      
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 27 makes it clear that a State can only claim damages from 
another State if it is based on negligence, which excludes strict liability. According to 
paragraph 2, the ANSP can be held liable; no direct claim might be file against it, but 
paragraph 3 gives States the right to seek reimbursement from the ANSP. Paragraph 4 
adds a twist; if the accident occurred due to negligence from both a national ANS and 
ANSP, then the cost will be divided proportionally between the two parties. Again, the 
agreement dedicates in paragraph 5 that the choice of forum and applicable law will be 
the law of the State where damages occur.  
 
The provisions governing liability issues for NEFAB are straightforward and do not 
require further agreements. Additionally, a sub-agreement between Norway and 
Finland service providers is integral part of the NEFAB agreement. The agreement 
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sets a legal framework for the supervision of cross-border ATS provision.285 However, 
NEFAB includes nothing with respect to its relationship with international 
conventions except in the explanatory note. This point will probably have to be 
clarified by the competent authorities.  
 
  
                                                 
285 Murto, LSSIP Year 2011 Finland (n 281), p.5 
  
68 
 
  
  
69 
 
2. Comparing the agreements 
After having looked in details at each of the inter-state agreements, we can try to 
compare them. Even though the grounds for comparison is how liability is treated in 
each FAB, as we will see, this is not an easy task due to the various approaches the 
Member States have taken with regard to that specific topic. However, we will work 
toward the best solution to solve the problem.  
 
Some of the agreements are similar or adopt the same wording. For instance the 
agreement establishing the FABEC, BLUE MED and the Baltic FAB are nearly a 
direct replica of each other. These three agreements are the most detailed and yet 
ultimately, it is clear that the State of occurrence is liable, which could be established 
simply by looking at international law. It is not however until the fifth or sixth 
paragraph of FABEC, BLUE MED and Baltic FAB that this is stated, which may lead 
to confusion. Furthermore, it is clear from the provisions that the agreement is only a 
last resort instrument. A reading of these agreements suggests that while the liability 
provision was included, the Member States did not really want to deal with the 
problem in depth and therefore took the easiest solution, namely to create an article 
based on a broad International Convention containing many exceptions. The 
provisions on the question of jurisdiction or choice of law are not clear; they state 
‘Claims for compensation as provided for in Article 30.1 shall be filed with the 
Contracting State concerned’, in other words, the State of occurrence. But since the 
three agreements are last resort instruments, no guideline is given about the competent 
court or law applicable to the case at first. This complicates finding a solution in a 
given case. But in a sense it is not really surprising, at least with regard to the FABEC, 
as already in the Agreement conferring power to the MUAC (Maastricht Upper Area 
Control Center) no choice of law or jurisdiction provisions were included either.   
 
The NEFAB agreement is the only agreement that explicitly states that a Member 
State can sue another State for costs incurred by the first State as a result of the 
negligence of the second State. The same holds true for Article 27, paragraph 2 of the 
South West FAB arrangement. Although, one may assume that it is also the case for 
the other FABs, this is not the fact.  
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Few arrangements explicitly refer to the choice of law and jurisdiction questions, 
namely the NEFAB, FABEC, BLUE MED and Baltic agreements. In the South West 
FAB agreement, the provision only deals with the choice of law issue but not 
jurisdiction. The Baltic arrangement is also unique in that it contains the possibility for 
the State or ANS to sue any natural or legal person arrangement, Article 27 paragraph 
7. This right cannot be found elsewhere in the agreements governing the other FABs. 
 
Notably, none of the agreements helps resolve the question of what will happen in 
the case of a cross-border collision between two FABs. Let us take the example of an 
aircraft flying from Florence to Brussels, which, just as it leaves the Italian airspace 
and enters the Swiss airspace, crashes over Switzerland due to a gap in information 
between Italy and Switzerland. How do we determine liability here? Switzerland will 
have to pay but could it claim damages from Italy? That question will have to be 
solved by international or national law because the agreements provide no assistance. 
The situation is different in the case of Sweden and Finland, whereby a Swedish 
ANSP delivers service over a part of Finish airspace and liability is dealt with, these 
two countries are in different FABs. Additionally, there is an agreement between these 
two states.286  
 
What is even more striking from the comparison of all the agreements is that some 
FABs, namely FAB Central Europe, Danish-Swedish FAB and Danube FAB, have no 
provisions on liability, leaving the answers to be provided by national laws. But, 
examination of the agreements that include liability provisions suggests that 
ultimately, the answer will likewise also be given by national and international law. 
The fact of having provisions creates legal certainty. One point is clear in all the 
agreements, the State of occurrence will be primarily liable and has jurisdiction, which 
is similar to Article 20 of the Rome Convention but much more restricted than Article 
33 of the Montreal Convention.  
 
It is mostly a matter of taste and expectations, but in my opinion, the NEFAB and 
South-WEST Europe FABs are the most complete and straightforward agreements. 
                                                 
286 Murto, LSSIP Year 2011 Finland (n 281), p.5  
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The Commission has perhaps made a mistake by requiring close cooperation within a 
FAB without requiring the States to include a provision on liability containing similar 
information, leading to individualistic behaviour of each FABs.287  
ii. Airports 
Most Member States have followed the requirements laid down in the Chicago 
Convention, more precisely in Annex 14.288 Annex 14 outlines in detail the standard 
characteristics for aerodromes. Article 15 of the Convention requires the States to 
make airports available on its territory for both domestic and international flights.  
 
In general, major airports are linked to the State; either they are operated by the 
State or by a private body especially licensed by the State. An example of the latter is 
Schiphol Airport, created as a limited liability company so that it is a private company 
but it is partially publicly owned.289 As a result the State will bear the responsibility if 
accidents occur. Airports are not free from all responsibility; an airport may be held 
contractually liable or liable based on tort, depending on the activities that cause the 
damages.290 For instance, in the case of the Concorde accident, the airport was also 
held liable due to its negligence in cleaning the runway.291  
 
There is a trend to privatize airports in order to improve efficiency, which may 
change the extent of State liability.292 Airports may be held responsible and obliged to 
compensate for personal injuries or property damages that occur on the airport 
                                                 
287 Lawless (n 20), p.78  
For a quick overview please refer to the table in Annex 1 
288 The annexes of the Convention have a special status; they are derivative international norms which are 
mandatory as soon as the signatory states accepted the power of ICAO See: "Les normes contenues dans les 
Annexes ne sont donc en aucune façon des normes conventionnelles, ce sont des normes internationales dérivées 
qui ne sont obligatoires que si l’organe international qui les a édictées a reçu des Etats, qui en sont les 
destinataires, pouvoir de prendre des décisions liant les membres de l’O.A.C.I."  
Retrieved from: Henri Rolin, ‘La portée juridique des annexes à la Convention de Chicago  un désaccord entre 
les jurisprudences Française et Belge’ (1973) 9 Revue Belge de Droit International 403, p.406; International 
Civil Aviation Organization, Annex 14, Volume I, Aerodrome Design and Operations (5th ed, ICAO, 2009)  
289 du Perron (n 85), p.210; Guillaume Burghouwt, Airline network development in Europe and its implications 
for airport planning (Ashgate Publisher, 2007), p.211-212 
290 du Perron (n 85), p.211 
291 Harding (n 158), p.25 
292 Clifford Winston and Ginés De Rus, Aviation infrastructure performance a study in comparative political 
economy (Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p.37 
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premises.293 Depending on the facts of the case, the claim might be based on contract 
or tort.  However, the terms of a contract may contain clauses excluding liability 
although even if there is such a clause in the contract, the clause might be 
unenforceable for various reasons, such as unfairness. It is common for airports to be 
insured against such claims.294  
 
According to the UK Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957, the airport owes a duty of care 
to the passengers; this duty obliges the airport to provide reasonably safe premises to 
the passengers. This duty is limited and does not extend to injuries occurring in places 
where passengers were not expressly or implicitly invited to go. The mere fact that 
warning signs have been placed in the premise does not automatically release the 
airport from its liability. As always under Common law, it is the judge who decides 
whether such a duty was owed and whether it was breached when looking at all the 
evidence. The airport also owes a limited duty to trespassers under section 1 of the 
Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984, but only when the airport knows or could foresee the 
risk of danger. In the case of an independent contractor causing an injury, the airport 
can only be sued under contributory negligence.  
 
Of course, when speaking about airport liability, what is really meant is liability of 
the airport operators, such as airport managers or directors who are held responsible.295 
They will be vicariously liable for the damages caused by their employees, in 
countries where such vicarious liability exists in the law. This is above all the case in 
countries where employers or managing board can be held vicariously liable for the 
                                                 
293 The airport can be liable for nuisance but only if the noise exceeds the maximum amount allowed by national 
and European legislations. In the UK, statutory nuisance caused by noise, including vibrations, may lead to tort 
claims. Claims can be established under the Environmental Protection Act 1990 part III. 
See: Alissa M. Dolan and Richard M. Thompson, ‘Integration of drones into domestic airspace selected legal 
issues’  (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2013) R42940 
 <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42940.pdf> (accessed 3 July 2014), p.2; Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ 
(1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252, p.1; Bartsch (n 126), ch. 6 and 16; MOD Corporate Environmental, ‘ 
Statutory nuisance’ (Leaflet 4) JSP 418 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27606/JSP_418_Leaflet04.pdf> 
(accessed 3 July 2014)  
294 Harding (n 158), p.25 
295 Alexander T. Wells and Seth Young, Airport planning & management (McGraw-Hill Publisher, 2004), p.44 
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wrongdoing of their employees.296Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that, 
generally speaking, the State will be liable first before it can use its right of recourse 
against the airport. Nothing will change with the implementation of the SES. 
iii. Airline companies 
When a person books a flight ticket, he/she enters into a contract with the air 
carrier. Both parties have rights and duties stemming from this contract. For example, 
the passenger must pay and comply with the rules of the airline company with which 
he/she has contracted. But he/she also has the right to claim damages if the air carrier 
does not fulfill its obligations, such as delays or damaged baggage.297298 In addition to 
contract law, air carriers can also be sued under tort law, and can also sue other 
wrongdoers under tort law.299 Therefore, it is not always the airline companies being 
sued it can also be the other way round.  
In the last decade, the Union legislator has been keen on enlarging the protection 
offered to consumers in general. This trend is also noticeable in the field of airspace 
transport, as exemplified by the entry into force of Regulation 261/ 2004. The 
Regulation reinforces the right of passengers against airline companies under certain 
circumstances. The Regulation is crucial in providing a framework for liability in 
cases where denial of boarding, cancellation or long delay results in damages. One of 
the most common examples would be when the airline company is unable to use the 
aircraft for another scheduled flight due to its delay. Before, only international or 
national liability regime would have applied.300 The new regime is rather strict and 
permits only one defense: ‘extraordinary circumstances’ such as force majeure.301 
                                                 
296 At Common law and in France and the Netherlands no fault on the part of the employer is needed, whereas in 
Germany, employers will only be liable if he committed a fault but there is a rebutable presumption of it, §831 
BGB. At Common law three conditions need to be fulfilled.  
297 In case of an actual and contractual carrier, the one having been sued can sue the other one according to their 
contract.  
298 Montreal Convention and Regulation 889/2002. See also: IATA, ‘Conditions of contract and other important 
notices’<http://www.flytap.com/mediaRep/editors/Contentimages/PDFs/Outros/Condicoes_Transporte/responsa
bilidade/en/MONTREAL_EN.pdf> accessed on 22 June 2014, p.2-3 
299 Erotokritou (n 146), p.2 
300 CATS, ‘legal assessment: contract- based air transportation system’ (2007) Report D. 2.2.3 
 <http://www.cats-fp6.aero/doc/CATS_D2.2.3_Legal_Assessment_V10.pdf> (accessed 22 June 2014), p.27 
301 Article 5(3) Regulation 261/2004 dealing with cancellation of a flight.  
It is clearly mentioned in the article that the airline company and the crew should have took all the necessary 
measures: ‘An operating air carrier shall not be obliged to pay compensation in accordance with Article 7, if it 
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Nevertheless, a right of redress is embodied in Article 13 of the Regulation, allowing 
the company to obtain compensation from a third party who causes the cancellation or 
delay. Most airline companies flying in Europe have transposed the Regulation’s 
provisions directly in their policy.302 
 
Another aspect of liability is covered by Regulation 2027/97 which aims to define 
and harmonizing the duties of European air carriers under European law with respect 
to their liability. The Regulation is heavily based on the Warsaw Convention, which 
can be deduced from the Preamble and Article 2(2).303 Nevertheless, the scope of the 
Regulation is very narrow, applying only to damages which occurred on board an 
airplane or while embarking or disembarking.304 The liability that airline companies 
bear is unlimited and therefore cannot be restricted through contract, convention or 
law, as stipulated in Article 3(1) (a) of the Regulation. The only defense available to 
the airline companies is to prove that the damages were directly caused by the 
negligence of the passenger, paragraph 3 of the same article. This differs from the 
fundamental principle of airline liability embodied in the Warsaw Convention and 
international protocols, as normally the liability of airline companies is limited.305 
However, in both the Regulation and the Warsaw Convention, the liability is based on 
fault of the airline company. But in practice apparently the Regulation is not really 
used as there are inconsistencies with the Warsaw Convention.306 Additionally, airline 
                                                                                                                                                        
can prove that the cancellation is caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided 
even if all reasonable measures had been taken’. 
302 For instance Alitalia, British airways, Brussels Airline, Air France, Swiss Air, etc  
303 Elmar Giemulla and Maria Schimd Ronald, ‘Council Regulation (EC) No. 2027/97 on Air Carrier Liability in 
the Event of Accidents and its Implications for Air Carriers’ (1998) 23 Air & Space law 98, p.98 
304 Europa, ‘Air carrier liability in the event of accidents’ 
 <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/protection_of_consumers/l24169_en.htm> accessed 29 June 
2014; Giemulla and van Schyndel, ‘Liability in European Law’ (n 154), p.341 
305 An attempt to established unlimited liability was done with the 1995 IATA ‘Intercarrier Agreement on 
Passenger Liability’ (IIA) and the 1996 ‘Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier 
Agreement’ (MIA) but they were declared null and void. See: Lorne S. Clark, ‘European Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 2027/97: will the Warsaw Convention bite back?’ (2001) 26 Air & space law 137, p.138-139; Doo 
Hwan Kim, ‘The innovation of the Warsaw system and the IATA intercarrier agreement’, in Doo Hwan Kim and 
Chia-Jui Cheng (eds), The utilization of the world's air space and free outer space in the 21st century: 
proceedings of the International Conference on Air and Space Policy, Law and Industry for the 21st Century 
held in Seoul from 23-25 June 1997 (Kluwer Law International, 2000), p.65; Paul Stephen Dempsey, 
‘International air cargo & baggage liability and the Tower of Babel’ (2004) 36 George Washington international 
law review 239, p.247; Hwan Kim, ‘Some considerations of the draft for the convention on an integrated system 
of international aviation liability’ (n 139), p.780; Brian F Havel and Gabrial S Sanchez, The principles and 
practice of international aviation law (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.260-261 
306 Clark (n 305), p.143  
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carriers are obliged to contract insurance with regard to damages, Article 3(2). 
However, the passenger should insure his luggage if the value of its contents exceeds 
the applicable limit of liability established by the airline company.307  
 
Regulation 889/2002 attempts to bring European law in line with the Montreal 
Convention. It harmonizes defenses that could be used by air carriers as well as the 
limits to their liability. Article 3(1) stipulates that community carriers’ liability is 
governed by the Montreal Convention, which amended the Warsaw Convention. The 
level of protection and compensation is lower in the Regulation.308 But sometimes the 
rights are identical, for instance the passenger can sue either the contractual or actual 
carrier.309 The Community needed to legislate as the Convention set new rules on 
liability in international air transport.310 Again this established an unlimited liability 
regime.311 For instance, the obligation of insurance was added and expended. This 
obligation is to be found in SES Regulation 1070/2009 too. Similar articles and 
requirements are to be found in Regulation 2027/97.  
 
One may conclude that the liability of airline companies towards passengers is 
broadly regulated by EU law. These regulations have brought legal certainty because 
most airline companies have transposed the regulations into their policies. However, 
with regard to the possibility for airline companies to sue the wrongdoer, no EU law is 
to be found. Consequently, only international and national law will be applicable. A 
similar approach is to be taken with regard to tortious matters, whereby the State 
                                                 
307 Article 6(2) Regulation 785/2004 stipulates: ‘For liability in respect of baggage, the minimum insurance 
cover shall be 1 000 SDRs per passenger in commercial operations’. Therefore if the value exceed the 1 000 
SDRs, then it is for the passenger to contract an additional insurance. It is worth mentioning that this amount is 
identical to the one in the Montreal Convention and that it does not prohibit airline companies to fix a higher 
threshold. So before contracting an additional insurance, the passenger should check the airline policy, as it 
might be that the company refuses to take responsibility for certain objects, for instance jewelry, fragile or 
valuable goods, etc.  
See for instance: IATA, ‘Conditions of contract and other important notices’ (n 298), p.2 
308 For instance in case of destruction of baggage, Article 22 of the Montreal Convention states that the amount 
should be no more than 1131 SDR while in Annex 1 of the Regulation it is only 1000 SDR. 
309 Article 40 of the Montreal Convention and Annex 1 of the Regulation 
310 Europa (n 304)  
311 The regime in the Regulation is similar to the strict liability regime embodied in Article 17 of the Montreal 
Convention whereby the victim only needs to prove that the damages were caused by the accident.  
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might be liable but can subsequently seek recourse against the airline company.312 
Therefore it is important to determine the ownership of the aircraft in order to hold the 
right party liable.313 However, none of these regulations are the direct result of the 
implementation of the SES.  
  
                                                 
312 However it is a right of recourse not a duty and therefore discretion is left to the State or airline company 
whether it wants to bring a claim or not. The same can be found in Article 37 of the Montreal Convention.  
313 Gbenga Oduntan, Sovereignty and jurisdiction in the airspace and outer space : legal criteria for spatial 
delimitation (Routledge Publisher, 2012, p.82 
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iv. Insurance companies 
Insurance coverage is a good way to allocate risk and create incentives to hedge 
against things containing higher risks. Insurance coverage allocates the risk between 
the insured and the insurer. The airline companies -flying within, over or out of the 
Union- are required to have adequate insurance coverage that is especially designed 
for the risks involved in aviation activities.314315 This requirement is embodied in 
secondary European legislation, namely in Regulation 785/2004 and in international 
conventions.316 Aviation insurance policies are unique and should not be compared to 
normal insurances or even the insurance for other areas of transportation because 
airline companies are exposed to risks that are so difficult to evaluate.317318 
Furthermore, there are numerous types of aviation insurance coverage all of which are 
enumerated in Article 4 of the Regulation 785/2004, namely; public liability 
insurance, passenger insurance and, hull insurance.  
 
Passenger liability insurance is mandatory in most countries for commercial and 
charter flights. The coverage is embodied in the carriage contract.319 In general, the 
insurance is sold to the passenger on a per-seat basis and offers coverage for injuries 
or death of the passenger. Article 6 (1) of the Regulation sets the minimum amount the 
insurance should cover, which is 250 000 SDRs320 per passenger. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
314Article 8 (2) and (6) give the possibility to Member States to refuse a non-Community aircraft to land if it 
failed to comply with the insurance requirements.   
315 Ladd Sanger, ‘Mandatory aviation insurance: a Domestic and International perspective’  
<http://www.slackdavis.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/mandatory_aviation_insurance08.pdf> accessed 29 
June 2014, p.2; Alias, E.02.13 (version 00.01.02) (n 157), p.45; Allianz, ‘Aviation & Aerospace’ 
 <http://www.agcs.allianz.com/services/aviation/> accessed 23 April 2014 
316 For instance see Chapter III of the Rome Convention 
317 Insurances are mostly based on the value of the aircraft, its ownership, the amount of liability, etc. Therefore, 
it is really unlikely that private model of insurance will work since the insurance’s companies might not have 
enough resources to bare the risks and pay in case an accident occurred. 
318 International Union of Aerospace Insurers, ‘A guide to aviation insurance: International Union of Aerospace 
Insurers’ (2012) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/4.DavidGasson-background.pdf> accessed on 23 April 
2014, p.1 
319 Alias, E.02.13(version 00.00.01) (n 154), p.38  
320 Special Drawing Rights: ‘The SDR is neither a currency, nor a claim on the IMF. Rather, it is a potential 
claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members. Holders of SDRs can obtain these currencies in exchange 
for their SDRs in two ways: first, through the arrangement of voluntary exchanges between members; and 
second, by the IMF designating members with strong external positions to purchase SDRs from members with 
weak external positions. In addition to its role as a supplementary reserve asset, the SDR serves as the unit of 
account of the IMF and some other international organizations’. Retrieved from: International Monetary Fund, 
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level is decreased to a minimum of 100 000 SDRs per passenger with respect to non-
commercial operations by aircraft with a Maximum Take Off Mass (MTOM) of 2 700 
kg or less. It is up to Member States to decide whether to lower the level or not.321  
 
Public liability insurances are designed to cover owners of airplanes for damages 
caused by their aircrafts to the property of third parties. This type of insurance does 
not cover damages caused to the insured aircraft. The insurance will only reimburse 
damages done to houses, airport premises, cars, etc. If an accident occurs, the 
insurance company will compensate victims for their losses via a friendly method that 
does not involve the court. As indicated in Article 7 of the Regulation, airline 
companies are obliged to purchase this kind of insurance.322 
 
Several companies propose to combine the two above-mentioned types of insurance 
into a single package. Therefore, the maximum amount of coverage per accident has a 
single overall limit. This solution offers more flexibility to the insurance companies, 
especially when not many third party properties are damaged but many passengers are 
injured.323   
 
Hull insurances cover the aircraft itself.324 Article 4(1) of the Regulation mentions 
this kind of insurance without naming it Hull insurances. There are two types of hull 
insurances: that which covers the airplane while it is motionless on the ground and that 
which covers the plane when taxiing.325 Damage for the first type is mostly due to 
incidents such as fire, vandalism, theft, or war. The second type does not cover landing 
and take-off’ generally it ceases to cover the plane when it takes-off and covers the 
aircraft only when it has completed the landing and it is driving to the parking place. 
Since it is complicated to draw a line between the mere fact that the airplane was 
taxiing or if it was attempting to take-off, most of the time insurance companies avoid 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)’ (25 March 2014) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm> accessed 
23 April 2014  
321Article 6(1) Regulation 785/2004 
322 Sanger (n 315), p.2 
323 Alias, E.02.13(version 00.00.01) (n 154), p.38  
324 Diederiks-Verschoor (n 193), p.248; International Union of Aerospace Insurers (n 318), p.1 
325 Alias, E.02.13(version 00.00.01) (n 154), p.38; Harding (n 158), p.7  
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providing that kind of coverage.326 Yet, that does not mean that planes are not insured 
during these phases; mostly airline companies subscribe to an ‘in-flight’ insurance 
which covers the aircraft at all stages of the flight and ground operations, including 
parking. The Rome convention of 1952 was the first instrument that provided the State 
with the possibility of requiring an insurance that covered liability on the ground only 
however, it received little ratifications.327 Similarly, Article 50 of the Montreal 
Convention requires States to have an adequate coverage.  
 
The SES contains no reference to the relationship between the SES Regulations and 
Regulation 785/2004. However, insurance is included in the SES Regulation, as listed 
in the common requirements of article 6 Regulation 550/2004. Therefore, one may 
conclude that Regulation 785/2004 will be applicable. Moreover, it seems rather 
logical that each aircraft and flight should be insured due to the risk of financial 
consequences of a collision.328 Additionally, companies should be insured against 
legal claims in case of death, injury or physical damages.329 
  
Although, the scope of Directive 123/2006 does not cover air transport, as clearly 
stated in Article 2(2) (d), the insurance’s requirement of Article 23 is of similar 
wording in Article 6 of Regulation 550/2004 with respect to ANSP.330 Article 23 of 
Directive 123/2006 requires all providers which operate in the Union to be covered by 
professional liability insurance based on the nature and the type of risks that may arise 
from their work. Here again we see the willingness of the Union to create a market in 
the sky which would be the counterpart of our existing internal market.   
 
As a result of European secondary law, a service provider is under a ‘double’ 
obligation to be insured if it wants to be appointed as an ATM service provider within 
the Union; first at national level and second at FAB level.331 Nevertheless, problems 
                                                 
326 QBE, ‘Insurance Products Glossary’ <http://www.qbeeurope.com/aviation/glossary.asp> accessed 8 May 
2014  
327 Alias, E.02.13(version 00.00.01) (n 154), p.38 
328 Imposed by the second paragraph of Article 4 of Regulation 785/2004 
329 Harding (n 158), p.9 
330 In order to be designated as an ANSP, the provider will need to contract a valid insurance.  
331 Alias, E.02.13(version 00.00.01) (n 154), p.39 
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persist because there is no standardized insurance policy with respect to ANS liability, 
one must look at all the different insurance agreements separately.332 
 
Lastly, it is also possible, though rare, that a contract between manufacturer and 
purchaser of software to include measures that displace liability. This means that one 
party agrees and commits himself to cover the damages caused by the product sold by 
the other party. In other words, the purchaser of a software agrees to reduce the 
liability of the producer because he is covered by an insurance in case the software is 
defective.333 
  
                                                 
332 Chatzipanagiotis (n 124), p.339 
333 Moccia (n 166), p.121 
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v. Controllers  
Air traffic is not possible without controllers, and they hold heavy responsibilities. 
Air traffic controllers must prevent collision, either on the ground or in the sky, and 
take care of the safety of the passengers and third parties on the ground.334 In order to 
prevent collisions, the controllers must ensure that flights remain separated from one 
another and do not enter into specific areas of the airspace that are not open to 
them.335336 Additionally, civil aircrafts are very expensive and the controllers’ job 
includes ensuring that nothing happen to the airplanes themselves.337 Given the 
riskiness of their job, controllers want to know what liability they face.  
 
If there are no loopholes in the law, then a controller will be liable per se for a 
collision under his watch.338 However, another parameter restricts the controllers’ per 
se liability: in most Member States, such as France and Sweden, controllers are civil 
servants.339 Switzerland does not consider controllers civil servants, but their status is 
comparable to that of a public function, leading to the same result as in France and 
Sweden.340 Consequently, it is the State that will have to first indemnify victims, 
before taking any actions against the negligent control officer.341 The type of recourses 
a State has against the negligent controllers, with regard to civil liability, vary from 
Member State to Member States. For instance, in France, the State could only use 
administrative sanctions against air traffic controllers342 whereas in Germany, UK and 
Italy, due to the fact that the ANSP is a private entity, the controllers cannot seek 
protection under the umbrella of State liability and will be held directly liable.343 This 
difference makes it is interesting to look at to what extent controllers are liable and 
how that fits into the broader picture of liability within the SES. A judge cannot look 
only at the ultimate actor involved, but rather, must look at the broader picture because 
                                                 
334 du Perron (n 85), p.205  
335 For Instance some sectors are reserved to military aviation.  
336 Joyce (n 185), p.2; Garcia-Chico (n 191), p.12 
337 Erotokritou (n 146), p.1 
338 Eurocontrol, Note EEC No. 06/05 (n 114), p.2  
339 Erotokritou (n 146), p.1; Eurocontrol, Note EEC No. 06/05 (n 114), p.3 
340 Eurocontrol, Note EEC No. 06/05 (n 114), p.44 
341 Erotokritou (n 146), p.1 
342 Eurocontrol, Note EEC No. 06/05 (n 114), p.23 
343 Ibid, p.44 
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latent conditions can change the outcome of a case.344 In other words, the interaction 
between the man and the machine renders it impossible to isolate their respective 
actions.345   
 
The first legal instrument to define the liability of air controllers was the Warsaw 
Convention of 1929. This definition was consolidated by the Montreal Convention of 
1999. Nevertheless, a universal convention regulating air traffic controller liability is 
still nonexistent. Even the ICAO document 4444, which purports to provide precise 
provisions for technical and operational aspects of air navigation generally fails to 
reference controller liability.346 In the 1960’s, the ICAO committee drafted a 
Convention on liability for Air Traffic Control. This proposal attempted to provide a 
complete and uniform set of rules to deal with all aspects of liability of the Air Traffic 
Control Agencies, however it did not include liability of controllers.347 Consequently, 
it might not be surprising that the question of liability was not dealt with in the 
Chicago Convention of 1944. This omission is probably due to the fact that the issue 
was touching upon the States’ sovereignty, even if Annex 11 of the Convention lists 
the functions of a controller. The drafters of the Convention preferred to leave the 
answer to this delicate question to national law.  
 
In the US, the controller owes a duty of care to the pilot, according to the rulings in 
United States v Union Trust348 and in Eastern Airlines v Union Trust349. It is unclear 
whether the same duty applies in Europe. Additionally, in the US when a TCAS 
order350 is given, the controller stops being responsible for the traffic separation and 
                                                 
344 Ottimo (n 237), p. 293; Whittingham (n 180), p.48 
345 Garcia-Chico (n 191), p.23 
346 Erotokritou (n 146), p.1 
347 van Antwerpen, Cross-border provision of air navigation services (n 160), p.204  
348 330 U.S. 907 (1955) 
349 221 F.2d 62 Cir. (1955) 
350 Traffic Collision Avoidance System; is a system which ‘utilizes a satellite navigational system to 
continuously determine object motion parameters relative to the earth’s surface and exchanges this information 
with other objects. The system calculates collision potential with other objects that are stationary or in motion 
based on the exchange of the motion parameters.’  
Retrieved from: M.A Eberwine and D.B Eberwine, Integrated air traffic management and collision avoidance 
system (application n° US 09/221,925, patent n° US 6133867 A, 17 October 2000), p.1 
The system is also designed to answer to the questions and advice the pilots in order to avoid a collision.  
  
83 
 
for the aircraft until the pilot informs him that the problem has been solved.351 Even 
though a hierarchy has been established, by both Eurocontrol and ICAO, which rank 
TCAS advices higher than controller one352, it has not been made clear whether the 
responsibility of the controller is entirely extinguished like in the US or not.  
 
States are placed under the enormous burden of providing air navigation services, 
and are also the first to pay compensation. After, a State can decide to sue the 
wrongdoer; this action can be both an action for negligence and a criminal 
prosecution. The reason for the vicarious liability of the State towards its agents is that 
the controller may not be, financially, able to indemnify all the victims.353 However, 
when the air navigation service provider is a private company, then the State will not 
be primarily liable but only liable for damages arising out of its negligence. It remains 
unclear whether the liability of the controller would be reduced if someone assisted the 
controller in his tasks or influenced him in his decision process. It is said that liability 
is not transferrable but nothing is stated with regard to the reduction of it.  
vi. Pilots  
None of the International or European instruments ever clarified the relationship 
between air traffic controllers and pilots.354 The controllers and pilots are under a duty 
to communicate at all times during a flight.355356 The latter is under the duty to obey to 
the former, according to the Chicago Convention Annex 2. This poses problems with 
regards to liability, as it is unclear whether the controller or pilot would be held 
responsible for a collision.357 The picture has been made even more complex with the 
introduction of Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). What makes this 
relationship- air controller, pilot and TCAS- so complicated to analyse is partially due 
                                                 
351 Garcia-Chico (n 191), p.21 
352 International Civil Aviation Organization, Airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) manual (1st ed, 
ICAO, 2006), provision 5.2.1.14; Garcia-Chico (n 191), p.21; Eurocontrol Mode S and ACAS Programme, 
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to the fact that TCAS are airborne systems invented to function independently of air 
traffic control.358 Generally, when a pilot receives an advisory resolution from the 
TCAS, it does not conflict with the controller’s orders. Moreover, the controllers are 
usually not surprised by the alert because, either they know a collision could happen, 
or because the STCA359 alerted them of the problem.360 However, it is possible that the 
information received conflicts; then the question is, who does the pilot need to follow? 
And in the event of an accident, who is liable?  
 
Under Annex 2 of the Chicago Convention, pilots are bound to follow the air traffic 
control officers’ instructions361 because it is believed that controllers have more 
knowledge than pilots. Surely, the controllers know more about the local elements 
than pilots, but above all, thanks to their equipment, the controllers have access to an 
overall picture of the air traffic in real time.362 But the picture changed with the 
mandatory introduction in Europe of ACAS II363/TCAS364. Still, there remains no 
liability provision at the International or European level. However, guidelines have 
been established as to the hierarchy of orders to obey in the event of conflicting 
orders.365  
 
TCAS was first introduced as a monitoring backup in case both the controller and 
pilot failed to detect the danger. It can be defined as a last-resort safety system.366 The 
                                                 
358 Steve Henely, ‘TCAS II’, in Cary R. Spitzer, The avionics handbook (CRC Press, 2001), p.18-1 
359 Short Term Traffic Alerts ‘is one among many different alert systems preventing airplanes from colliding in 
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TCAS should help the pilot realise and visualize potential threats to the aircraft.367 
Additionally, it should provide advice as to the maneuvers that will help an aircraft 
maintain a safe distance from other objects. Furthermore, the TCAS should sync the 
orders it gives to an airplane with information from other airplanes.368  For a long 
time, when there was a conflict of information, similar to that in Überlingen mid-air 
collision, the pilots would not follow the TCAS.369 The reason is firstly because 
controllers have a broad picture and secondly because the TCAS is a tool to help 
pilots. The system has limits; it cannot handle all situations. The information in the 
system must be accurate and it cannot predict how the pilot of the threatened aircraft 
will react.370  
  
However, after Überlingen mid-air collision and the Japan mid-air collision, ICAO 
clarified the relationship between ATC and TCAS RA information. It has been 
established, by both Eurocontrol and ICAO, that the pilot should follow the TCAS 
advice and certainly not make any manoeuvre in the opposite direction from that 
advice, regardless the situation.371 In some countries, the obligation of the pilot to 
follow the TCAS RA has been phrased in much stronger terms. For instance, in the 
UK, the Civil Aviation Authority explicitly stated that in the case of conflicting 
information between the TCAS and the ATC, the pilot is under obligation to follow 
the advice of the TCAS. Furthermore, the pilot should, as soon as possible, inform the 
controller of the RA who may be unaware of it.372 According to ICAO 5.2.1.14.2, the 
controller should not provide separate services to the aircraft which follow the TCAS 
RA, or any contrary information.373374 Nevertheless, the controller is not precluded for 
                                                 
367 Henely (n 358), p.18-1; U.S department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration, ‘Introduction 
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368 U.S department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration, ‘Introduction to TCAS II version 7’ 
(n 367), p.7 
369 Erotokritou (n 146), p.1 
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giving complementary information to the pilots.375 Confusion may arise when the 
controller simultaneously receives information from more than one RA, which could 
lead to an error in guidance of other flights.376  
 
The Chicago Convention also stipulates, in Chapter 4 of Annex 6, that since the 
pilot is ultimately responsible for the safety of the passengers and retains the right to 
make final decisions.377 Yet, it is common practice for pilots to follow the instructions 
given by either the TCAS or the controller, if they are similar, unless particular 
circumstances lead him to take other action.378 The pilot can be held accountable for 
non-compliance with the given instructions.379 On the one hand, his liability may be 
reduced, but certainly not absolved, if he follows the instructions given by the traffic 
controller. This is particularly true when the instructions or information given is 
questionable and the pilot realised this even as he followed it.380 On the other hand, the 
pilot can be held liable for non-compliance with the TCAS RA order.381 Therefore, the 
pilot owes a duty of care to his/her passengers and can be held responsible on the basis 
of his/her negligence. Additionally, pilots can face criminal charges for an accident.382   
 
This makes it seem as though the pilot is under an obligation to obey to the TCAS 
RA. Nevertheless, the pilot makes the ultimate decision whether to comply with the 
TCAS order or the controller order. Neither the SES regulations or any European 
instrument nor the FAB agreements try to or even provide a hint on how to solve the 
liability question of pilots. Surely one may expect inconsistency in Europe; obviously, 
due to the different tort law regimes that exist within the Union, different answers to 
this problematic relationship, with respect to liability, will be given.  
                                                                                                                                                        
374 However, in the US the controller’s responsibilities during a TCAS RA are defined in FAA Order 7110.65. 
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By letting Member States and national courts decide, the Union legislators have 
opened a door to divergences and enormous inconsistencies. Even though one may 
argue that inconsistencies will be reduced by relying on the ICAO imposed on the 
pilots to follow the TCAS order, we still return to the previously enounced question: 
what will happen when there is a defect in the TCAS software? Who will be held 
liable then?    
vii. Air navigation service providers (ANSP) 
Air Navigation Service Providers is a broad term that encompasses various types of 
services. One of the main fields this article looks at is the Air Traffic Service (ATS). 
Under the heading of ATS, it is possible to find the main mandatory services of 
preventing accidents and the procedures to be followed in the case of a collision. ATS 
is subdivided into three main services, namely; Flight Information Service (FIS), 
Alerting Service (ALTS) and finally, Air Traffic Service (ATC).383 
 
There are three types of Air Navigation Service Providers: first an Individual State 
can provide the service; the second type is the provision of the service throughout a 
joint institution, like the MUAC; and thirdly, a non-governmental entity, either 
corporations or private entities, acting on behalf of a State or group of States384. The 
provider is subject to national law and regulation for the performance of his ATS 
duties.385 The tasks that can be delegated by the State are limited to specific 
operational tasks. Any sovereign function of ANS remains with the State.386  
 
Similarly to the actors analyzed above, no general legal instrument, either European 
or international, can help to answer any question about the liability of ANSPs.387 One 
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exception can be pinpointed: the Maastricht Upper Area Control (MUAC), which is 
under the supervision of Eurocontrol, and for which specific provisions on liability can 
be found.388 Article 28 of the Chicago Convention only requires States to provide ATS 
within their airspace.389 The Montreal Convention and its transposition at EU level, 
Regulation 889/2002, require unlimited liability only when an accident results in 
bodily injuries or death.390 Yet, even with all these instruments, the substantially 
important questions are left to national law provisions, provision in bilateral agreement 
if applicable and general tort law without taking into account the specific nature of the 
risks.391 The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has observed that there 
is no real need for an international convention on the liability of traffic management 
agencies, or at least that is what can be deduced from its failure to create an 
international convention dealing with such liability issues.392  
 
As long as the case only involves domestic parties there are no problems. The 
picture starts to become blurry when a cross-border dimension is involved. Such cases 
cannot be entirely resolved by applying only national law as the issue might be much 
more complex. Purely domestic flights are rare. For instance, a flight might be subject 
to both domestic and international law: for some passengers, the flight is domestic but 
for others it is part of a longer (international) trip.393 Even if at first glance a case looks 
like a purely domestic problem, it may raise international issues and consequently, 
more complicated legal issues. The creation of the FABs will augment the number of 
cases with a cross-border dimension as the new system authorizes and favors the 
provision of ATM services by foreign ANSP.394 As a direct result, the airline 
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companies may have to adjust their insurance, as they will need higher coverage limits 
for accidents involving international elements.395 
 
Thanks to the Chicago Convention Article 28, ANS has a sovereign status, meaning 
that if the State has not transposed the Convention into a national legal instrument, a 
natural person would not be able to rely on the Convention because no rights to claim 
damages flow from it.396 Due to its sovereign nature, most national legal orders follow 
the approach that the State is primarily responsible. In most Member States the air 
navigation service function has been delegated to a public agency either fully or 
largely owned by the State.397 The fact that the service is provided by an independent 
body does not change the primary consideration, i.e the State is still liable first, except 
when the provider is a private entity. The only provider that has been privatized in 
Europe is NATS, which is in charge of the UK air navigation service.398399 This means 
that NATS will be the only entity bearing liability, unless damages occurred due to 
some mistake on the part of the State.400 Then the State will be liable for the damages 
it directly caused.401 The ANS in the Benelux countries and part of Germany is, 
unsurprisingly, operated by a common agency, namely the Maastricht Upper Air 
Traffic Control Center (MUAC) which is under the control of Eurocontrol, which is 
primarily liable.402   
 
Additionally, the Chicago Convention governs the relation between States but does 
not give a right to natural persons to sue an ATS.403 Even if Article 4(2) of Regulation 
549/2004 requires the Member States to establish an independent national supervisory 
authority from air navigation service providers, it does not extend the right of private 
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parties to file a claim against an ATS. Concretely, two different agencies will have to 
be created; one to govern the regulatory function and the other to deal with service 
provision function.404  
 
The type of liability for service providers is based on fault-liability except in 
Switzerland where strict liability is used.405 The liability of ANSPs towards airline 
companies is universally accepted to be delictual and not contractual in nature.406407 
Additionally, the liability is unlimited and is normally borne by the State, except for 
NATS.408 Of course, the State can then seek reimbursement from the provider.409 This 
reimbursement will be based primarily on the provision of the agreements between 
States and their ANSP, as required by Recital 15 and section 7 of Annex 1 of 
Regulation 1035/2011. However, these arrangements are only of secondary value and 
may seek to redress the impact of damages paid by the taxpayers of that country. The 
secondary value of these agreements comes from the fact that FAB treaties and 
international law prevails, as the agreement between States and their ANSPs are 
considered contractual in nature. Even if the primary consideration is identical, namely 
that the State is liable, we have seen that the modalities and the ways States deals with 
such liability varies considerably.  
 
It might be surprising that in the Regulations the only reference to liability is the 
requirement for ANSPs to be insured for the risks that may arise from their 
activities.410 It is even more surprising that this requirement is to be found in Article 6 
of the Service Provision Regulation, which enumerates the common requirements. 
                                                 
404 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.53 
405 Schwenk and Schwenk (n 161), p.141; Vrbaski, ‘Liability of Air Navigation Service Providers: Towards an 
International Solution’(n 261), p.36 
406 But for instance in the privatisation agreement of NATS, it is stipulated that NATS is not liable for losses of 
airline companies caused by air traffic control failures. 
See: Software Forensics Centre, ‘At last a silver lining around the troubled NATS Air Traffic Control System’ 
(2002) Report TR 2002-01 
 <http://www.eis.mdx.ac.uk/research/SFC/Reports/TR2002-02.pdf>(accessed 5 July  2014) 
407 du Perron (n 85), p.205; van Antwerpen, Cross-border provision of air navigation services (n 160), p.220 
408 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.53 
409Chatzipanagiotis (n 124), p.343; Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons 
from the Single European Sky’ (n 253), p.53 
410 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.56 
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Article 6 should be read in conjunction with Article 7 which requires the ANSP to 
obtain a certificate from a Member State.411 Paragraph 4 of Article 7 specifies that the 
certificate must contain a clause with the rights and obligations of the ANSP. 
Nevertheless, it is up to the Member State to decide if the ANSP is sufficiently 
covered. Additionally, Article 7 of the Annex 1 of the Common Requirements 
Regulation stipulates that the ANSP must be covered with respect to rights and 
obligations and that questions of liability should be dealt with. The liability issue is 
answered by using the applicable law.412 Consequently, the applicable regime will be 
determined by the provisions of the agreement that governs the cross-border service on 
a case-by-case basis.413 
 
Within a FAB, Article 8 (5) of Regulation 1070/2009 states that one or more 
Member States within that airspace block must designate one ANSP that will provide 
ANS exclusively within that geographical area.414 Therefore, it is imperative to 
include liability provisions in the treaty on which the FAB will be based. Otherwise, 
the only country that will have to bear the responsibility for the collision will be where 
the accident occurred, making it nearly impossible for the State to recover damages 
from the ANS.415 Just to give an example of the protection of ANSPs: Article 30.2 of 
the Treaty establishing the FABEC stipulates that ‘No direct action may be brought 
against the effective air traffic service provider or its agents or any other person acting 
on its behalf.’ In other words, the State may seek reimbursement from the ANSP after 
having compensated the victims. The victims, however, cannot directly file a claim 
against the ANSP. Nothing in the agreements gives the ANSPs the rights to claim 
damages that they pay to the State from a sub-contractor. This issue is either resolved 
through special clauses in the contract or by relying on national law.416 
  
                                                 
411 Article 7(8) Service Provision Regulation, 550/2004. The principle of mutual recognition applies, therefore 
the certificate will be recognized throughout the Union.  
412 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.56 
413 Ibid, p.57 
414 The geographical area can encompass part of the territory of the Member States or them entirely   
415 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.56; Simoncini, ‘Governing air traffic management in the single European sky: the search for possible 
solutions to safety issues’(n 115), p.223 
416 Alias, E.02.13(version 00.00.01) (n 154), p.67 
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One should not forget that within Europe, the main ANSP is Eurocontrol. As a 
result any victim of an airplane crash can start lawsuit against Eurocontrol, even if 
they are not EU citizens.417 Nevertheless, with the FABs system and the opening of the 
market to all ANSPs, the role of Eurocontrol might diminish.  
  
                                                 
417 Erotokritou (n 146), p.3 
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D. Problems encountered  
i. Victims 
The victim normally files a claim against the State in which the injury occurred, if 
the state follows the territorial state doctrine, or against the state responsible for the 
ANSP, if the state follows the provider state doctrine.418 But, this is in theory. In 
practice, states may not rely on the doctrine of territorial State or the ANSP could be a 
private entity. Even though Eurocontrol advocates for the provider state doctrine, there 
is no consensus within the Union on which doctrine is prevailing. Therefore, if the 
agreement creating the FAB does not contain clear conflict of law rules, then the case 
may quickly become a nightmare. First of all, it would be complicated to determine in 
which forum the claimant needs to bring his lawsuit. Secondly, when the case has been 
filed with the relevant court, the judge will have to figure out which law is applicable. 
Clearly, filing a lawsuit will be burdensome for the victim and the length of the 
proceedings might be prolonged given that the court may not be the most appropriate 
forum to hear the case. Therefore, the principle of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation is at stake.419 Prompt compensation principle obliges the State to fully 
compensate the victims for the wrong it committed.420 
 
It can be costly and time consuming to assign the authority of a country in front of a 
court with no certainty whatsoever that the person will receive compensation. Even if 
the cases are straight-forward, in some countries a consequential amount of time could 
lapse before any compensation is given to the victims or their relatives. For instance, 
more than 6 years passed before the relatives of victims from the Nantes collision 
received any damages. The documents that need to be produced as evidence, differ 
from country to country. Furthermore, one should keep in mind that those cases cost 
                                                 
418 Vrbaski, ‘Liability of Air Navigation Service Providers: Towards an International Solution’ (n 262), p.13; 
Simoncini, ‘Governing air traffic management in the single European sky : the search for possible solutions to 
safety issues’(n 115), p.224 
419 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.54 
420 For more information see: Frank G. Dawson and Burns H. Weston , ‘"Prompt, Adequate and Effective": A 
Universal Standard of Compensation?’ (1962) 30 Fordham Law Review 727 
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million/billions of euro to the country. Therefore, some States are reticent about the 
cases.  
 
The situation may be worse for bystanding civilians injured or killed because of an 
airplane accident, as seen in the Nantes collision. This explains why few lawsuits were 
filed by the relatives of the civilians killed by the accident.  
 
Normally, because of the sovereign nature of ANS activities, all claims should be 
filed in the court of the State of occurrence and therefore forum shopping is limited. 
But as soon as an ANSP is involved, the case takes directly bigger proportions as 
claims against various defendants cannot be merged and need to be submitted to 
different forum, which can mean different claims in different countries.  
 
The airline company- passenger relationship is well regulated at EU level. 
Furthermore, the ruling in the case Peter Rehder v Air Baltic Corporation makes it 
clear that the victims can sue an airline company in both the court of departure and 
arrival.  
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ii. States  
A State is under the obligation to compensate victims even if the collision was due 
to a failure by a foreign ANS, but the accident occurred over the territory of that State. 
This specific case is submitted to customary international law for breach of the duties 
under Article 28 of Chicago Convention but above all to the national law of that 
State.421 This might seem normal. However, the problem lies in the fact that if that 
State and the State which the foreign ANS is from are not parties to an agreement, 
then the State over which the accident occurred may not have any legal mechanism for 
the reimbursement of damages paid out to victims of an injury caused by the foreign 
ANS.422 Instead, the taxpayers of that State will have to bear the final responsibility. 
The difficulties of a case like Überlingen, should be avoided.423424 Most of the time the 
agreements, which the cross-border service is based on, are drafted and concluded 
between ANS without States being involved.425 These agreements are mostly of a 
technical nature and do not encompass any rules governing liability questions.426  
 
As already mentioned above, according to Article 8 (5) of Regulation 550/2004 or 
Article 4(4) 1079/2009, within a FAB, a Contracting States can designate one service 
                                                 
421 Chatzipanagiotis (n 124), p.344; Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some 
Lessons from the Single European Sky’ (n 253), p.54 
422 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.54 
423 In this case the plaintiff filed lawsuits against the U.S defendants in the United States, however due to the 
minimal connections the U.S court dismissed the case under the rule of forum non conveniens. The plaintiff then 
filed a lawsuit in Spain which ironically decided to apply Arizona and New Jersey law to the issues of liability 
and damages. 
For more information see: Alan H. Collier and Nicholas A. Weiss, ‘Choice of law & choice of forum in foreign 
air disaster litigation’  
<http://www.fitzhunt.com/sites/default/files/news/Choice%20of%20Law%20and%20Choice%20of%20Forum%
20in%20Foreign%20Air%20Disaster%20Litigation-Collier-Weiss.pdf> accessed 29 June 2014  
Furthermore, the district court in Germany applied German law and found the German state liable. But even if it 
would have applied the Treaty, which was not signed, between Germany and Switzerland, the answer would be 
similar as Germany agreed to be liable for errors made by the Swiss air navigation service provider in German 
airspace. See: Niels van Antwerpen, ‘Cross-border provision of air navigation services with specific reference to 
Europe: Safeguarding transparent lines of responsibility and liability’ (PhD, Universiteit Leiden, 2007)  
424 Franklin (n 32), p.429; Vrbaski, ‘Liability of Air Navigation Service Providers: Towards an International 
Solution’ (n 262), p.14 
425 For instance see: Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the 
Single European Sky’ (n 253), p.55; Aireon, ‘Aireon signs agreement with NAV Portugal, another strategic air 
navigation service provider, for space-based ADS-B’ (3 March 2014) 
 <http://www.aireon.com/NewsEvents/NewsReleases/NewsReleaseDetail?pid=45> accessed 29 June 2014 
426 See for instance: FABEC Implementation Phase Cooperation Agreement ANSP Annex F; Schubert, ‘The 
Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ (n 253), p.55 
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provider that will function as the exclusive ANS for the airspace over one or more 
States. If the FAB’s treaty does not mention how responsibility is to be divided among 
the actors involved, only the country over which the accident occurred will have to 
pay. And then it will be nearly impossible for the State to recover damages from the 
ANS.427 Furthermore, the foreign ANSP can be tempted to escape liability by refusing 
to be subject to foreign jurisdiction. This refusal would be based on the, direct or 
indirect, public status of the agency providing the services.428   
 
On top of that, the SES Regulations make it even more complicated and tricky by 
giving the ANSP the possibility to delegate work to other certified service providers 
under Article 10 of Service Provision Regulation. A safeguard has been placed in 
Article 7 of the Common Requirements Regulation, however, which requires that the 
arrangement between the ANSPs contains a provision on the allocation of 
responsibilities. But, if this obligation is treated with the same zeal as in some of the 
FAB treaties then it will be of no use and national law will apply. If the contract is not 
well-drafted then we will (again) witness legal battles. Naturally, the ‘main’ ANSP 
will remain liable toward the Member State that appointed it, without taking into 
consideration the fact that power was delegated to another ANSP. Yet, the State will 
be the first to compensate and will be then able to claim damages from the wrongdoer. 
 
As has been mentioned above, some authors have raised the argument that if the 
ANSP governing the airspace of the country is of the same nationality as the place of 
occurrence, then it will be considered a wholly internal situation429. There are two 
reasons to be cautious of such categorization. First of all, the questions of liability are 
ultimately dealt with by ICAO. Secondly, the Union has established a general 
framework of provisions covering the technical aspects of air traffic management. Yet, 
it is doubtful that the CJEU will consider these reasons as valid and take a different 
approach than the one it takes from free movement of goods and persons.  
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One may raise the argument that when States engage in a FAB co-operation, they 
would have to address also the liability case and it would be highly unusual for a State 
to accept a set of arrangements where its own service provider is at a disadvantage. 
We may agree and at the same time disagree with this statement; it is true that the 
whole FAB will not be serviced by one ANSP but rather cooperation among them. 
Therefore, there will be few changes in that regard from the existing system. For 
example, Article 12 of the agreement establishing the FABEC stipulates that there will 
be more than one provider. The cross-border cooperation is not a new concept in the 
field of ANSP; there are already the Maastricht and Copenhagen agreements, which 
are currently working without the point of wholly internal situation ever being raised. 
But at the same time, if the State seeks reimbursement from its own ANSP, then the 
situation cannot be regarded as European because it lacks a cross-border element. In 
such situations, the normal provisions apply, i.e national tort law.   
 
It is true that the State cannot force an ANSP to supply another Member State with 
its services. Yet, there is a need for clear and concise agreements in which liability 
issues are included.  
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E. Liability in US 
Air litigation has become more complicated with the technological evolution of the 
industry.430 Today, airline travel is common and therefore, juries are more inclined to 
think that the cause of a collision was due to negligence.431 Two federal agencies take 
care of airspace related problems, the FAA and the NTSB.432 Lawsuits in the US can 
be brought in front of either state or federal courts. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
will be able to pick the jurisdiction with potentially larger damages, or where punitive 
damages are available.433 The fear of punitive damages plays a great role in the fast 
resolution of a case; the defendants will stipulate to liability in exchange for an 
agreement from the plaintiff to waive punitive damages. When liability is established 
and accepted by the wrongdoer, then the only remaining question is the amount of 
compensation. As a result, air collision cases often can be resolved quickly.434 
Additionally, when the NTSB investigates the reasons for an accident, the main actors, 
e.g., the airline companies, manufacturer, and controllers, are extensively involved in 
the process of fact finding.435 Product liability is dealt at state level but federal law can 
also play a role.436437  
 
                                                 
430 Jonesday, ‘Aviation Product Liability Litigation’ <http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/7476e01e-
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Of course, international conventions are also applicable in the US.438 Consequently, 
the State will still be liable under customary international law for breach of duties 
under the Chicago Convention. Nevertheless, it is the United States as a whole that is a 
signatory member to the Convention, rather than the individual States. Furthermore, 
Annex 11 of the Convention dictates that it is the Signatory States who decide for 
which part of the airspace ATS must be provided, as well as which organisation will 
provide that service. In case of an’ internal’ accident, the Convention is not applicable. 
As a result, liability is mostly dealt with as an internal matter, relying on relatively 
similar tort rules and one investigation agency. In such situations, the airline company 
will usually be the first to bear responsibility. Furthermore, it is common ground in the 
US to file a lawsuit against multiple actors; air collisions do not derogate from this 
rule.439  
 
The possibility of combining claims filed in different states exists in the US but not 
in Europe. The resolution of aviation claims without a lawyer is unlikely, partly 
because the litigation is costly and time-consuming.440 Generally, claims are settled 
after negotiation between lawyers for the plaintiffs and insurance companies.441  
Generally, the insurance coverage is high in order to anticipate damages incurred from 
a collision.442 However, most of the agreements establishing FAB contain a clause on 
litigation. Therefore it seems that the option is left open in Europe.  
 
Usually, the first named defendant is the airline company, then the aircraft 
manufacturer, air traffic controllers and some government agencies.443 The job of air 
traffic controller is regulated by federal law since the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) employs all controllers and they must pass through a federal civil-service 
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system.444 Lastly, in the US, the minimum altitude level is prescribed by federal 
law.445 Consequently, liability is dealt with differently in the US and Europe because 
states are not likely to be liable and trials always include multiple agents and agencies.   
  
                                                 
444 Before 1946, the controller was the only one to bear liability, if the State did not expressly accept to be sued. 
The State applied the doctrine ‘the King can do no wrong’.  
See: Kevin N. Courtois, ‘Standards and practice: the judieiary's role in promoting safety in the air traffic control 
system’ (1990) 55 Journal of Air Law & Cornmerce. 1117, p.1120-1121; Freudenrich (n 111), p.4; Vanessa 
Warriner, ‘La responsabilité des controleurs aériens dans les systèmes Américain et Français’(LL.M, Institut de 
droit aérien et spatial, McGill University, 2000), p.21 
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F. Intermediate conclusion  
To sum up, a state will be liable but can file a suit against the person, legal and 
natural, whose failure has led to the accident. If it is a clear-cut case, the state will 
compensate for the damages. One may ask why an entire master thesis on this topic is 
needed, given the apparently easy and straightforward answer. The reason is that 
complications arise with regard to how to deal with internal liability.446 Furthermore, 
we might be witnessing, now that we will notice a change from national based rules to 
supranational based rules, the risks that Member States reject the fault on one another 
is greater. Claimants and states may face difficulties with respect to liability when a 
cross-border dimension is involved. Although such fights also occurred before the 
creation of FABs, the fact that they are no longer based on national borders may create 
more problems within an FAB itself in the case of an accident, as it will be more 
complicated to determine who or what element caused the accident.  
 
By requiring the Member States to closely cooperate inside of a FAB, the Union 
may have opened the door to divergence within Europe. Furthermore, except in the 
case of Sweden and Finland where an agreement exists for cooperation and a 
declaration that the NEFAB and Danish-Swedish FAB will cooperate, there are no 
instruments dealing with this aspect of the problem. It is in human nature that when 
you regroup people together and ask them to closely cooperate together they will 
mostly not look at what their neighbor is doing. If an accident occurs on the border of 
two FABs, the question that was already difficult without the FAB, would start to 
become impossible to answer. To explain, we will use the following hypothetical 
example; a plane under Irish flag, flying above the Alps, leaving the control of French 
ANS and entering the control of Spanish ANS, crashes in proximity of the border. It is 
obvious that the pilot made no mistakes, but the plane is not well-maintained even 
though the company had received a certification from Ireland. The lack of clear 
communication between the French and Spanish ANSs leads to the accident. 
However, if the plane would have been well-maintained, fewer people would have 
died. The question is who is liable? Probably, Spain might say it is not liable because 
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the French ANS has provided incorrect information. France might say it was the 
Spanish that did not lead the plane well enough and therefore it crashed on French 
territory causing the death of x number of persons. Ireland might say it was unaware 
that the plane did not meet the required safety requirements. This would result in 
judicial arguments between countries. Although, this scenario could occur before 
FABs were created, the fact that FABs are no longer based on national borders may 
create more problems within the FAB itself in case of accident; it will be more 
complicated to decide who or what elements amount to the accident. Therefore, adding 
a layer of difficulty rather than suppressing one. 
 
Generally, when a collision occurs, passengers die. As a result, in the US and in 
Europe, one of the subsequent lawsuits is against the wrongdoer for wrongful death or 
manslaughter but less often for personal injuries.447 In the United States, they also 
encounter the same problem as in Europe in a sense: it is difficult to establish with 
certainty which entity was at fault and who to sue. Therefore, in the US, lawsuits often 
contain multiple defendants, namely the manufacturer, operators and regulators of the 
aircraft.448 Furthermore, class actions and multi district litigations are available. This 
would never be possible in Europe. Multi-defendants trials are possible, Article 6(1) 
Brussels I. But, class actions are not yet available.449  
 
The Commission wishes to imitate the system implemented in the US where 
airspace is divided efficiency and seems to work well. However, the US model cannot 
be applied to the European Union for one simple reason: the US as a whole is a 
signatory country to the Chicago Convention, rather than by individual states. 
Therefore, as long as the US fulfills its obligation, its internal division is of no real 
importance to its international obligations. In contrast, in Europe, each Member State 
is signatory state and therefore individually bound the Convention’s obligations. 
Additionally, in the US, a plaintiff can choose whether to bring his claim before a state 
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448 James A. R. Nafziger, ‘Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation Rules and the Common 
Law’ (1994) 54 Louisiana Law Review 1001; Liam P Sarsfield et all (n 431), p.83 
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or federal court. This system allows plaintiffs’ lawyers to forum shop for the court that 
is likely to award the largest amount of compensatory damages or punitive damages. 
Due to the fear of a jury trial and the vast amount of damages a jury may award, the 
airline companies and aircraft manufacturers have a bigger incentive to reduce risks 
than do the entities in Europe.  
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3. Recommendations and conclusion  
As has been highlighted in this thesis, the first party to bear responsibility in the 
event of an accident is the State of occurrence. Under the SES framework, this has not 
changed. However, due to the complexity of the system introduced, the resolution of a 
case will be much more complicated and the line between the actors involved will be 
even more blurred.450 However, it should be kept in mind that it is impossible to 
isolate the liability of one actor from the liability of the rest of the involved actors.451 
As long as the Union is convinced that the problem of allocation of liability should not 
be dealt with at European level, we can only propose remedies which will ease the 
resolution of a case but certainly not resolve the problem.  
 
The system and delineation imagined by the Commission might not be the most apt 
to address entirely the problem of inefficiency. Indeed, the highest density region of 
Europe has been divided into four different FABs. In other words, Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK are 
not in the same FAB even if the most dense air corridor is above their territories. Even 
Eurocontrol stated that it was unlikely that the division as it stands would be 
‘operationally optimal.’452  
 
But beyond this problem of division, another major problem is that the Regulations 
leave a considerable room for maneuvering by the Member States453, which can lead 
to disparities within Europe. But the main problem the SES proposal is facing is that 
no one really understands its advantages or values it as it should, as is exemplified by 
the Member States’ reluctance to adopt the SES. Furthermore, when reading the first 
regulations it seems that the Union tried to push an idea forward but without thinking 
through the details and side effects of such legislation. This is also highlighted by the 
fact that traffic controllers were not considered during the drafting the legislation, or at 
least that the legislator forgot to look at the proposition’s side effects, and only valued 
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the potential profits. That is why the French traffic controllers went on strike; they fear 
the adverse consequences on security that could result from the SES, but furthermore 
they fear losing their advantages, such as work benefits.  
 
The concept behind the SES is amazing and can bring the necessary changes the 
European airspace is craving for, at least economically. But legally speaking, at least 
with regard to the liability question, no real change will occur. Quite the contrary, an 
additional layer of fragmentation may result. As it now stands, the European legal 
framework designed for the SES does not provide for any form of liability. Therefore, 
the resolution of a case will rely on national law and international conventions. Even if 
the Commission considered the issue but preferred to leave the States’ room to decide 
upon the matter, it would not change the fact that this would lead to divergent 
approaches towards liability within Europe. 
 
First, when people are asked to closely cooperate together, they tend to focus on 
their group only and not on what their neighbors are doing. If we extrapolate from this 
notion, we can easily arrive at the conclusion that there will be nine bubbles that will 
emerge in Europe, one for each FAB, each with different criteria for liability. Of 
course, every bubble will only care about its well-being and will implement its ideas to 
that end. Therefore, the result might be a bubble effect, similar to that which 
characterizes Brussels’ institutions. The Commission has maybe made a mistake by 
requiring close cooperation within a FAB, leading to individualistic behaviour in each 
FABs.454 
 
Second, the level of liability will differ greatly for people in the same position. To 
this, the counter argument is that we are already facing this problem with tort law. 
This will not be denied but where, in my opinion, the problem lies, is that some ANSP 
providing services in a foreign State will be subject to unclear and convoluted 
agreement, which will undermine legal certainty and disincentive for companies to do 
indeed provide services in a foreign state. If the inter-state agreements were clear, 
precise and concise, as some already are, the service provider would know where it 
                                                 
454 Lawless (n 20), p.78  
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stands before entering into an agreement to provide services on the territory of another 
State. Furthermore, due to the differences in the State agreements, a ruling by the 
CJEU may only be applicable to a certain FAB, not to the Union in general since the 
status of the intra-state agreements is unclear. Additionally, it is to be assumed that in 
case of dispute within an FAB, the CJEU will have jurisdiction and will render a 
judgment. However, this is only an assumption flowing from the normal application of 
European law. The judgments might be different in each FAB. Moreover, several non-
European states are involved in the SES, which begs the question whether they would 
accept CJEU rulings? If not, how would we resolve a case when the parties are not 
agreeing on the facts?  
 
Finally, the competition between the FABs will be higher. Since most major 
airports are within the same block, their objective may be quite different from that of 
the other FABs.    
 
In my opinion, the biggest mistake the Union is making is trying to create a system 
similar to the US system by using FABs. This creates at least two problems: the US is 
a nation and the judicial procedure. 
 
Firstly, the US as a nation is under the obligations of the international conventions. 
So long as the nation complies as a whole, what the individual states do is immaterial. 
Therefore, the US has much more room of manoeuvre: the Chicago Convention 
requires each Contracting States to provide ANS, if the entire US has one, it meets its 
obligation; the US need not have 50 ANS for each of the 50 states. In contrast, every 
Member States of the EU is a Contracting States to the Chicago Convention, so each 
Member State must have an ANS to be in compliance. As a result the only possibility 
for Member States is to cooperate more but this would probably not solve the problem 
on the long term. Perhaps, the Union could sign the Convention, but that does not 
seem to be on the agenda nor very realistic. 
 
Secondly, in the US, there is a possibility of going to Federal Courts. This 
possibility is totally excluded in the Union since the Union never wanted to be a 
federation. One may argue that we do not need a federal court to deal with airspace 
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collisions. Well that would be a mistaken assumption! Not every FAB agreement 
provides a clear answer to the choice of forum or choice of law question. According to 
international law, the place of occurrence has jurisdiction, but nothing is written with 
regard to the other states. Nor is it certain that state immunity will not hinder the 
smooth resolution of the case. Even though, within the Union that problem was never 
raised, one should keep in mind that non-European States are also involved in the SES. 
Of course, some of the FABs encompass States with similar legal systems; therefore in 
the event of a collision, solving the problem may not be too difficult. This is not the 
case in every FAB. For example, within the FABEC three different types of liability 
exist. Although it is clear that the State of occurrence has to pay and then it can file a 
claim against the wrongdoer, if the penalty imposed in the first State is higher or 
lower, then problems may arise. Certainly, when the penalties are higher, the State of 
occurrence will probably not get full compensation and then it will be the taxpayers of 
that State who will have to bear part of the consequences of the crash. 
   
Thirdly, in the US, there is the possibility of starting multi-district proceedings, 
which groups all the claims against the same parties in one multidistrict court. That 
simplifies the investigations and renders judgment more quickly, therefore 
compensating the victim faster as well. In Europe it would be impossible to have such 
a mechanism. However, since the state of occurrence is under the obligation to 
compensate, one may argue that it is not a real problem. The place of occurrence will 
have to pay even when it has done nothing wrong; it can then sue other parties, but this 
generally results in lengthy proceedings.  
 
Finally, the US has extensive discovery in civil cases, which can help uncover the 
reasons for a collision. This possibility is not available in most European countries and 
may lead to problems: when it is unclear who the wrongdoer is, it will be difficult to 
attribute liability. Furthermore, certain countries may argue that the discovery was not 
extensive enough or the evidence not taken in accordance with national practice and 
therefore declare it inadmissible. The only possible solution would be to create a 
committee at the EU level to supervise the collection of evidence and assist general in 
Member State cooperation.  
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It is indisputable that the inefficiency of the European airspace is costly for airlines. 
Nor is it disputed that this situation should be changed. To this point, it is again 
interesting to compare the Union with the US. In the US, the cost of traffic control is 
lower than in the EU. However, there are limits to this comparison. For instance, in the 
EU, labor law is different than in the US, and gives more protection to employees. As 
a result, employers have to guarantee certain rights that may raise costs. And there are 
fewer accidents in Europe than in the US, where the market is similar to the one the 
Union wants to introduce. 
 
The above critiques lead us directly to the critical part where changes should occur.  
As we have seen in the section dedicated to inter-state agreements and as I have 
advocated, there is a need for provisions regarding liability in the treaties establishing 
the FABs. An even better solution would be for the Union to stipulate which points 
should be mandatory in all such treaties, which would help mitigate the enormous 
disparities that currently exist between the agreements. The only similarity is the final 
outcome that the State of occurrence will be the first to bear responsibility, since this 
obligation flows from international law. The idea of the Union dictating to the 
Member States what to do will most certainly be rejected by the Member States and 
viewed as a threat to their sovereignty. Knowing who is liable would be helpful for the 
victims and other actors involved. It is surely questionable if the Union enters into 
more detailed regulation of secondary liability arrangements and may be against the 
principle of freedom of agreements and subsidiarity. Nevertheless, it is desirable that 
the Union at least requires all States to include a liability provision and choice of 
forum rule in their agreements.  
 
An alternative solution would be to refer any dispute to the International Court of 
air and space arbitration. The costs of litigation are low and speedy interim decisions 
are available when necessary. But, since it has been created no cases have been 
referred to it.455 However, this can change as in most of the FAB’s agreements an 
                                                 
455 Géraldine Meishan Goh, Dispute settlement in international space law a multi-door courthouse for outer 
space (Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), p.74 
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arbitration clause is included. With regard to private parties it seems rather unlikely 
that they will use this means.  
 
Furthermore, it is indispensable that all agreements between FABs are concluded, 
as is already the case between Finland and Sweden.456 These agreements should 
encompass provisions on liability, as the worst case scenario would be if an accident 
occurred when a flight is in between two FABs, or leaving the control of one for the 
control of another. In such a scenario, it will be necessary to establish who was at fault 
and who will bear liability. Inter-FABs agreements will render the resolution of a case 
faster and easier if there are provisions dealing with the matter. Furthermore, providers 
will know the sanctions they may face and will enhance legal certainty. In order to 
avoid, the above-mentioned, bubble effect it is of crucial importance to establish 
cooperation among FABs as well.  
 
In order to ameliorate the current framework, it is important to make a clear 
distinction between air traffic services exclusively under national sovereignty versus 
those in which a cross border element is involved. As was illustrated in this 
dissertation, a purely internal situation is rare or perhaps nonexistent as usually, at 
least one passenger will be a foreigner, making the case international as well as 
domestic. Nevertheless, it would not be problematic if the SES does not deal with 
those cases because international conventions can solve it. Thus, a clear definition of 
what is regarded as a cross-border element is needed. Is it the fact that the plane is 
operating between two countries or could it be a citizen of State A on a domestic flight 
within State B? If it is the latter, then how do we solve it? The resolution of such a 
case will lead to reverse discrimination. Even though this is accepted by the CJEU, it 
might seem unfair. Additionally, that means that the victim will have to file his/ her 
claim in the place of occurrence and may have to follow the case in a foreign language 
because the case will be purely domestic containing a foreign element. Then which 
law will be applicable? There are still many questions without clear answers. 
 
                                                 
456 Murto, LSSIP Year 2011 Finland (n 281), p.5 
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A better approach to the problem may be to not change the entire legislation but 
rather, to replace some theories with renewed ideas that better reflect the current 
reality. As has been highlighted earlier, the doctrine used in the agreements 
establishing the FABs is the territorial state doctrine, which means that the State of 
occurrence is the one primarily liable. This theory was totally appropriate in earlier 
times when national ANSPs were providing services. However, with the current 
reality, it might create an unfair outcome: the State of occurrence may have delegated 
power over that part of its airspace to a foreign ANSP and therefore did nothing 
wrong. Additionally, this approach is not totally adequate and in line with the 
cornerstone idea of the SES which is: to eliminate boundaries.457 A better approach 
would be to follow a doctrine holding the ANSP liable; in other words, to directly hold 
the wrongdoer liable. Article 14 of the draft model State Level FAB agreement 
proposed by Eurocontrol is based on that concept. The SES allows a Member State to 
directly designate a foreign ANSP, therefore changing the theory of liability would not 
contradict the legal text of the SES.  
 
But, this theory also has some defects; the ANSP could be sued and judged under a 
laws different from its own, as the habitants of the State of occurrence might suffer 
from damages caused by the collision and want to sue the ANSP in their own courts.  
Additionally, if a Member State designates a foreign ANSP, then the governing law 
for liability matters will be the law of the State designating the ANSP. This is also true 
for the model FAB agreement, the choice of jurisdiction and law is clearly expressed; 
the one of the state where the damages occurred. Furthermore, that model agreement 
allows the State of occurrence to sue the ANSP in order to recover any compensation 
incurred by the State resulting from damages caused by the negligence of the 
ANSP.458 One could argue, however that these risks are an inherent part of the 
provision of services in a different state, and therefore, the ANSP should be ready to 
bear such responsibilities. If a Member State designates a foreign ANSP, a possibility 
under the SES regulations, then the governing law for liability matters will be the law 
of the State designating the ANSP, and ultimately leading to problems. It might be 
                                                 
457 Schubert, ‘Legal Aspects of Cross-Border Service Provision in the Single European Sky’ (n 17), p.135 
458 Article 14.3 of the model FAB agreement 
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wise to try negotiation first in those cases. First of all, it is difficult to change national 
law in order to include all the possible consequences that the designation of foreign 
ANSP could have.459 Therefore it is of great importance that the Intra-government 
agreements encompass this issue. 
 
Another potential solution is to create a European fund for victims. The fund would 
work as follows: when an accident occurs, the fund will compensate the victims and 
then after a genuine investigation, the wrongdoer(s) would reimburse the fund. 
Therefore avoiding lengthy proceedings in courts, as the victims would be precluded 
to bring a claim through normal channels of litigation. The fund would be alimented 
by all the actors involved and augmented by the Member States.460As a result, 
Member States will show solidarity and no longer bear the costs of accident. Indeed, 
instead of the State of occurrence, which might not be at fault but currently must 
compensate the victims, under this system, the fund would be the primary payer. 
Using the fund will then avoid the problem of taxpayers from one country paying for 
the wrongdoing of a foreign state agency. With this idea, there is no need to change 
liability theories, but merely substitutes an external actor as the first to compensate. 
Since the fund will be purely European, the investigation might not be biased. It will 
be in the interest of all States involved to help because part of their money is in the 
fund. 
 
However, one could argue against this idea in that the fund may not be used much 
and the money could be better used for other projects. This is undeniable but it is hard 
to imagine that a crash occurs over the territory of your country and that your tax 
money is used to compensate the victims even if it is clear that your country has done 
nothing wrong. Would you like it? Or would you prefer that victims are compensated 
by a special fund in which 28 countries have put money in? Instead of one country 
                                                 
459 Schubert, ‘Legal Aspects of Cross-Border Service Provision in the Single European Sky’ (n 17), p.119 
460 A fund was created, by Germany, Switzerland and Skyguide, for the victims in the Überlingen mid-air 
collision. See: Eidgenössisches Finanzdepartement EFD, ‘Überlingen: Verlauf und Stand der Verfahren zu 
Schadenersatzund Genugtuungsforderungen’ (2008) 
<http://www.google.be/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F
%2Fwww.efd.admin.ch%2Fdokumentation%2F02288%2F02485%2F02507%2Findex.html%3Flang%3Dde%26
download%3DNHzLpZeg7t%2Clnp6I0NTU042l2Z6ln1acy4Zn4Z2qZpnO2Yuq2Z6gpJCDe4N4fmym162epYb
g2c_JjKbNoKSn6A--&ei=eKS6U4_-OeSm0AWzjIHYCw&usg=AFQjCNE9-QLv_DWBS_COXg-
XaQudq60DbQ&sig2=zVqBgiNBqJLWSMgkqXECsw&bvm=bv.70138588,d.bGE> accessed 29 June 2014 
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bearing the millions of euro losses, it will be millions divided by 28 and then 
reimbursed by the wrongdoers.  
 
To establish a single Air Traffic Control Center per Member State might be 
problematic if the system breaks down, as happened in the UK in December 2013, 
which paralyzed a major part of UK airports.461 The problem in such a system is that 
there are hardly any alternative ways to function in the event of a system break down. 
When there are different control centers, the planes can be sent to different airports. 
The idea of a unique center is interesting and will definitely enhance efficiency. 
However, there should be an ‘emergency’ system that can operate during a break 
down of the regular system. 
 
Regarding the resolution of cases, it might be wise to create a panel of experts to 
help the CJEU. Creating a special court for the SES would not be feasible or practical 
for at least two reasons: first, air collisions are rare in Europe, and secondly, it will be 
way too costly.  One thing is clear, however: the CJEU will encounter problems if it 
has to deal with a case of that kind. Already, experts in aviation law disagree with one 
another and are not entirely sure how to resolve certain issues that may arise; it would 
be unrealistic to believe that the judges in the CJEU, with their general knowledge, are 
the best equipped to solve cases encompassing lots of specificities.  
 
These difficulties will be compounded by the differences in the FAB agreements. 
As a result, it might be that a ruling by the CJEU will only be applicable to a certain 
FAB or FABs and not to the Union in general. Furthermore, it is to be assumed that in 
case of dispute within a FAB, the CJEU will have jurisdiction and will render a 
judgment. This judgment might be different in each FAB.  
 
In order to resolve the knowledge problem, there were proposals for a European 
aviation court, which would exclusively deal with aviation-related cases. This court 
                                                 
461 Sky news, ‘Air traffic control problem delays UK flights’ <http://news.sky.com/story/1179070/air-traffic-
control-problem-delays-uk-flights> accessed 26 April 2014 
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would be composed of experts, one for every specific field.462 Such a court would 
bring legal certainty and predictability.463 Furthermore, this court would be able to set 
common standards.464 Concurrently, the same problems exist as for the proposed 
special panel within the CJEU: it will be costly and hopefully, not often needed.  
 
A more rational recommendation would be to allow Member States in a same FAB 
to create a ‘committee’ to handle collisions. The committee would be composed of one 
representative from each of the states involved in the FAB and its main role would be 
to facilitate the distribution of liability. Furthermore, the committee could be 
composed of experts, or be able to hire experts to assist it. Consequently, the 
resolution of a case could be easier, as it would not be in the formal context of a court 
room but rather a mediation/negotiation style. One should never forget that 
investigations in such cases can be lengthy and costly. Furthermore, a (rather 
unwilling) Member State may decide to cooperate with the investigation as little as 
possible. Most of the treaties already provide for a committee to deal with 
investigations, but this committee could be involved in the negotiation and the 
resolution of the case. Without the fear of punitive damages as exists in the US, a court 
case will be less efficient in Europe.  
 
It is difficult to change national law in order to include all of the possible 
consequences that the designation of foreign ANSP could have.465 Therefore it is of 
great importance that the Inter-government agreements encompass this issue. What 
would have enhanced cooperation and efficiency, would have been the possibility for 
Member States inside of a same FAB to jointly designate one ANSP for the whole 
block. Then each of the states would have an agency under the orders of the main 
ANSP. This model would bring EU airspace closer to the US model in a sense, with 
controllers dealing with a specific sector. However, this would conflict with their 
obligations under the Chicago Convention. Although article 28 does not explicitly 
                                                 
462 Michaelides-Mateou and Mateou (n 131), p.149; Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services 
Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ (n 253), p.53; Schwenk and Schwenk (n161), p.141 
463 Michaelides-Mateou and Mateou (n 131), p.149  
464 Schubert, ‘The Liability of Air Navigation Services Providers: Some Lessons from the Single European Sky’ 
(n 253), p.53; Schwenk and Schwenk (n 161), p.141; Michaelides-Mateou and Mateou (n 131), p.149 
465 Schubert, ‘Legal Aspects of Cross-Border Service Provision in the Single European Sky’ (n 17), p.119 
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prohibit States from entering into agreements with other States or delegating control 
over part of their airspace, States will still ultimately be liable under Chicago 
Convention. One may argue that the Member States do not have a great incentive to 
delegate all their control to one single agency. One example of the delegation of part 
of their airspace is the MUAC, however in this case, Article 11(3) of the Maastricht 
Agreement dictates that it is Eurocontrol that bears direct responsibility if something 
goes wrong and Eurocontrol was at fault.   
 
It can be concluded that the use of a Eurocontrol type of agency can be of great 
help in solving part of the problem because it is not linked to a national jurisdiction 
and is regarded by ICAO as an international agency.466 Therefore, there is less chance 
of conflict between international conventions and SES. Nonetheless, it is not clear if 
Eurocontrol will be directly liable, or if the State of occurrence will have to pay first 
and then file a claim against the agency. It seems that the option taken is that 
Eurocontrol will be directly liable for any fault but that it has a right of recourse 
against a contracting state if the latter has misbehaved, ex article 11(3) Maastricht 
Agreement.   
 
Another problem might arise, namely, the SES does not harmonize national law 
which regulates the States’ airspace. Therefore, we may witness huge disparities 
between Member States. Therefore, if a foreign service provider is designated to 
control part of the airspace of another State, it will have to comply with two sets of 
rules and procedures. Although it is common practice for Member States to follow 
ICAO procedure, there is still room for maneuvering by the States. Consequently, one 
may wonder if the concept of dual burden and its prohibition under EU law would not 
be applicable in this situation. It will be hard for a State that delegates its power to 
control and supervise the foreign ANSP. Therefore, it is unclear which type of 
procedure will be used unless an agreement stipulates all the requirements and 
procedures that will be applicable. This leaves the door open to the question, is the 
harmonization foreseen by the SES adequate or should it be lower or more? 
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The Single European Sky is one of the greatest ideas of the Union. First, it will 
transpose the concept of the internal market to the sky, with some differences. It is a 
fact that the opening of the transport market should have been done earlier, which may 
have prevented Member States from being so protective with their airspace market. 
However, we can only change the future. With the current situation, the SES is the 
most suitable instrument to reduce delays and increase efficiency. The only flaw of the 
regulation is its lack of clarity with regard to liability. The position taken by the 
Commission is understandable but its overly lenient approach is leading to a different 
type of fragmentation within Europe, namely, a risk of bubble effect. Although it 
seems like a minor detail, it is imperative that some changes occur otherwise the first 
accident that happens will lead to catastrophically complicated cases and 
consequences for the taxpayers of the country in which the accident occurs. 
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Annex 1 
 FABEC South 
West 
UK-
Ireland 
 
Danish-
Swedish  
BLUE 
MED 
Baltic FAB CE Danube NEFAB 
Specific 
article for 
liability 
Article 30 Article 27 No  No Article 25  Article 27 No  No  Article 27 
Choice of 
jurisdiction in 
the article   
Yes Article 
30.5 
No   No No Yes Article 
25.5  
Yes Article 
27.4  
No No Yes Article 
27.5  
Choice of law 
in the article  
Yes Article 
30.5 
Yes 
Article 
27.3 
No  No Yes Article 
25.5   
Yes Article 
27.4  
No No Yes Article 
27.5  
Who is 
primarily 
liable  
State of 
occurrence  
State of 
occurrence  
NATS  According 
to 
international 
law 
principle: 
the State of 
occurrence  
State of 
occurrence 
State of 
occurrence 
According 
to 
international 
law 
principle: 
the State of 
occurrence 
According 
to 
international 
law 
principle: 
the State of 
occurrence 
State of 
occurrence 
Cost sharing  Yes the 
State of 
occurrence 
and the 
State of the 
ANSP can 
agree to 
share the 
costs. 
Article 
30.8 
Not stated  Not 
stated 
/  Yes the 
State of 
occurrence 
and the 
State of the 
ANSP can 
agree to 
share the 
costs. 
Article 
25.9 
Yes the 
State of 
occurrence 
and the 
State of the 
ANSP can 
agree to 
share the 
costs. 
Article 
27.6 
/ / Not stated 
Right of 
recourse of the 
State  
Yes 
against 
ANSP  
Article 
30.6 and 
against any 
other 
person or 
operational 
entity, 
Article 
30.9  
Yes 
against 
another 
State and 
ANSP  
Not 
stated 
/ Yes against 
ANSP 
Article 
25.6 and 
against any 
other 
person or 
operational 
entity, 
Article 
25.10 
Yes against 
ANSP 
Article 
27.5 and 
against any 
other 
natural or 
legal 
person, 
Article 
30.7 
/ / Yes against 
another 
State and 
ANSP  
 
Dispute 
concerning the 
reimbursement 
by the ANSP 
to the State  
Arbitration 
with the 
State of the 
ANSP. 
Article 
30.7  
Not stated  Not 
stated 
/ Arbitration 
with the 
State of the 
ANSP. 
Article 
25.8 
Not stated / / Not stated 
Right of 
recourse of the 
ANSP for the 
negligence of 
the State  
Not stated  Not stated  Not 
stated  
/ / Not stated  / / Article 
27.4 
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Last resort 
agreement 
 
Yes Article 
30.3 in 
conjunction 
with  30.4  
Not stated Not 
stated  
/ Yes Article 
25.3 in 
conjunction 
with 25.4 
Yes Article 
27.2 in 
conjunction 
with  27.3  
/ / Not stated 
 
 
